THE NEW POLITICS
OF ISLAM

Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a
World of States

Naveed S. Sheikh

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With the end of the Cold War and the unfolding of unprecedented acts of transnational terror, representing perhaps new civilizational cleavages, Islam has attained renewed prominence in Western political reflections. Too often viewed from ethnocentric or sensationalist perspectives, how is Islam, as a strategic entity, to be understood in contemporary political analysis?

*The New Politics of Islam* is a timely study of Islam in international relations. In detailing both theory and practice, it approaches Islam both as a norm of policy-making and a discourse of policy-presentation. Its primary empirical investigation is centred on the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a unique pan-Islamic international regime consisting of fifty-seven member states. Working from the premise that contemporary Islam cannot be adequately understood without considering classical Islam, this book highlights the normative narrative of classical pan-Islamism and its implications for the foreign policies of contemporary states in the Middle East and South Asia. Its comparative study of the international politics, and national polemics, of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan serves to illustrate the elusive balance between religion and realpolitik. In its theoretical deliberations, *The New Politics of Islam* reconstructs contemporary International Relations theory to facilitate a better understanding of how ideas and identity influence foreign policy in the Islamic world.

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Naveed S. Sheikh
To Mawlana al-Shaykh Muhammad Tahir ul Qadri
and Ustadh Abdal Hakim Murad in whom Providence has
fused exoteric erudition and esoteric altitude:

_Homo non prorie humanus sed superhumanus est._
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The present study owes a debt of gratitude to both individuals and institutions. First and foremost are my parents who both in a self-evident biological sense and a less genetic, and more generic, psychosocial sense have been responsible for my cultivation. In terms of academic blessing, both established authorities and fellow-disciples have proved catalytic, very much since my first encounter with the wizardry of pen and paper. On balance, though, I should be inclined to identify some of the agents by name. Professors Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Timothy Niblock, directors, respectively, of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at the University of Durham and the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, deserve particular mention. All those who have ever taught me the intricacies of international affairs know how exhausting that experience can be. Thus a note of appreciation for their gracious, even graceful, endurance.

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Last, but God knows not least, I thank—with a thousand wishes of bliss—my consort, Kiran Fatima, who allowed this study to intervene in our initial stages together. To critics who disapprove of such anti-social cynicism of supposedly single-minded academic fundamentalists like myself, we shall point to Nour as-Sahr, our new daughter: in earnest, thus, the neglect was not entirely uncompromising. In this book, as in our progeny, any shortcomings (in form or content) will have derived only from myself.
Islam has figured prominently in post-Cold War paradigms of international politics. Given the disappearance of the Communist threat, leading scholars within the discipline of International Relations have described Islam as the “next ideological threat” vis-à-vis the current world order. Indeed, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Nye, R.D. Kaplan, and numerous other scholars have painted a picture of Islam as a “monolithic” and “unified” threat to Western interests. Western media, the policy-making élite, and the general public in many Western countries have, collectively, been swayed by the negative image of Islam as conveyed by theoreticians of international politics.

Other schools of thought, representing a minority viewpoint—John Esposito, Graham Fuller, Ian Lessor, Leon Hadar, and others—believe that the Islamic threat is a “myth,” sustained by certain scholars with vested interests, corrupt and despotic governments in Muslim countries, and a tiny extremist element within the Islamic world. Islam, in their view, is neither “monolithic” nor unified and, therefore, lends itself to multiple interpretations. “Fluidity,” as opposed to “rigidity,” characterizes the multiple phenomena called Islam.

This debate has profound consequences, not only for the West and the Muslim world (which constitutes no less than one-fifth of humanity) but also for the rest of the world. If the confrontationists come to dominate policy-making and the relationship between Islam and the West follows a conflictual path, one is left to visualize an exponential rise in terrorism, bloodshed, entrenchment of despotic regimes, massive human rights violations, and instability within the international system. Alternatively, if an accommodative relationship evolves, both would not only avoid tremendous human, as well as material, costs, but could also significantly help each other in overcoming the uncertainties of this transitional era.
Naveed Sheikh’s study, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States* is an outstanding contribution to the understanding of the many issues involved in the mistaken “Islam vs. the West” debate. He debunks the myth of a unified and monolithic Islam by making an in-depth, empirical analysis of the nature of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), commonly regarded as the primary institutional embodiment of pan-Islamism. Departing from the tradition of descriptive, and largely idealistic, studies of the OIC, he brilliantly analyses the nature of political realism within the OIC, leading both to its formation and sustenance over time. Analysing the policies of the three critical key states—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan—he notes the changing character of their interests and patterns of alignments over time, exposing the discrepancy between national interests and pan-Islamic ideals.

Another merit of this study is that he brings into focus the coexistence and tensions between “national Islam” and “transnational Islam” in the postmodern context. He does not dismiss the latter as merely a legitimizing framework for national interests of the states, but views it rather as a normative international order that may have the potential to destabilize the existing nation-states in the Muslim world. When viewed in this context, the significance of the OIC re-emerges as an arena, rather than an actor, in which multiple interpretations of Islam compete against each other and signify the continuing relevance of pan-Islamism.

Employing insights from the realist, functionalist, and sundry cognitive theoretical frameworks, he makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the OIC and highlights the complexity of the issues involved in understanding the politics of postmodern Islam. I am sure that his study will be read with great interest, both by scholars and policy-makers interested in the politics of the Muslim world.

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As the outcome of a sustained intellectual engagement with Islam in world affairs, the present text is, unlike many sporadic cuts forced by the tragic events in and after September 2001, an attempt not only to undo the semantics of civilizational categories but to think about the thinking and ponder on the praxis of Islamic state actors. The ideational–material dialectic is, like the spirit–matter divide, an assumption that, in multiple ways, guides both the policy making of the practitioner and the policy analysis of the observer. The present study, too, is no objectivist “view from nowhere,” but if it makes its own assumptions explicit, by way of enunciating its research method and narrative, it is only because it seeks to challenge “conventional wisdom” (sometimes a euphemism for societal ignorance).

In seeking a holistic approach to Islam in contemporary foreign policy, I suggest, the analyst must keep in view at least three superstructures, all of which are potentially both subjective (cognitive) and intersubjective (socio-cultural). The first pertains to world order and the very constitutive premises of international relations and the state as its primary unit of analysis. Ideas such as political sovereignty, the typological equality of states, and the nominal inviolability of territorial borders, together with associated action programmes such as national interest and non-interference in domestic affairs, although not entirely endogenous to the intellectual history of pre-politicized Islam, provide one set of cognitive variables which are assumed to be causative in political decision-making and, thus, explanatory in political analysis.

A second superstructure is the exact inverse, viz. Islam’s distinctive political ontology with all of its self-styled iconoclasm and normativity (in contrast to the prevalent positivism in current international relations). From such a belief-system springs a certain
teleology of political meaning and virtue, for in addition to organizing perception into a meaningful guide for behaviour, any belief-system has the function of establishing policy goals and ordering political preference. Indeed, a cogent belief-system may well affirm otherwise obscure political objectives and legitimate vehicles and visions of the exercise of power as an expression of, say, the ascent of religiosity (an anthropocentric narrative) or the hidden hand of God (a theocentric configuration).

Finally, the third superstructure entails an institutionalized fusion of these two realms of political cognition in the form of international organization, particularly the entity called the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which emerged at the historical moment when Islamic internationalism met the imperatives of a world order purely synonymous with the state-system. As analysts we, consequently, have three levels, and three logics, of investigation: A state-based world order with its immanent inner logic and operative principles, a pan-Islamic world order with transcendental heuristics, and the regime of the OIC at their interface. The present work deals with the antecedents, contours, and contradictions of this constellation. But before we seek to construct, de-construct, and re-construct our understanding of Islam as an interstate resource, let us review the stakes in the debate.

SCHOLARSHIP & STATESMANSHP:
A MILITARY—ACADEMIC COMPLEX

The increased saliency of culture and religion within the disciplinary boundaries of International Relations (IR) is a product of transformations in both the material and ideational milieux, inside and outside the wondrous world of the academe. The metamorphosis in international political geography triggered by the demise of the Soviet Union and the adjacent rise of new dangers, largely as a policy of determined threat procurement from military and political quarters deprived of credible foes, has provided one causal influence to move beyond the bicentric strategic symmetry and thus turned the watchful eye, and much nuclear targeting, away from Moscow and toward a non-suspecting B-team (e.g. Beijing, Baghdad, and Belgrade) or other defiant genies in the big bottle called the international community.

Innovative interpretative and epistemic élites, particularly west of the Atlantic, have rationalized this convenient, albeit largely imaginary, horizontal proliferation of new threats by reference to
the irrational, and therefore insistently parasuicidal, political or strategic assertion of those aggressive states—honorifically labelled “renegades” or “rogue states”—that by their very psychic, doctrinal or cultural makeup find themselves under the irresistible compulsion to transgress the codex of the established international order, citing questions of its validity or expediency. Thus came “Islam”—a somewhat fuzzy, but none the less feasible, new contender in that ordered cosmos of an international system exorcized of its Communist ghoul—to be a prominent feature in political statements, popular imagery, and academic textbooks in the less-than-wild West. This holds true, in particular, for the Far West (also known as North America) notwithstanding the fact that it has historically shared no geographical boundaries with that perilous phenomenon described as Islam.

But the mere availability of the starring role—as undisputed villain—is not enough to propel Islam to the centre-stage; historical narratives (i.e. the selective enumeration and current interpretation of events past) as well as at once trans-temporal axioms and belaboured mythology (as the set benevolence of “America” as polity and ideal and the corresponding malevolence of anti-American forces/ideas) are involved. So, too, is the tectonic shift in the paradigmatic and interparadigmatic assumptions of theoretical inquiries within the discipline of IR, which have, cumulatively, expanded the realm of legitimate, or only required, analysis.

Where IR-scholars and practitioners could earlier subscribe wholesale to the founding dicta, indeed guiding imperatives, of realpolitik so as to shape and sustain a Cartesian divide between the moral and the material (insofar as the latter itself contained an eternally self-validating inner logic), recent reappraisals remain ever more sceptical to the extent that many present-day analysts are professedly positivist-by-default or, more daringly, post-positivists. Any postulation to the effect that the sociological, anthropological, psychological, and theological arenas penetrate international politics can no longer be met with dismissal, disdain or uncontrolled laughter—at least not outside a shrinking circle of empiricists. Although culture and religion, as nebulous concepts, represent “everything that good, positivistically trained international relations specialists should hate,” the global resurgence of primordial idioms in the discursive space of dispersion has forced a reconceptualization of the ontological domain.

As such, Western IR-theory has come full circle: Its disengagement with matters of the Geist, the domain of the intangibles and therefore
analytically untouchables, had prompted the development of a sterile, albeit self-proclaimedly rational, iconography of international affairs, thereby stripping the humanness (i.e. sentient, reflective, and emotive rudiments) from what became social and political animals. Epitomized in the embarrassingly unforetold collapse of Communism, the explanatory or indeed predictive value of such a mechanical mindset was exposed as entirely myopic, notwithstanding its indiscriminating import of natural science lenses and lexes. Predictably, therefore, the new political theology emerging from the pulpits of academic high priests (mostly professorial chairs) is, continuously, searching for a new divinity, a new scripture, a new sacrament, and a new law for the living. As ontological-epistemological orthodoxy gives way to an eclectic, and possibly celebrated, heterodoxy, religion re-enters the sphere of academic interest, beyond that of the just-rehearsed metaphor.

Given that the selfhood of the West to a large measure is based on civic theology—as “a secular church”—it should occasion little surprise that Otherness now, once again, is sought to be defined in religio-political terms. If truth be told, there is hardly a more pervasive political dogmatism in place on the face of our common globe than that springing from American political cosmology, a cosmology that stratifies states in a hierarchy, the horizontal rubrics of which range from the demons (revisionist states) to the divines (liberal-democratic allies and clients), as per their ideological proximity vis-à-vis the American ideal. And, as betrayed by the various manifestations of international conflict or cooperation in which the United States has embroiled itself, this “nation under God” will deal with a given state accordingly in matters of peace and war. At the same time, the “exceptionalist” ingredient in American political cosmology ascribes to Washington the status of the epicentre of the political cosmos—the United States is not only separate from but also superior to any other national or ideational allegiance, such segregation-cum-elevation being typified in the archetypal “City upon a Hill” metaphor. Closer to the divine ambit than any other state or institution (not excluding the United Nations), the United States is charged, by divine grace, with the ever-expanding mission of the political salvation of humankind, a mission only accomplished by political redemption in the form of the liturgical praise of and practical submission to Pax Americana (polity-wise or policy-wise) by states outside the Judaeo-Christian realm; or, if they should so prefer, damnation in the form of cultural retreat or military defeat. Recall Afghanistan, anno 2001.
But this work is about Islam; the point therefore comes to this: The prominence of Islam in contemporary IR-discourse, perhaps, says more about the Western side of the perceptual equation than the subject under scrutiny. According to Thierry Hentsch (1992), the cultural and religious Other has, as self-referential and therefore self-revealing myths and projections of Western insecurities about its own selfhood, always been an “immense repository of our own imagined world.” Little surprise, therefore, that in a bewildering variety of media—electronic, printed and floating in cyberspace that which is both—Western audiences are enlightened by Western pundits about the unholy onslaught of the Orient against a reified Western modernity, a modernity which paradoxically found its genesis in Europe’s encounter with, and enrichment from, the Muslim world. Indeed, while the medieval West had earlier fancied to refer euphemistically to the Saracens as “heathens,” it nevertheless did not shy away from emulating much of their science and philosophy, art and architecture, literature and symbolism, as well as some of their salient institutions (such as universities and public libraries) and practices (not least personal hygiene and, say, the cultivation of private gardens). Dante would subscribe to the architecture of the Islamic spiritual universe in The Divine Comedy, that most Christian of poems, and once a year Roger Bacon would don the Arab dress at Oxford when lecturing on Islamic illuminationist doctrines. In its multiple facets as faith and community, polity and society, civilization and philosophy, Islam provides us, as any enduring legacy, with a mixed archaeology.

At this juncture both classicist Hellenists and less-than-classic Foucauldians would surely insist that history remains a conveniently contingent science; as historiographers of all colours and stripes can vouch for, “doing history” is the preserve, and privilege, not of she who simply yields the pen (or the PC) but he who yields the power to define and disseminate the logos. An all-pervasive “anti-Muslimism” could thus take shape with the Renaissance, which deplored its own past as much as the Muslim present. With time, and the Age of (European) Enlightenment, emerged racialist pseudo-science, such as eugenicist explanations of (or justifications for) racial superiority and, by strategic extension, colonization and genocide. Thence also, within a situational ethic of imperial dominance, arose “Orientalism,” less as a paradigm of rigorous philological or anthropological scholarship than a contrived narrative of the supposed superiority of the Occidental Self over the Oriental Other.
Empiricist epistemology, where truth (or simply good) is determined in the free interplay of opinion, was never part of the Orientalist agenda in any of its different morphological guises, whether auxiliary to projects such as “White Man’s Burden,” “Manifest Destiny,” or “mission civilisatrice.” Alien peoples—habitually conquered, subjugated, or otherwise pacified—were conceived from a distance and, often curiously, evaluated on the basis of presumed deficiencies according to distilled Western (or White) ideals, rarely to be understood empathetically on the basis of indigenous norms. Certainly, the cross-cultural encounter precipitated by the expansion of colonial holdings was bound to become an unequal dialectic, for the preponderant party heralded two, and only two, principles: (a) Might is right, (b) White is right.

Intellectualized, however, the Orientalist architecture continuously revolved around a binary polarity, an oppositional constellation in which one side’s instrumental rationality, enduring enlightenment, and perpetual progress was—and is—not only counterpoised to the other’s naturalized irrationality, inherent ignorance, and hence inescapable stagnation, but very much defined by its recourse to Otherness. The Other was not simply “Another” but the very “Alter.” Put differently, the Orient was not only creatively constructed as the alien Other—that is to say, the Orient was “orientalized” as Edward Said (1978, 1998) has noted—but the Occident itself was positioned, and privileged, by the deductive discourse about the Orient: By the orientalization of the Orient, the Occident itself was occidentalized. In cross-civilizational assessments of the fallen fortunes of the Muslims, the output differential came to be explained by the input differential, an analytical manoeuvre whereby Islam, as the independent variable, could conveniently be advanced as explanatory category and thus diagnosed as causal predicament. Although observers, particularly those with a disciplinary background in anthropology (albeit not simply those subscribing to ethnomethodology), insisted on the impossibility of identifying “Islam” as a variable, let alone independent variable, in social intercourse, Orientalist paradigms allowed a representation of normative belief-systems, if highly selective, to generate, and therefore explain, behaviour. While later intramural methods in the social sciences denied the pertinence of the Islamic referent altogether, Orientalism, in reifying (or mummifying) Islam, was responsible for the denial of cross-cultural constants and thus the loss of intersubjective insight. Both privileged the synchronic over the diachronic.
Whatever its temporal designation, we find in Orientalism an uncommon combination: A scholarly paradigm suitable for mass-consumption. The market forces, with and without marketing forces, together with the popular logistics of the supply-push and demand-pull assured its energization from the Reconquista and Inquisition to the age of globalized news cartels. Drawing on a-/historical and ethnocentric catalogues of stereotypes, symbols, foremeanings and fears, the grand narrative could follow a linear, and subsuming, dissemination through history. Sustained, as Norman Daniel (1993) has argued, by the twin dynamics of ignorance and religio-cultural antipathy, if not purposeful malice, anti-didactic “[n]onsense was accepted, and sound sense was distorted” in an elusive quest for the essence, indeed quintessence, of that enigmatic faith called Islam.¹⁴ Not that this was a distortion belonging to eras bygone: Unlike comparable religious rubrics, Islam, as that lone ideological contender to West-centric modernity, poses not as a protagonist committed to parochial idiosyncrasy but as a rival claim to universality. By assertory Islam, the West, pre- or post-modern, is displaced to the deuced periphery; the latter is thus denied its privileged position as universal epicentre and, by implication, negated as a norm for general emulation. (It should here be pertinent to recall why the West, albeit cosmologically its own causal centre, came to be relegated to the geographic designation of the “west”; namely the historical fact that Europe and later its cultural offspring in the Americas were situated west of the Islamic caliphate. The very designation of “the West,” thus, was derived from an Islamic preoccupation.)

Nor does the contemporary global resurgence of Islamic idioms allow for a devaluation of Islam’s international role. Amplified not least by a dramatic demographic surge, Islam becomes a global contender that cuts across national boundaries, albeit in fragmented local guises (what creative commentators refer to as a “glocal” socialization, for globalism becomes both manifested in and modified by local forms).¹⁵ As Edward Said (1997) has observed, Islam’s news value, albeit unflattering, appears undisputed:

For the general public in America and Europe today, Islam is “news” of a particularly unpleasant sort. The media, the government, the geopolitical strategists, and—although they are marginal to the culture at large—the academic experts on Islam are all in concert: Islam is a threat to Western civilization.¹⁶
Reflexively rather than reflectively, Islam unleashes mixed feelings, ranging from curiosity to hostility and agony, and rekindles rather unsavoury memories about the Muslim military assaults on the soft underbelly of medieval Europe. With a longer pedigree than the woes of the 2001 aftersummer, Islamophobic metanarratives have been a constant part of Western intellectual discourse. Thus, even before the Soviet Union had dismantled itself, such narratives could be rediscovered as immensely saleable “winners”—and sometimes breadwinners. Indeed, the call-to-arms imprint was unmistakable already in a widely influential article by Bernard Lewis (1990), originating as the prestigious Jefferson Lecture, the highest honour accorded by the US government for scholarly achievement in the humanities. Scholastic credentials notwithstanding, we find here an exploration, and explanation, of an alleged global resuscitation of Islamic confrontationism by reference to the generic, or perhaps genetic, aberrance of the “Muslim” psyche. Alerting to the psychopathology of the violent Other in all-but-unwholesome formulations, the diagnosis is disturbing:

Today much of the Muslim world is again seized by an intense—and violent—resentment of the West. . . . Why? . . . It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.

Devoid of scholarly rumination and temperance, the analysis insists that for Muslims, and Muslims alone, it remains wholly “natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy and should draw its strength from ancient beliefs and loyalties.” Thus, we are enlightened, the Muslim rage is nothing short of the age-old Muslim craze: Their fundamental acceptance of, and sometimes promotion of, other-worldly culture in a this-worldly realm render adherents to Muhammad’s faith incapable of dealing unsentimentally with political affairs. Such polemic, addressed in a perfunctory manner, which leaves more unexplained than illumined, mirrors the exact Orientalist fallacy that historical Islam coincides,
neatly, with doctrinal Islam—which is to say that Islamic *praxis* (understood, in the light of its Greek etymology, neither as theory or practice but as the exact interface of thought and action) in a given situational setting can be extrapolated from its first principles of dogma or belief, a form of ideational determinism. As Mecca can replace Moscow *qua* the centre of ideological subversion and military expansion, the cosmic battle, part II, can begin, even as observers have difficulty in discerning cause from effect.

Fred Halliday (1996), among many others, has sought to critique the shaky neo-Orientalist foundations of present-day political analysis exactly by reference to such reflexive determinism. “The presupposition upon which much discussion of the question rests,” he rightly complains, “is that there exists one, unified and clear, tradition to which contemporary believers and political forces may relate,” and which comes to condition both intellectual history and international policy. In not specifying the *antecedents* of the Islamist resurgence—“political suffocation, economic marginalization, and a growing sense of hurt” together with a failure of alternative models to produce either democracy or development—nor its *aim*—“to rectify stratification and underdevelopment” by restoring religio-political authenticity—a grand narrative of the atavistic backlash of Islam is perpetuated. The parameters are set such that Muslim grievances cannot be broken down to their constituent components, for that would assume external causality and internal rationality (and, perhaps, plausible legitimacy); they must rather be discussed as a collective psychosis. Islam becomes the fool’s paradise, and hell for the rest.

By the same token, in a special issue in *Orbis* dedicated to religion in world affairs, the editorial inclination of this nominally respectable journal of world politics prescribes a rather different methodology when dealing with Islam as opposed to other religious traditions, such as Judaism, different Christian denominations and, granted the eclectic mould, Confucianism. “The ultimate aim of the Islamic faith,” we are instructed, “is clearly hegemonic on a global scale.” True to established Orientalist conventions, the accent in this supposedly learned exposition remains on advocating the, largely mythic, theme of “the centrality of war” in the Muslim mind, whereby war, holy or unholy (“essentially offensive and hegemonic”), becomes established in the narrative as a “principled and normative mode of conducting international relations” for polygamous Islamic males.

Should Islamists, against all odds, suddenly turn democratic, we are cautioned, the West must be wary: Lo, they could actually...
win elections! That the author operates under the assumption that “radical Islam does not believe in democracy” notwithstanding (which, of course, is difficult to reconcile with the warning that they might be taking the parliamentary route to power), the policy prescription comes to be exactly that: The West must not believe in the global distribution of democracy, for democracy comes to breed Islamism; Muslim territories must not turn representative for here “democratization equals chaos, violence, and civil war.” Rather “economic liberalization without political democratization” (which is to say, in home-grown American lingo, taxation without representation) remains the sensible course of action. We are not far behind John Stuart Mill’s assertion, noted so nonchalantly in Considerations on Representative Government (1861), that political participation was inapplicable for the lesser races and must therefore be proffered selectively by men (and presumably women) of reason. Thus spoke the great liberalist. A century and a half later, when respectable academicians and syndicated journalists can write with alarmism and hyperbole about a “global intifada” and warn, without wit and satire, that “the Muslims are coming,” a monolithic Islam comes to be party to old conspiracies and new Cominterns. Inexorably so, a Western iron fist becomes an appropriate answer to such “religious Stalinism.”

Fortunately, Leon Hadar (1992), former United Nations bureau chief for The Jerusalem Post and one among the few temperate voices in security analysis, has provided a health warning: “There are dangerous signs that the process of creating a monolithic threat out of isolated events and trends in the Moslem world is already beginning.” According to Amos Perlmutter (1992) writing in The Washington Post, however, there is little room for nuances or niceties, so the desensitized, denunciatory harangue can be absolute: “Islamic fundamentalism is an aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and the Nazi movements of the past.” Indeed, being “authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular” in a way that cannot be reconciled with any “Christian–secular universe” (the interminable ideal-type), it must, at all cost, be “stifled at birth” by timely Western intervention.

The ensuing tragedy in Algeria, though it has occasioned few tears north of Algiers, owes much to such a contemptuous mindset, which has only reinforced the perception of violence as the only credible political instrument for unswerving, but disenfranchised, Islamists. Yet the abortion of elections, suspension of democracy, and militant repression of political opposition remained the exact policy of
preference in Algeria in January 1992, just as the Islamists seemed bound for electoral victory. With the trans-Atlantic West’s all-too-willing rescheduling of national debt and the provision of agricultural credits, an initial conspiracy of silence turned to active collusion. In the process, a Marxian military junta that had raped the ever-so-desirous goddess of liberty was visibly augmented, notwithstanding the Wilsonian new-worldism with which President Bush, Sr. had promised the global distribution of free-market economy and free-for-all democracy. Hence, the logic seemed to be, better kill the bride than let her run off with someone else. But the barbarians are rarely seen in the mirror.

Unsurprisingly, the belligerent and bloody terror attacks on American financial and military icons in September 2001 accelerated anti-Islamic sentiments. The popular media, led by the glossy and creatively illustrated pages of *Newsweek* and *Time*, keenly recycled Bernard Lewis’ psycho-pathological analysis, discounting other causal or explanatory themes (see e.g. the 15/10/01 issues of both magazines). East of the Atlantic, however, the prize must go to the defence editor in *The Daily Telegraph*, Sir John Keegan. In an uncanny reflection on the US counter-terror campaign in Afghanistan, he defined the stakes in the conflict thus, “This war belongs within the much larger spectrum of a far older conflict between settled, creative, productive Westerners and predatory, destructive Orientals.” Accordingly, the rules of engagement were to be premised on the military psychology of the “Orientals,” such that a “harsh, instantaneous attack” would likely “impress the Islamic mind” given that “Orientals [in contract to Western ‘rules of honour’] shrink from pitched battle. . . preferring ambush, surprise, treachery and deceit.” If someone thought this characterization seemed to “stereotype Islam in its military manifestation” they were, Keegan could assure, plain wrong: “It is no good pretending that the peoples of the desert and the empty spaces exist on the same level of civilisation as those who farm and manufacture. They do not.” And not to worry, as the headline promised, “In this war of civilisations, the West will prevail.”

But perhaps this is all rather incongruous. Since the end of the bipolar existential struggle, it is Muslims, among all religious groups, who have faced an increasingly intensifying life-and-death struggle. Rather than the threat of Islam to the West, the threat to Islam by the West (and the rest) has been witnessed in the most merciless forms: mass-liquidations, mass-deportation, mass-torture, and mass-rape. To the Islamic world, the bipolar Cold War was never “cold,”
because conflict and violent confrontation in the Middle East, West Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia remained a poignant, and poisoning, feature of Muslim history after the Second World War (another ethnocentric designation which equates Western history with universal experience). But in the last decade of the twentieth century, judging from the devaluation of human life, Muslim blood was exceptionally low-priced: Thousands were slain in Burma, Kurdistan, Malaysia, and Palestine; tens of thousands were killed in the cases of Chechnya, Kashmir, and Kosovo; hundred of thousands were killed in Algeria, Bosnia, and Rwanda, and in Iraq the number vastly exceeded the unceremonious 1,000,000 mark. But these exact examples also reveal that the West, no longer synonymous with blue eyes and blond hair, has become both a political category, however diffuse, and, paradoxically, a cogent geo-strategic block, which safeguards the interests and aspirations of that political category. If Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) could advocate a “categorical imperative” as universalism backed by ethics, the current deontological imperative remains reminiscent of universalism backed by militancy. “Give me liberty or give me death,” the age-old libertarian liturgy becomes less a supplication of the protagonist than an ultimatum to the antagonist. Welcome to the New World Order.

The military and industrial paramountcy of the West readily secures that the Islamic threat remains entirely theological (when emanating from the mindful) or flatly rhetorical (when from the mindless). Little can Islam scheme, let alone execute, a battle with the very Western powers that exercise effective suzerainty over it, with the most vital natural and economic resources almost entirely controlled by foreign governments and corporations. Sayyed Hossein Nasr (1996) is, as ever, instructive:

It is in light of this whole lack of parallelism and complete inequality on the material plane, in which the West dictates, more or less, the agendas of the Islamic countries and judges them only on the basis of the extent to which they accept passing Western norms, now called euphemistically, “global,” that the present relation between Islam and the West must be viewed. 29

To view a contingent standoff with any haughtily Islamic non-West as a new cold war, therefore, remains sightless to the disproportionality of the material and military equations: Will impoverished anti-West antagonists seek to counter intercontinental missiles and state-of-
the-art delivery vehicles, conventional or mass-destructive, with a pious appeal to heaven?

That is not to say, of course, that material asymmetry instantaneously translates into a power differential; nay, only so when coupled with dysfunctional institutions and decrepit ideologies. In other words, power as a social attribution (of extrapolated or anticipated outcome in a situation of conflict) has little to do with material volume and everything to do with the battle of wills. But even here, and thanks largely to the premeditated penetration of Western secular education in the élitarian Islamic non-West, no Cold War II seems at hand.

To the extent that it has emerged in Muslim societies, Islamic “fundamentalism” remains, in a plethora of manifestations, an outgrowth of perceived weakness—much concerned with internal regeneration and little with foreign penetration. As the seasoned observer Fred Halliday (2000) has remarked, “The Islamic revival concerns, above all, the Muslim world itself.” Be that as it may, few Islamic thinkers would wish to discriminate between internal symptoms and, supposedly, external causes. When aetiologized, Muslim melancholy ties together, casually but causally, the globalization of the West and the marginalization of Islam.

A number of questions seem to arise from this linkage: Do the increasing intensity and ever-expanding ramifications of Muslim calamities in the post-Soviet period suggest a Kafkaesque alienation or anxiety on the part of Muslim nations? Are any common lessons being drawn from the new religio-political ABC (if you like: A for Afghanistan, B for Bosnia, and C for Chechnya, etc.)? Or is the present configuration of confessional internationalism entirely appropriative vis-à-vis a secular map and mind? Does the praxis of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the “Muslim United Nations,” offer any experimental lessons as to whether Islam, as a cultural and geo-strategic entity, is at all a single civilizational corpus? Having set the scene by describing the subtext of the global dislocation and breakdown of Islam, as a religious and political category, let me complete the picture by introducing the context in which the redemptive redefinition and build-up of global Islamdom has occurred.

WHERE FROM HERE? THE IDEATIONAL IDIOSYNCRASY OF THE OIC

The advent of the post-colonial era implied not only a territorial re-definition of the world of states, but equally a redistribution of power
between the retired empires and the new players in the age-old game of gain-search and interest-pursuit. Given the anarchical cosmos that is the international order, prudential statecraft imposed on the political actors an anatomized structure of autarky and, by correlation, a predictable behaviour of self-reliance and self-help. Yet, at times, the dictates of rationality (ergo cost-minimization and benefit-optimization) urged the collegiate action of states, unfolding within a spectrum from ecology, to economy, to security.

Thus emerged intergovernmental organizations, defined as an institutional ramification of regular political intercourse among sovereign states or, alternatively, as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” Arguably, international organizations came about neither for matters of benign altruism nor as the incarnations of cosmopolitan transcendentalism but, quintessentially, for the promotion of interest via the balance of interest or, more specifically, the promotion of self-interest via the balance of collective interest. Yet less material–mundane incentives for transnational dialectics may not rightfully be dismissed as a rehearsal of past anachronisms.

True, the days of the Holy Roman Empire seem to be have departed, but it does not follow that Westphalian logic—that of the primacy of the state as a source of collective identity and security—meets no resistance. If the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War and became the “founding act” of “the modern system of nation-states,” sought to strip certain issues from the agenda of international affairs—as a form of conflict-contraction but therefore also dialogue-inhibition—the reification of territoriality could suppress neither ethnographic/psycho-historical taxonomy nor cultural conflict. Culture, it is understood from its etymological siblings, remained political exactly because of its twin functions as social cult (culture < cult) and, within the innermost psyche of the individual, human cultivation (culture < cultivation). In the cosmos of international anarchy, global geopolitics, understood simply as the politics of space, therefore remained both a politics of ability and, notably, a politics of identity.

In time, though, the celebrated invective, “Silete theologi in munere alieno!” (“Let theologians observe silence in matters outside their province”) could lead to the adoption of that “Mortal God,” the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), to which the geo-stratified (and therefore geo-politicized) subject owed his peace and security. A relapse into the politics of theology, thenceforth, would
break the boundaries of the newfound theology of politics. With the ascent of the principle that to each ruler his religion ("Cuius regio eius religio"), the Westphalian template sealed the sacral from both national and international entanglement in matters mundane and, ultimately, began a secularization of international diplomacy (and also a secularization of modes of subversion and subjugation). That sub- or trans-state voices could or would, via cooption or infiltration, interfere with the de-sacral resolve of officialdom was not considered; nor was the applicability of the Westphalian norm to regions with different historical and religious referents. International relations, as a theoretical discipline and a practical pursuit, thus came to have no articulation for the perpetuation and persistence of religion in the international arena. As with Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), political science had prognosticated God to remain dead and had clearly heard nothing of asphyxia. But, in any case, Nietzsche had always been talking of the Christian God as in his dictum “Christianity, alcohol; the two great means of corruption,” but was hardly ever Islamophobic: “War to the knife against Rome! Peace and friendship with Islam!” While faith and force to Nietzsche was a question of personal (im)morality, their interpositionality, however, was to become a geo-strategic issue once again with the passing of time. The scene, thus, was set for “la revanche de Dieu”—the empire would strike back, but from its eastern frontier.

Certainly, with the implosion of the Cold-War order and the incarnation of a new world (dis-)order, the significance of Islam in foreign policy has oscillated in academic constructs from historicist eschatology (the “End-of-History” creed) to inter-cultural gloom (the “Clash-of-Civilizations” cult). As already discussed, Islam, somehow understood as a strategic entity/quality, is often invoked in policy debates as an obscure geopolitical variable, thus vindicating its importance in the new strategic equation. Yet the exact ontological constellation of Islam-as-strategy lacks both descriptive rigour and prescriptive clarity and therefore displays little analytical purchase. At the same time, however, a wholesale dismissal of the new interest in Islam solely as a conscious/subconscious policy of threat inflation, a post-Communist trauma of dedicated cold warriors robbed of their self-vindicating Other, will be fiercely resisted, not least by observers internal to the Islamic tradition. Islam’s jurisdiction over social, rather than exclusively spiritual, activities provides a prism alien to many comparable religious belief-systems, for with the dual jurisdiction Islam, aiming both at socio-political order and personal piety, becomes as much a political project as a religious community.
Such primordial transnationalism could, of course, be dismissed purely as a semantic structure—had it not been institutionalized as a political structure in the contemporary international order. Indeed, the OIC, a notoriously under-researched international regime, emerges with definitive/definatory import as a political embodiment of pronounced, if pretentious, religious internationalism. Indeed, as an intergovernmental organization, the idiosyncrasy of the OIC is categorical, for whilst adhering to the secular logic of multistate functionalism, its ideological source is reflected solely in terms of a religious attribute, that of Islam, and its purpose is guided by a single imperative, that of pan-Islamism. By pan-Islamism I mean the ideational subscription to a unification, or integration, of Muslim peoples, regardless of divisive antecedents such as language, ethnicity, geography and polity. Still, even in the panist category pan-Islam becomes peculiar, for pan-ideologies are often based exactly on geography (e.g. pan-Americanism, pan-Europeanism, pan-Turanism) or ethnicity (pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, pan-Africanism).37 Both pan-Islamism and the OIC are thus, in their respective (ideational, institutional) categories, *sui generis*.

Surely, as a political, economic, and cultural conglomeration of Muslim states spread over four continents, the OIC cannot with due credibility be regarded as a *regional* organization; yet, given its incapacity to attract members without prejudice (and thus transcend placement in the ideological landscape), it cannot be deemed a *universal* association of states either. That the fifty-seven constitutionally Muslim, but not constitutionally Islamic, member states that comprise the OIC have vastly differing political and social structures and vary greatly in population, size, economic status and, to add, geopolitical culture, exposes its *raison d’être* as solely religious—ideological, rather than secular—functional.38

In proposing, once again, the synonymity of religious affiliation and international allegiance, the OIC seems to challenge the underlying norms of modern statecraft. If that unfashionable Western imperialist Lord [Evelyn Baring] Cromer (1841–1917), not without a certain religious chauvinism, could insist in his prognostication that Islam’s “gradual decay cannot be arrested by any modern palliatives however skilfully they are applied,” Islam’s continued vibrancy and global resurgence betoken a reappraisal of the modernizing trajectory.39 Indeed, to much modernization theory, especially that of Whiggish tendency, the national model represents the pinnacle of societal self-realization and all else is either aberration, deception or, worse, treason. If the OIC seems an
ideational misfit in a homogenizing world of nation-states, Bernard Lewis (1998) can, as always, assure that with Muslims both ideas and action demur to the established parameters of rational national behaviour:

The very idea of . . . a grouping, based on religious identity, might seem to many modern Western observers absurd or even comic. But it is neither absurd nor comic in relation to Islam. Some fifty-six [now fifty-seven] Muslim governments, including monarchies and republics, conservatives and revolutionaries, practitioners of capitalism and disciples of various kinds of socialism, friends and enemies of the United States, and exponents of a whole spectrum of shades of neutrality, have built up an elaborate apparatus.40

Hence, it is not only the qualitative distinction that renders the OIC uniquely paradigmatic; so too do its quantitative parameters—a combined population of 1.3 billion (exceeding the combined citizenry of Europe, Russia, and North America) and a pooled territory extending over 32 million square kilometres (approximating a quarter of the planetary landmass).

The present study represents an attempt to unveil both the inner logic and the outer operational principles of the OIC, both from the viewpoint of conceptualization (whether as la voix de Dieu or raison d’état) and praxeology (as the study of real-worldly preference and behaviour). Whilst most monographs and surveys relating to the OIC and the Muslim world remain essentially of a descriptive nature, carefully avoiding “any hypothetical assertions” and “generalized theoretical constructs,”41 my leitmotif, on the other hand, has been exactly that, viz. conceptual linkages, discursive turns, and geopolitical stimuli. To be sure, the ornamented unitarian analysis (the assumptions of which come to necessitate an anthropomorphization of the OIC body politic) has, in my opinion, been the constant analytical category mistake by observers seeking to infuse a largely illusory harmony in the political games of states that carry an Islamized self-reference. In the final instance, such analytical naïveté is of little, if any, heuristic value and must retreat when challenged with the intuitive, but potentially purging, question about the extent to which it contributes to the understanding of the dynamics (in action, reaction, and inaction) of this international regime. Thus to break the analytical tautology, I have thought it vital to depart from the single-actor construction by seeking to anatomize the OIC into a
forum that reflects the interests and the agendas of leading member states. Yet, as the foundational premise of the OIC is its transcendental intersubjectivity in the form of an Islamic cosmopolis, the application of the unrefined rational-actor model, too, must be eschewed. It is this exact interplay—that of rationale and discourse, of interest and legitimacy, of state-centrism and pan-Islamic self-identity—that we set out to explore.

In aspiring to offer a holistic inquiry into Islamic internationalism, the present work analyses (a) the political theory of pan-Islam, (b) the political geography of pan-Islam, and (c) the political sociology of pan-Islam. I have, admittedly, adopted a non-linear division of the present study into three parts, each approaching the subject-matter in a new light. Composition-wise, empirical analysis is sandwiched by, an equal dose of, theoretical deliberation. The initial chapter will commence with an outline of the ideational and historical contexts in which the OIC emerged and highlight the synthesis of national interest and transcendental imperatives that enabled its inception. Via a theoretical discussion of its central tenet (viz. the pan-Islamic episteme) and its charter (espousing étatism), I shall seek to establish the very illusory, or deceptive, self-presentation of the OIC as an incarnation of global Islam. The following chapter, which amounts to the policy-analytical crux of the exposition, will seek to disentangle the myth of monolithism by analysing key players’ manipulation of the OIC machinery in pursuit of self-defined self-interest. The final chapter, in turn, will depart from the geopolitical scrutiny and engage in high-theoretical wrestling in relation to the paradigmatic and methodological debates surrounding religious self-identity in foreign policy, thus moderating both realism-on-the-rocks, as it were, and ontological fatalism.

As such, the study is based on a tripartite structure, which first seeks to construct the Islamic narrative, derived from classical theological and jurisprudential treatises modified plus reapplied in the course of modern history. It then seeks to deconstruct the conceptual paradigm emerging from classical intellectual history by reference to true-life state policy. Yet, the study disallows a collapse into the recycling of an interest/power-fixated script in which Islam is little more than a tool of post hoc rationalization or justification and instead reconstructs the IR-discipline by recourse to a sociological understanding of foreign policy that integrates soft and hard factors (i.e. ideational and material forces). With this construction–deconstruction–reconstruction organization of the material, it is hoped that the text becomes a three-in-one: It investigates religious
philosophy plus practical policy plus social theory, the three of which are usually dealt with as separate, or sealed, inquiries.

As illustrated in the preliminary discussion, I have assumed some insight on the part of the reader both in IR-terminology and the history and vocabulary of the Islamic world. Thus both the narrative and definatory claims have been minimized in order to allow analysis to carpet the spatiotemporal limitations. Departing from established method, I have declared no allegiance to any of the prevailing research paradigms of IR, and the eclectic methodology applied in the different chapters mirrors that exact (anarchical) preference. The conclusion, however, will seek to synthesize theory and praxis by reconsidering the linkage between material power-games and metaphysical language-games in relation to pan-Islamism and the OIC.

The present study was initiated as an attempt, however modest, to fill a gap in the existing literature. In bridging the gap, one must, as one is incessantly reminded in the London underground, mind the gap. Consequently, it was with the realization of the difficulties and disadvantages of working on a subject-area in which no pioneering study is available that my venture to disaggregate, and then reassemble, established narratives emerged. Needless to say, therefore, most of my calculations and the end-result, too, may occasion controversy, and—as a repeated note of assurance—this remains the very purpose of the exercise.
The opening part of the present chapter will operate on two levels. It shall, as a credulous point of departure, seek to analyse the conceptual foundation of the OIC, namely the pan-Islamic body of believers. Tracing the conceptual genesis of the OIC in Islamic intellectual history, we shall seek to explore those themes of the Islamic theory of intercommunal relations (al-siyar) that allegedly sustain the OIC body politic. Establishing thus the discursive matrix of the OIC, we shall attempt to evaluate the extent to which the OIC can rightfully claim the lofty title of a pan-Islamic project. To this end, we shall turn, first, to a critical assessment of the historical milieu in which the OIC emerged and, second, to a critical re-appraisal of the Charter of the Islamic Conference.

**THE TRANS-ISLAMIC “UMMA”: POLITICAL TAXONOMY AND EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY**

“And hold fast, all together, unto the bond with God, and do not draw apart from one another,” is the Qur’anic imperative (or aspiration) incorporated in the emblem of the OIC. As an expression of its organic submission to the (pan-)Islamic dictum which transcends ethnic, racial and geographical antecedents, the OIC thus appeals to one of the oldest forms of identification, namely that of the pre-modern, and perhaps primordial, religious community. Indeed, the unitary community of Islam provides an idiosyncratic corporate identity evolving around submission to the Islamic code of law (shari’a) and the religio-political leadership (qiyaṣda), whether expressed in Prophethood or in caliphal succession. The Mecca Declaration of the OIC (1981) details this very theme:
All Muslims, differing though they may be in their language, color, domicile, or other conditions, form but one single nation, bound together by their common faith, moving in a single direction, drawing on one common cultural heritage, assuming one mission throughout the world.³

If the pan-Arabists had espoused both “unity of rank” and “unity of purpose,” the pan-Islamists present no less than an almost mystical doctrine of monism, approximating a political translation of the Sufi master Ibn Arabi’s (d. 1240) mystical vision known as wahdat al-wujūd, “unity of being.” But the conceptual pedigree is, of course, more entrenched in early Islam and its doctrinal self-exposition. Since the very first political manifestation of Islam in the form of the Medinan state, the precept of primordial divine unicity (tawḥīd) has been reflected both in a singularity of doctrine (‘aqīda) and in the externalization of this monism into the experimental world by a communitarian construction of the flock of the faithful (umma). Islam thus becomes operationalized in a human community rather than in an abstract body of creed, while the contingent unity of humankind, as the creation of a conscious Creator, is distilled into a compound unity of the believers. The Semitic epistemological roots of umma, denoting mother-source, command that the community of creed be understood as an essential, rather than attributive, and universal Ur-community and civilizational ideal type.⁴

Mousalli (1999), however, detects a potential discrepancy in the tawḥīd–umma composite: “Although tawhid is profoundly a unifying concept in principle, it leads, in practice, to a duality of thinking: Western paganist thought and Islamic religious thought.”⁵ Leaving aside a necessary discussion of international law as per Islam, e.g. in the form of the idiosyncratic Shāfi’ite buffer-categories of dār al-‘ahd (the treaty-governed intercourse with the political Other) and dār al-amn (the functional safe haven provided by a non-belligerent power), Mousalli manages to develop a compelling argument about Islam’s discomfort with a world inhabited by egalitarian political units. Arguably, though, Mousalli is confusing ontology (unity of origin) with epistemology (plurality of manifestation) and in the process misses a fundamental point pertaining to Islam’s self-ascribed mission. Islamic cosmopolitanism, epitomized in the concept of the umma, remains not only political taxonomy (the orbit of Islam vs. the domain of disbelief) but also an epistemic community (a transnational movement of purpose). Hence, the umma itself is no boundary and certainly no barrier.
Indeed, the political cosmology entailed in the equation of ḍār al-ỉṣlām vs. ḍār al-ḥarb (incidentally, wholly non-Qur’ānic terminology) signifies less the fortress of Islam versus the forces of infidelity than the realm of hierarchy vs. the realm of anarchy. In suggesting this nomenclature one is, admittedly, departing from conventional translation, but the virtue of the proposition entails a realignment of Islam’s political philosophy with contemporary IR-theory which sees the anarchical absence of a common sovereign (whether in Heaven or on Earth) as the working assumption of interstate intercourse. The suggestion is no radical innovation, however, for Hanafi jurisprudential sources—such as “the Hugo Grotius of Islam,” Abu Bakr as-Sarakhsi (d. 1090)—have long argued that ḍār al-ỉṣlām implies the domain of security and protection (particularly so of minority groups), regardless of the professed religious affiliation of the majority of the inhabitants within that territory, while ḍār al-ḥarb signifies the realm of insecurity and chaos, notwithstanding chief religious practice.\(^6\) While ḍār al-ỉṣlām therefore does not unavoidably correspond to ḍār al-imān (the abode of faith, as opposed to peace/security) and ḍār al-kufr does not readily translate into ḍār al-ḥarb, given the conceptual segregation of disbelief and insecurity, the chief dialectic coefficient in the ḍār al-ỉṣlām/ḍār al-ḥarb discourse remains the security matrix. With an admixture of the theocentric political purpose of Islam, the choice, to reiterate, remains this: hierarchy under God vs. anarchy under man.

In transcending the often-rehearsed binary of ḍār al-ỉṣlām contra ḍār al-ḥarb, this exact dimension of purpose and teleology emerges as a vehicle for transforming dualism, a contingent state, into universal unicity, a reflection of the divine essence. The location of Islam’s epistemic community vis-à-vis subordinate moral and political structures is therefore imperative to recognize when seeking to evaluate global ummadom as political agency.

\textit{Islam’s Political Community: Western Reflections, Eastern Responses}

Bryan Turner (1994) is, it seems, aware of both the normative and reformatory aspect of Islam as an integrated end–means dyad. Still, in his discussion of the umma construct, he somewhat hastily dismisses this “idealistic conception” which “involved an integration of the politico-religious authority” but was “never completely institutionalized.” While the latter estimation remains faulty for obvious historical reasons—in fact, the Medinan prophetocracy and
the early, righteous, caliphate (al-khulafā’ al-rāshidūn, 632–61 CE) remain those ideal types which have motivated the pan-Islamic transnationalists all along—the former statement suffers from that exact dichotomy which is alien to Islamic socio-political thought.

True, for Islam the realms of the political and religious are not independent, but since they are unitarian, sui generis, the Islamic paradigm certainly sees no functional need to integrate them. Even the well-circulated formula “al-islāmu dīnun wa dawlatun”—that Islam signifies both faith and polity—remains a nineteenth-century reproduction of Western political dichotomy (and, perhaps, an Islamist political program), for in the Islamic prism the divine code (dīn) subsumes statehood (dawla); and, as such, the latter ceases to be a category, which (with political endeavour) may be integrated into the former.9

On the other hand, the functional and spatial differentiation of God and Caesar has in Christian-turned-secular international theory allowed the state to escape ethical foundationalism and, as with the realist school, rather perceived in amoral expediency (Machiavelli’s virtù) an apposite iron law of politics.10 The contrast between the strategic logic of the realist persuasion, epitomized in the balance of power and thus the division of privileges, and the political logic and linearity of Islam’s universal community is patent. The former logic was predicated in Machiavelli’s diremption of ethics from politics and the latter in, the contemporaneous Ottoman thinker, Kinalizade’s integration of the two realms (compare The Prince to Akhlāq-i ‘alā’i). Islam, like Judaism, subscribes to the divine origin (but, with the exception of the Shi’a, not divine right) of government. It follows, therefore, that political science for Islam is no independent inquiry, but an extension of its theology.11 The Qurʾān provides the Muslims with principles, both definite and interpretive, by which they may shape their relationship to God while also laying down a code of conduct, for individuals and communities, that both leads to and follows from that relationship. The political shari’ā, and perhaps the politics of shari’ā, denote the direction of the Islamic polity, not its destination.

While Western sociology has typically, but according to both Anthony Giddens (1990) and Ernest Gellner (1992) unconsciously, taken society to be coterminous with the state, Islamic political transcendentalism has defined the umma as boundary-free, even potentially expansive, in time and space.12 Nationalism, which Gellner (1983) defines as that “political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,”13 remains
anathematic to an Islamic philosophical position that “recognizes no geographical, linguistic, cultural or racial barriers.” After all, both history and territory were God’s handiwork and political spatio-temporality, the way we perceive and pursue political ambitions, too was to revolve around the infinitude of its celestial source. Secular nationalism—which stipulates (a) that primordial and atomized nations exist, (b) that they ought to exist, and (c) that they should be matched by independent states—becomes “a form of glorified tribalism” and an inorganic lethargy imposed by the hand of imperial map-makers playing the “great game.” Here is Hassan al-Turabi, the chief ideologue of the National Islamic Front in Sudan, who echoes this sentiment ingenuously: “The international dimension of the Islamic movement is conditioned by the universality of the umma . . . and the artificial irrelevancy of . . . borders.”

Certainly, in the classical conception, the basis of the Islamic states was ideological (not political, territorial, or ethnic) and the primary purpose of governance was to defend and protect the faith and all its corollaries, not the state. The authenticity and authority of the Islamic polity derives from a collective subscription, and submission, to an idea—that of Pax Islamica in its various spiritual and political manifestations. Rather than territorial or national referents (such as cultural, linguistic, or ethnic markers), abstract ideational allegiance comes to define citizenship. In short, therefore, the Islamic polity is an ideocracy, albeit unlike Marxism not anchored in the mechanics of the material but in a wider metaphysical political cosmology. After all, God’s power, as well as His bounty, has no limits per ‘ilm at-tawhid (the theology pertaining to divine essence and attributes) and His imperative (amr) too is notionally infinite in a cosmos that is governed not by chance or chaos but by a reign of purposive law. From this follows that the godly community be not only cross-boundary but trans-boundary as it takes power not to rule but to serve.

Indeed, Islamic socio-politological concepts are foundationally derived from the idea of a covenant. Where the state as a systematization of man–to–man relationship is a social covenant, it is also an expression, and an extension, of the primordial man–to–God covenant, whereby all authority in the universe rests with Allāh who alone created it, ex nihilo, and who, as a social consequence, alone must be obeyed. The usage of the concept of khaliifa both for man as vicegerents of Allāh on earth (a generic condition) and as a political authority (a specific institution) remains an interesting indication of this holistic link between the ontological and political spheres, for both in their turn require deference to the responsibility of
trusteeship (*amāna*). Unlike the politics in and of the West, Muslim politics is not self-referential nor indeed is Muslim civilization self-perpetuating—materiality is meaningful only to the extent it satisfies and reinforces spirituality, so Islam as a practice, political and social, remains contingent on Islam as a cosmological norm.

Consequently, Islam aspires to be the chief component of self-identity, individually and communally, and the chief referent for allegiance. This self-acknowledged conceptual centrifuge is reinforced by the adherence to religion not only as any code of living (or a paradigm of life) but as “*dīn al-ḥaq,*” as the supercessionist expression of *religatio divina.* Political life with its agnostic epistemology, its drifting alliances and ephemeral objectives, must therefore necessarily meet no other accommodation than outright dismissal. Islamic politics, as it seeks to address the here–and–now in the perspective of the hereafter, remains a two-pronged inquiry: It is concerned not only with material goods, tangibles, in this life, but also with spiritual goods in the afterlife.18 For the agent elect, who as a divine trustee (rather than a product of social privilege), undertakes political pursuit, his subsumption in a mission of absolutist teleology is self-evident and self-sustained. Transcendentalism, thus, reproduces itself both as the ontological departure-point and the normative end-destination.

Still, Harvard’s Professor Samuel Huntington (1996) somewhat overdramatizes the sequence. Without citing source, he detects a (potentially destructive) disparity between the Islamic episteme and the world of states, for “the concept of ummah presupposes the illegitimacy of the nation state” and, inversely, “the idea of the sovereign nation states is incompatible with belief in the sovereignty of Allah and the primacy of the ummah.”19 To be certain, the proposition is often aired that the *umma,* the indiscriminately global Islamdom, does require (both as canonical prerequisite and operational prolongation) a caliphate, an all-inclusive Islamicate. That is to say, the community of creed is rendered operational qua *umma* only by its institutionalization in the form of a single “pious” polity.20 Yet an empirical assessment renders such linkage altogether surreal. In fact, political unity, let alone unification, has never been the logical corollary to the supranational identity of Islam. The norm of caliphal history (e.g. the Ummayid–Abbasid–Fatimid or the Safavid–Mughal–Ottoman co-existence) displays pluralism rather than ideological-cum-institutional exclusivism. Granted, though, such coexistence often came with the caveat, as revealed subtly, for
example, in the 1555 Treaty of Amasya between the Shah of Persia and the Sultan of Turkey, that opposing Muslim dominions were recognized as part of dār al-islām only grudgingly and, while approved as de facto autonomous, were viewed as quasi-states which were both morally and legally inferior. Still, the tension between the sovereignty of God (ḥakimmiyyat Allāh) and the governance of man, perhaps, provided the exact allowance for a segregation between the celestial and the mundane: No single earthly domain was the Kingdom of God, no polity divine protectorate. As caliphal political control declined, even before the turn of the first millennium, and Islam disintegrated into independent, and sometimes rival, sultanates, the theoreticians, too, internalized the dichotomy of faith and state by departing from the notion of integrated “caesaropapism.”

Classical legal authorities such as Abdul-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037), Abu'l-Hasan al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1206) recognized both a plurality of Muslim states and a division of labour (and authority) between the sultanate, as the temporal polity, and the caliphate, signifying the ummatic umbrella. This dual move, political plurality and functional segregation, betokened an early appreciation of a courteous, even symbiotic, coexistence among a multiplicity of Muslim authorities and institutions.

The most well-known defence of the changing political order is undoubtedly al-Mawardi’s Kitāb al-ahkām al-sultāniyya, in which a pre-eminent jurist allowed the worldly potentate a share in heavenly prerogatives, as long as the latter upheld the authority and authenticity of the caliph (who as an institution would preserve the functional integrity of the sharī'at). This figurative, or derivate, leadership (imārat al-isti’la)—in as much as it would substitute a state of anarchy with the rule of law—provided for a retroactively binding authority, morally and legally, for subjects from the very moment the new political order was established, regardless of the original validity or otherwise in its claim to power. Might, per se, was neither right nor wrong but, as a morally neutral category, contingent on the political purpose to which it was exercised. Alongside this conceptual linkage between Islam and power, which in time led to a “doctrine of necessity,” justice and capacity (to implement public policy), rather than piety or lineage, were specified as the central tenets in seeking to judge claims on authority.

Nearly five centuries later in the new lands of Islam, Ottoman rulers, most prominently Sultan Selim I (d. 1520) and Süleyman “the Magnificent” (d. 1566), would activate exactly this notion in
order to legitimate their claim to the “Exalted Caliphate” (khilāfat-i ʿulya), although in their political theory the correlation between military credentials and moral privileges was immediate and proportional. References to lineal descent from the prophetic tribe of Quraysh, a common criterion for leadership among the Abbasid jurists, was in all but mythology redundant for the Ottomans; it was their de facto guardianship of Muslim territory, including the routes to pilgrimage, which made them, and only them, able to claim de jure caliphal guardianship over the doctrinal and geographic boundaries of Islam. Realpolitik became idealpolitik, and it was all God’s will.

Only with a voice from a third continent was the moral–material tension solved. Shah Waliullah (d. 1762), the leading muḥaddith of Delhi, agreed that any king (malik) able to sustain a sizeable standing army (he mentioned the number 12,000) and fend off his territory must be deemed a legitimate caliph, while the prerogative of Head Caliph (khalīfa al-ʿazam or khalīfa al-khulafāʾ) belonged to he who exceeded in military might and thus came to guarantee order in the confederation of caliphates. Yet, in order to avoid collapsing into a vulgar might-is-right frame, Waliullah, who has been referred to as “the Muslim Hegel,” introduced a highly original distinction. He qualified the authority of the Head Caliph, who as the holder of the external dominion (khilāfat zāhira) would be the exoteric principal only, while the spiritual successors and esoteric heirs to the Prophet were the sages, saints, and righteous scholars, both theologians and jurists, who had been endowed with khilāfat bāṭina, the inner dominion. Here again a totalistic, or totalitarian, investment was eschewed as duties and privileges, ranks and roles, were divided by way of theological decentralization.

Al-Ghazali, a near-contemporary of Mawardi but with a tremendously versatile legacy across the Islamic sciences, had also spoken with pragmatism about the subtleties of rule on earth. Expressing his cognizance of the political as a science not only of the right and the good but also as an art of the possible, he stated in his noted philosophical composition Maqāṣid al-falāsifa (“The Intentions of the Philosophers”) that “man’s welfare in this world and bliss in the next is attainable only if governance is rooted in the juristic sciences [ʿulūm sharʿiyya] complemented by the political sciences [ʿulūm siyāsiyya].” Further, in his politological treatise Naṣīhat al-muluk (“Counsel to the Kings”) and his doctrinal work Al-iqtisād fiʾl-ʿiṭiqād (“The Middlepath in Dogma”), he had reasoned thus: As de facto power was different, and differentiable, from de jure authority, the
sultanate did neither curtail nor compromise the caliphate. Temporal power, rather, was the guardian of faith, exactly as the spiritual head of believers, the *imām*, was its custodian.28 Given that ultimate sovereignty (*rūubiyya*) belonged to God alone, and was among His exclusive attributes, the immediate sovereignty (*ḥākimiyya*) invested in the offices of both the caliph and the sultan derived only from their defence, respectively by constitutive authority and coercive potential, of the foundations and manifestations of faith.29 In disallowing the theophanic descent of celestial sovereignty and its incarnation in any human institution, including the caliphate, late-Abbasid Islamic state-theory thus delegitimized both institutional exclusivism and, critically, the centralization of political power. Indeed, legislative privileges rested largely with a third element in the socio-political composition, namely the ‘*ulamā*, thereby instantiating a trinitarian political order in which the caliphate, the sultanate, and religious scholarship would coexist in a symbiotic balance.30

When contemporary activists, following the twentieth century “Leninist”–Islamist, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, proclaim their normative prescription in the words that “political Islam cannot exist without the Khilafa State,”31 they are, as it happens, contradicting the traditional mainline (*al-jumhūr*) on two counts. First, the peculiar construction “Khilafa State,” paradoxically, reveals that traditionally the caliphate was, contrary to the sultanate or the emirate, not conceived as a state-formation but a trans-political signifier of the spiritual and sharī‘ite unity of the believers. Such exact apolitical transcendentalism remains the foil for those advocating an immanent caliphal state (as, perhaps, as parallel to the papal state of yesteryears), insisting simultaneously on all the institutional paraphernalia of a modern—and not medieval—state. Second, the equally oxymoronic designation “political Islam,” which qualifies Islam with (for Muslims) an entirely redundant adjective, reveals that the very discourse gives credence to a Western mindset, with a pronounced totalitarian leaning, rather than the decentralized structure and pluralist *modus vivendi* of early Islam.32

If, in the praxis of Christendom, “there were two authorities, God and Caesar, dealing with different matters, exercising different jurisdictions; each with its own laws and its own court to enforce them; each with its own institutions and its own hierarchy to administer them,” Islam has, more often than not, been little different.33 Indeed, Islam’s contraposition to, say, the thought of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas on the ground that in Islam “there was no Caesar, there was only God,” seems to be a victim of
Orientalist falsification. Accordingly, Bernard Lewis’ submission (1979) to the effect that orthodox Islam can provide only an idealistic, and therefore impoverished, political theory remains unfaithful to the intellectual history of Islam. Taqiuddin ibn Taymiya (d. 1328), to take another classical, if less-than-canonical, example, remained certain that the unity of the Islamic community depended not on the symbolism represented by the caliph, much less on caliphal authority, but rather more on the “confessional solidarity of each autonomous entity within an organic Islamic whole.” With the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate at the hands of Mongols in 1258, Ibn Taymiya was writing in the vacuum between the Abbasids and the Ottomans and accepted, perhaps prematurely, a post-caliphal order. As with the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, whom he antedated by three centuries and a half, Ibn Taymiya saw law and legal legitimacy to derive from “the command of the sovereign” and therefore politically, rather than philosophically, constituted. As long as Muslims find themselves, in units or collectively, part of an enforceable political domain, he insisted in his Al-siyāsa al-sharīyya, they remain under the shadow of God (although this did not extend to the converted Mongols, whom he considered undomesticated and notoriously lax in religious observance). In simultaneously accentuating the spiritual unity of the umma and its politico-structural partition, Ibn Taymiya made political unification redundant as a sine qua non of an Islamic world order. In effect, the caliphate became entirely dispensable as an international regime.

The Decline and Demise of the Caliphate: Revisionist Thought

The onslaught of European imperialism and the spatialization inherent in the divide-and-rule dictum gave credence to new notions of nationalism and, notably, internationalism among segments of the afflicted Muslim intelligentsia. A sense of siege was, perhaps, not entirely neurotic given the completion of the British conquest of India, the Dutch foothold in Indonesia, the French seizure of North Africa, and the Russian expansion in Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia. With Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi (1838–97), commonly known as “al-Afghani” although he almost certainly hailed from northwestern Iran, as well as with his equally prominent Egyptian protégé Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), a new doctrine of utility was introduced, which perceived in the transcendentalist allegiance required by the ummatic optic a plausible enticement for an anti-European, pan-Muslim alliance formation. This instrumental
perspective held that by appealing to the collective referent, the Islamic idiom, a prudent political agent could engineer a combination of talent and resources in a common counter-colonial figuration, a bulwark against European expansionism. Critically, though, the assumption was that Islam was a latent political discourse, rather than a well-defined political logic, let alone a political model; it was a rhetorical structure, grounded of course in an ideational structure, but no coincident political structure.

As al-Afghani and Abduh argued at length in various issues of their jointly edited Parisian magazine, *Al-‘urwa al-wuthqa* (1894), they were advocating *wahdat al-islāmi*., an ambiguous term which could mean both Islamic unity (a socio-ideational employment) and Islamic unification (a politico-institutional employment). Pan-Islamism—its English terminological equivalent which arose around this time (see e.g. *The Times*, 19 January 1882) and which entertained both connotations—thus became panacea regardless, or exactly because, of its ill-defined programme. In the subtlest of ways, the European belief-system inherent in the new vocabulary of pan-Islam had paradoxically influenced their conception of renewal (*islāh*) and revival (*nahda*), for *dār al-islām* was not *sui generis* but a malleable, if meaningful, political configuration. To al-Afghani and Abduh understanding pan-Islamism as religio-political solidarity had the merit that it avoided falling into the ditch of “fanaticism” (*ta’assub*) while being a sufficiently thick concept to foster geopolitical realignment.

Continuing al-Afghani’s legacy, Abduh with his new devotee, the Syrian Sufi-turned-Salafi Rashid Rida, started a new magazine, *Al-manār*, in 1898, which came to be tremendously influential in Islamist circles until it was closed down by Egyptian authorities more than four decades later. Summoning thinkers and dreamers, this publication repeatedly advocated that an international Muslim Congress be convened to safeguard the faltering fortunes of the Ottoman Caliphate and, separately, the pan-Muslim community. But, as it happens, this is only half the story, albeit the well-known part. In the second decade of the twentieth century, Rida embarked on an increasingly counter-caliphal trajectory. Having been disappointed, and personally insulted, by the Young-Turk agenda, he founded the Society for Arab Association (*Jam‘iyyat al-ja‘mi’a al-‘arabiyya*), which covertly advocated secession of the Arab dominions from the Ottoman Empire and the ultimate establishment of a pan-Arab state (albeit, not necessarily including all of North Africa). If *dār al-islām* had been a contingent configuration for al-Afghani and Abduh, the late Rida had, also on the basis of a cost–benefit calculus, advocated
its irrelevancy. Ibn Taymiya, thus, could be reinstalled in Muslim political theory.

But Rida’s blueprint was pre-empted by events in the caliphal centre. With Kemalesque laïcité installed as the state religion in Turkey and with, from March 1924, the dismantlement of both the sultanate and the caliphate came the nativity of the post-caliphatic political configuration. With it the notional umma was, perhaps irreversibly, turned into a normative—or, as Benedict Anderson (1983) would have it, “imagined”—community which, while retaining a determined political impulse, was never to become a monolith-in-the-making. Trans-ummatic anomic, the breakdown and loss of membership in the quintessential pan-Muslim socio-political institution, came to follow and the ummatic precept itself seemed devalued.

To the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who galvanized an entire generation of South Asian youth, pan-Islamism became no more, and certainly no less, than pure pan-humanism—a universal community intended exactly to overcome the ego–alter dichotomy. Since Iqbal’s contention was that “Islam is non-territorial in its character,” he could not, or would not, allow Islam to be identified with racialism or nationalism, whether communal or continental: “Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a commonwealth of nations which accepts racial diversity and ever-changing geographical demarcations only for the facility of reference and not for limiting the social horizons of its members.”

In this way, Islam was defined neither as territorial nor indeed anti-territorial; it was austerely a-territorial. After all nationality was different from nationalism, in that the former merely defined territorial categories while the latter misconstrued both sense of civic duty and primacy of identity. In such an agnostic intellectual milieu, multiple Muslim peoples seeking to advocate liberation from the yoke of colonialism saw themselves catapulted into an appropriative discourse evolving around nations, nationalities, and nationologies. Thus, as the Oxford professor James Piscatorri has lucidly displayed in his seminal Islam in World of Nation-States (1986), to the extent that modern Muslim states have come into existence the state itself has become an Islamic value. Although the statist paradigm was a counter-reaction to imperial domination it entailed, paradoxically, a naturalization of the taxonomical principle of European political geography: Nationalism, or wataniyya, was imported.

But it was not only imported, it was indigenized. The depolarized dialectic between pre-colonial identity (whether parochial or pan-Islamic) and post-colonial identity could be perpetuated by the
strategic utilization of Islamic vocabulary, for, as Ernest Gellner (1991), has remarked, “in Islam, and only in Islam, purification/modernization on the one hand, and the re-affirmation of a putative old . . . identity on the other, can be done in one and the same language and set of symbols.” To the extent that they could be mutually reinforcing, religion and nationalism became the dual “sources of macroloyalty,” for they could “generate the widest bonds of commonly held values in the region.” In effect, for contemporary Islam, an (ex post facto) “Islamized” territorial world order coexists with the ideological transnationalism of classical siyar.

Yet Muslim states, revived but disfigured, were rarely logical, or even typological, nation-states, given the imprecise fit between the nation (as the primary cultural unit in international relations) and the state (as the primary political unit in international relations). They remained instead state-nations in as much as statehood antedated nationhood even when, at times, illogical borders divided ethnic communities into several states and, at other times, frontiers lumped together mutually antagonistic peoples and thereby facilitated the introduction of inter-ethnic terror, mayhem, and massacre as recurrent manifestations of the geopolitical economy of statehood.

In addition, the conceptual genealogy of Islam, albeit now “in a world of nation-states,” implied a qualitative difference. To the West, its history seemed to suggest, the world was naturally divided into nations and the nation, in turn, could be subdivided into different religious communities. In the Muslim perception, on the other hand, the world remained naturally divided into religions and religions could, in turn, be segregated into nations and, only if pushed, states. To commentators craving for Islamic authenticity the nodal colonial and post-colonial syntheses thus “accelerated a process of deformation and transfiguration in public loyalties and perceptions” and initiated “an intrinsic process of derailment or an introvert displacement of community values.” The “double distortion,” which came to be the end-result, was manifest in the twin substitutions: qawn for umma, dawla for din, thereby institutionalizing both nationalism and secularism. Citizenship, too, came to be defined in terms of adherence to this twin pathogenesis rather than in terms of communal bonding (waḥdaniyya) and celestial bondage (‘ubudiyya).

By extension, contemporary commentators such as Ziauddin Sardar (1979) have resorted to a pragmatic deductive (re-)definition of the umma as an “ensemble of Muslim individuals and communities forming an entity of common cultural, legal systems . . . and a certain self-consciousness, but not necessarily a coincident common polity.”
Reading a backward teleology into Islamic history, they develop a compelling narrative about the collective consciousness, perhaps collective sub-consciousness, of the *umma*, which at no juncture remains more tangible than intercommunal norm-sharing. That the pan-Islamic feeling of fraternity does not readily translate into a structural order does not question its authenticity. It does, however, demonstrate its lack of exclusivity in the identity construction of the modern Muslim.

In a sense, one should argue, the ummatic assumption in its current casting readily corresponds to one of the seminal constructs of the English School in International Studies, viz. “international society,” understood as a conglomeration of states which, due both to common interests and common values, proceed to “form a society [of states] in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another.” At the same time they establish “by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.”

To import further vocabulary from Hedley Bull, among the founding fathers of the English School, the *umma* axiom connotes a “neomedievalism” in which a transnational civil society manifests a sense of plural identities and as such a “structure of overlapping authorities and criss-crossing loyalties.” The presumed insight in this parallel lies in the commonality of ideas/identity among the components of an international society (beyond the interest-fixation of a mechanical international system), while at the same time vindicating a principle of differentiation in the form of separate and equal legal entities (the working assumption of multiple sovereignties).

Based on this pluralistic premise, introduced into political history by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), let us now turn to an examination of the *Weltanschauung* proffered by the OIC. I shall, as a working hypothesis, seek to display that *umma*-centric pan-Islamism, whether in its classical or revisionist versions, was an aesthetic rationalization of the early chronicle of the OIC, which surfaced as an incarnation of altogether disparate maxims.

**THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE: CATALYST, CONCEPTION, AND INCEPTION**

The OIC emerged in a historical context of turmoil in the Middle Eastern region. In fact, the OIC may well be regarded as a child of the “Arab cold war,” which had trifurcated the regional system of the
Middle East and North Africa into three competing camps—a regional scenario that only added complexity to a global picture of the bipolar Cold War during which the Muslim world found itself divided into three categories: Pro-US, pro-Soviet, and non-aligned. Nasserite revolutionarism and Ba’athist anti-monarchism (twin embodiments of secular republicanism with a dogmatic anti-Western edge) were by their very design destabilizing for the status-quoist monarchies of the region. Indeed, an attempted coup d’état in Jordan in 1956, the confessional conflict in Lebanon in 1958, the Iraqi revolution the same year, and the Yemenite civil war from 1962 all displayed the volatility of the political scene.

Since power (whether as asset-input or capability-output) is relational, rather than possessive or substantive, the radical ascent implied a descent of the conservative regimes. Saudi Arabia, for long the received prototype of Oriental despotism, was acutely affected (and also infected) by the radical impulse. An increasingly besieged royalty in Riyadh, led by Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz, seemed intimidated by the growing marginalization of the kingdom in the realpolitikal algebra of the regional geopolitical system.

After Gamal Abdal Nasser’s popularly perceived triumph of 1956, having barred the united forces of Britain, France, and Israel from taking spoils at Suez, policymakers in Riyadh were not late to station Saudi troops in Jordan to stabilize King Hussein’s conservative regime vis-à-vis pro-Nasser elements among the general public and rank-and-file alike. Egypt’s union with far-away Syria, a shaky republic haunted by serial coups, and with the establishment of that bizarre entity of the United Arab Republic in 1958 (which for three years also included North Yemen) further intensified the Saudi sense of siege. That the two Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq were, it appeared, contemplating another unification must have provided for an unbearable aggravation in Riyadh where division, rather than unification, had always been the preferred way to maintain leverage—or at least favourable disengagement.

Eventually, a failed assassination attempt in 1958, also played into the hands of Nasser who could instead encircle the Saudis by inspiring, and operationalizing, an anti-royalist coup d’état in North Yemen. Although Saudi Arabia was a founder-member of the League of Arab States (popularly known as the Arab League, est. 1945), this particular institution proved insusceptible to Saudi influence. Indeed, by the late 1950s the Arab League had come to consist largely of variants of pan-Arab and secular-nationalist regimes, led by Egypt, which was, as it happened, also the very host-country of the League.
In order to regain leverage, the Kingdom, therefore, had to create a less influence-resistant framework for international cooperation. What was peculiar about King Faisal’s political engineering, as it was to unfold as a prelude to the OIC, however, was its self-conscious re-sacralization and thus conservative de-politicization. In resorting to the pan-Islamic invocation as a legitimizing counter-strategy against activist pan-Arab radicalism, by design a delegitimizing discourse, he attempted to shroud his commitment to policy-prescriptions based on vulgar political realism: divide and (maintain) rule.

Yet, in this security architecture—probably best viewed as a local version of the doctrine of containment, albeit here directed against Nasser’s revolutionary bandwagon—Islamic norms came to be both internal and external assets. The instrumentalization of Islam implied not only an exchange in superlatives within an existing constellation of threat, but also a diversion of the discourses of danger from interstate competition to intrastate rebellion. Islam, arguably, could ward off not only hungry and hostile neighbours but equally restate the indispensability of (established) order within the household.

Thus, already prior to his coronation, the Rābiṭah al-‘alam al-islāmī (The Muslim World League) was institutionalized as a non-governmental missionary organization based in Mecca. That the inaugural ceremony took place during the spiritual high season, the ḥajj, displayed the intended conversion of Islam from a fraternity of faith to a strategically informed anti-radical coalition. Its first proclamation, too, denoted a thinly veiled attempt to drive a wedge between secular Arabism and Islamic propriety: “Those who distort Islam’s call under the guise of nationalism are the most bitter enemies of the Arabs whose glories are entwined with the glories of Islam.” Generously funded from Riyadh, the new alignment—“an unofficial agency of the Saudis”—came to include the anti-Nasser, and therefore partly Saudi-sponsored, Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Ikhwān al-muslimīn, under the leadership of none else than Sayyid Qutb, the very chief ideologue of the brand of Islamism that regarded a large number of Arab states, including Egypt, as outside dār al-islām. If they made strange bedfellows, so be it; a common enemy could foster friendship along all axes according to that celebrated cartellian maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” As King Khaled abdicated in 1964, King Faisal, having added de jure accreditation to a de facto regency he had exercised at least since the republican revolution in Yemen, continued his pan-Islamic project, but now on an intergovernmental plane.
In his venture, the Saudi monarch was aided less by ideological rectitude or the sudden accession of the Kingdom to petroleum-preponderance (as the country holding the largest discovered oil reserves) than by two opportune historical happenings which he was not adverse to exploit. What pacified the rejectionist front of traditionalists and secularists alike and—almost by default—paved the way for a trans-Islamic summit derived, first, from the humiliation of the Six-Day War in 1967, in which three Arab states lost face and land and which, as it exposed the hollowness of the creed, came to be the final indictment of secular pan-Arabism, its “Waterloo.” Second came the irreverent attack of a messianic arsonist who had spitefully sought to torch the al-Aqsa Mosque in August 1969 to pave the way for the coming of the Kingdom of God. Each event, in turn, could be constituted as an assertion of the need to reintroduce the pan-Islamic paradigm of statecraft at a moment when secular visions had failed to protect the interests (“honour”) of the Muslims.

As the First Islamic Summit Conference materialized in Rabat, 22–5 September 1969, it implied a regularization, and later institutionalization, of a particular political currency. Initiated jointly by Saudi Arabia, Pahlavi Iran, Hassanite Morocco, and the young Pakistan, the trans-Islamic venture reflected a somewhat opportunistic amalgam of national agendas: A Saudi policy of containment vis-à-vis Nasserite radicalism, a Pakistani pursuit of security and finance, and a (joint) Moroccan–Iranian public relations venture, prompted by domestic contingencies and increasingly assertive challenges from Islamic groups. The summit, attended by representatives of twenty-four countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization (with a preliminary observer status), was thus a product of an ad hoc alignment generated by a multiplicity of national self-interests but sanctioned by the single stimulus of animosity to Zionist adventurism.

While pan-Islamism had long manifested itself “as an aspiration rather than a consistent activity, an idea more than an organized movement,” the OIC (baptized in Arabic as Munazzamat al-mu’tamar al-islāmi) claimed to have bridged the gap between aspiration and activity, between idea and movement. Still, pan-Islamic interests, at this juncture, were defined as little more than the aggregate of a variety of state interests. Prompted both by other-worldly pretensions and very earthly balance-of-power maxims, a tentative positive-sum game had allowed the inception of a half-breed pan-Islamic forum. In a win–win situation, God too could be enrolled as party to the political contract.
At any rate, it is difficult to sustain, *pace* Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg, that “the OIC concept was a logical culmination of the yearning towards which the Muslim psyche was always predisposed,” resembling that psychiatric diagnosis presented by Orientalists of yesteryears. Nor did the OIC, as a purely defensive construction, wishful thinking notwithstanding, exemplify that Muslim leaders were “motivated by the conviction that their peoples, although located in different parts of the world, formed an indivisible unity,” and that they were determined to “exert united efforts” in a display of the “inherent unity, integrity and strength of the Islamic community.” The very preliminaries to the inception of the OIC, rather, betokened a cautious synthesis of state-centric realpolitik and the invocation of that transnational allegiance required by the ummatic imperative. In candour, none of the architects envisaged an abandonment (or even modification) of the territorial-state paradigm, and the exact intentionality of the pan-Islamic exercise remained obscure. To be sure, the First Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Jeddah, March 1970) clearly illustrated the Saudi duality in seeking both a promotion of common institutions and, simultaneously, manipulating any attempt to grant substantive concessions to any supranational organ. It was the regulatory rules of the political game that were to be redefined, not the very quintessence of what constituted the game. In other words, the question involved the *balance* of power not the legitimate sources of power nor indeed the purpose of power.

By the end of the Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Jeddah, March 1972), by which time Nasser (and with him the rejectionist impulse) had already passed away, a Charter of the Islamic Conference was in place to guide the future *modus operandi* of the OIC. As the consensual legal codification of all inter-Islamic cooperation to unfold within the orbit of the OIC, the Charter attains pivotal symbolic and judicial prominence. In what follows, I shall seek to assess both the objectives and the operative principles of the Charter and attempt to determine to which extent, if any, they reflect pan-Islamic predilections.

THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE:
ÉTATISM AS FAIT ACCOMPLI

Dr Hamid Algabid, former OIC Secretary General and once contender for the UN General Secretaryship, writes in his preface to the official introduction booklet of the OIC (1995) that the
participants in the Rabat Summit “decided to establish an organization entrusted with achieving their unity.” As already suggested, this remains a hopelessly idealized proposition, reflecting either naïveté or the inventive inclination of a fake narrative prompted by the self-serving maxim, “where you stand is where you sit”—denoting that political positioning is contingent on, or derivative from, organizational interest. Instead a reading of the Charter of the Islamic Conference (CIC) readily reveals that unity (ittiḥād/wahdaniyya) is the exact non-word in the Charter, which commits itself only to “consolidate cooperation” (ta’awun) and “solidarity” (taḍāmun), very much in accordance with King Faisal’s repeated parlance of reaching for Islamic solidarity, taḍāmun al-islāmi. In fact, an Arabic monthly under this exact title was released from Mecca from the 1970s, again as a governmental project, but it recoiled at any advocacy for politico-religious unification and, unlike the Ikhwān movement in Egypt, abstained from seeking to promote a cogent principled ideology: It remained rather nebulous, and consciously so.

Nevertheless, Haider Mehdi (1988), while discussing the objectives of the OIC, assures the reader, “The intentions have been to go beyond intellectual, philosophical, and spiritual boundaries and unite in a well-formulated political identity to exert power in the international system.” This, too, seems a somewhat blue-eyed presentation for, surely, a “well-formulated political identity” is conditional on the actual convergence of political interest and, in turn, the actualization of this convergence into a tangible imperative of (joint) political action. My argument is not only processual, though, for the very presence of political will, rather than capacity alone, remains the sine qua non of political action. And here a deliberate omission in the Charter is revealing, for while it lists as among its objectives the “cooperation among Member States in the economic, social, cultural, [and] scientific” fields, it determinedly disregards political cooperation. This absence notwithstanding, Mehdi continues a, grosso modo, escapist narrative: “Whereas, historically, different nations have converged their common interest to form international [sic] organizations . . . the OIC represents the interest and the common objectives of a single nation, formed by several diverse geographical entities and different countries.”

This, at any rate, is a creative rendition, for the territorial states of the Islamic world (albeit rarely nation-states) can hardly be conceived as sub-entities of a cosmopolitan Islamic supra-nation, nor does their behaviour suggest that they identify themselves as such.
As regards the OIC, its entrenched state-centrism is rendered transparent by the very foundational premise that *states* constitute its membership. Indeed, the operational frame of the OIC is determined by “non-interference in the domestic affairs” and “respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each Member State.”74 Thus the ummatic insistence on individuals, or at least communities, to constitute the fellowship of faith is somehow undermined by the iron curtain of state borders. It goes without saying that for the OIC such faulty taxonomy, as a by-product, incorporates non-Muslim citizenry of member states and simultaneously excludes Muslim citizenry of non-member states. Per OIC’s mode of identity and differentiation, thus, citizen non-Muslims become subjects (which may or may not be a conceptual *faux pas*) and, more problematically, Muslim non-citizens remain judicial aliens.

Interestingly, the Charter is not explicit about its criterion for membership. Gabon (with a 99 percent non-Muslim majority), Uganda (with an 83 per cent non-Muslim majority), and Benin (with an 84 per cent non-Muslim majority plus Animism as official religion) as well as Suriname, Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire (each with a 77–9 per cent non-Muslim majority) are part of the “OIC umma.” On the other hand, countries in which the biggest confessional group comprises Muslims (like Ethiopia and Tanzania) have declined membership. As far as one can infer from Art. VIII of the Charter, the sole membership criterion, however vague, remains that the state be a “Muslim state” in the sense that it perceive Islam as one (albeit not necessarily the single) source of collective identity, or perhaps simply an important resource in (normative) inter-state relations. In practice, though, any state which obtains the approval of two-thirds of the OIC plenary is admitted as a member. Thus constitutionally secular countries, like Turkey, Lebanon, and Indonesia, have paradoxically been allowed to join the OIC, although their secular state constitutions have prevented them from being signatories to the very founding charter of the OIC.75 The proliferation in membership, including now twelve countries which are constitutionally secular or animistic and eight in which Muslims form a minority of the populace, has turned the OIC from a cohesive group of nominally like-minded countries to a rather more kaleidoscopic assemblage of Third-World aspirations.

The post-Westphalian framework (i.e. the mutual acceptance of the authenticity of all sovereign regimes), which the OIC inherited and then internalized as its own parameter of classification, surely
clashes with the classical Islamic ontology where ummatic considerations (rather than territorial integrity) reigned supreme and where sovereignty, albeit potentially plural, remained a pact with the Almighty (as the ultimate Sovereign) and in principle contingent upon the fulfilment of this divinely-ordained contract. Indeed, the classical conception of *siyar*, as formulated since the Hanafi jurist Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 804 CE), continued to relate predominantly, but not exclusively, to Islam’s interaction with the Other rather than intra-Islamic relations. To the pre-industrial political élites their own polity remained the best, and sometimes only, manifestation of post-prophetic authority but such political chauvinism required only an ascribed primacy in dealing, as the guardian of the *umma*, with non-Muslim communities (in diplomacy more than war) and not, at least not very often, the elimination of dissenting voices from rival Muslim polities. As it happened, the main preoccupation of the evolving “siyarite” paradigm—perhaps best described as a form of religio-moral realism—was less the sources of power than the uses to which power was put. In short, a state was Islamic less by virtue of its polity and more so by virtue of its policy. Nonetheless, while political geography had pushed forth the boundaries of the theoretical discourse, by creating new “facts on the ground,” primordial ontology remained, at the same time, a barrier against a totalizing and subjugating conception of polity: The state could potentially be Islamic, but Islam could never be étatist.

In the contemporary era, on the other hand, the centrifugalism of a national(ist) cartography does, as a segmentation of political allegiance, rest on both the territorialization of sovereignty and the secularization of international intercourse. That the CIC readily embraces such normative framework is discernible also in the apparent absence of Islamic vocabulary and references among its paragraphs. Indeed, the very preamble of the Charter reassures its commitment to “the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights,” while espousing no rival “purposes and principles.” In this regard, too, Dr Algabid’s reification provides a veiled confession, for his statement to the effect that the OIC continues to “draw inspiration from the immutable principles and teachings of the Holy Qur’an and from the provisions contained in the UN Charter” does, in truth, provide for a somewhat unholy union of Godly revelation (natural law) and manly ineptitude (positive law). As a matter of observance, the CIC thus remains self-consciously parasitic on the axiomatically given and *sui generis* legitimacy of the United Nations
and disallows the introduction of any normative programme that is, or could be conceived as, subversive to the obligations owed by member states to the United Nations.

For Moinuddin (1987), however, the “acceptance and application of general principles of international law by Islamic States in their external and inter-Islamic relations does not provide any evidence of their Westernization, Europeanization, or secularization.”80 This, of course, remains a rather depoliticized conclusion, ostensibly born out of a hyper-legalist fixation together with a determined dismissal of politico-ideological undertones of legal documents (for an antidote/indictment, see Judith Shklar’s critical study on legalism). Rather, one should think, the implication of the preamblic commitment is two-fold. First, the uncritical genuflection before the United Nations is a departure from the licit sources of Islamic siyar (and possibly a submission, as fait accompli, to a secular world order) and thus an adaptation, if not betrayal, of the idiosyncratic mission of the umma. Second, the inclusion of and immediate linkage to the fiercely-contested concept of human rights, in relation to which the Islamic world remains at continuous conceptual unease, implies an a priori commitment also to predefined norms of political discourse, whether plausibly universal or exceptional to Western intellectual history.81 In effect, then, the preamble declines any supercessionist, or simply secessionist, enterprise both in the spheres of rule-definition (theorization) and rule-application (praxeology) of international relations.

Even in theory, therefore, the CIC makes no pretensions of reviving the caliphatic institution and, in practice, even a moderate degree of supra-statism is disallowed. The very titular self-ascription of the Organization as an “Islamic Conference” rightfully suggests the institutionalization of a series of consultative mechanisms. Thus the Conference of Kings and Heads of State (also known as the Islamic Summit) remains “the supreme authority in the Organization” and the Jeddah-based secretariat is merely an administrative organ, entrusted to “follow up the implementation of the resolutions,”82 which implies little more than bureaucratic privileges. In-between is then the equally intergovernmental Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM). Absent both a permanent Islamic Council (of delegates) and an Islamic Parliament (directly appointed/elected), the OIC remains, per intention, deprived of a life (and voice) of its own.83 What remains absent in the organizational scheme is an undisputed/undiluted central authority, comparable to that traditionally vested in the caliph, capable of
mobilizing both ideological and institutional resources and thereby leading pan-Islam.

While the very theorem for the establishment of the OIC was the transnational body of believers, the OIC remains, in fairness, a secularized association of states rather than an international society (in Hedley Bull’s sense) or a community of creed (in the siyarite sense). Prompted by the current observations, a realization seems timely: “We cannot speak today of an Islamic conception of world order relevant to foreign policy or of a Muslim conception of international politics that differs from the Western one.”84 However, while a conception may well be irrelevant (as outmoded or undeveloped), human practice may well be conditioned by its chimerical omnipresence, say, in the form of atavistic behaviour or imaged validity. In addition, structural dynamics in an international organization, especially one founded on or with recourse to religious cravings, may well be conducive to its active self-perpetuation; indeed it may assume a life of its own, a life independent of the basic conditioning factors, and the responses, that led to its creation in the first place.85

Having, preliminarily, observed the ideational discrepancy between classical, prototypal pan-Islamism and Islamic internationalism in the contemporary world, a world of states, one must turn to an empirical reading of foreign-policy behaviour within the OIC in seeking to establish whether action (rather than abstraction) bears any Islamic semblance.
Having dissected the conceptual and structural operative principles of the OIC in the previous chapter, I wish to turn to the political praxis of the chief political actors within the OIC. Here the task at hand is rendered more complex by the fact that the OIC does not publish verbatim proceedings of its sessions (and one suspects this to be rooted in its self-definition as a unitary body in which national preferences lie prostrate before the holistic horizon of pan-Islam). Still, the rise and demise of different resolutions, their timing and wording, and the generic geopolitical constellations of the Islamic world remain indicators which, cumulatively, provide some insight, if tentative, into national purpose as well as incentive-structures. Hence, with the aid of an interpretative approach, we shall seek to unveil the inner logic of the OIC mechanics by reference to the action (and indeed inaction) of three key players, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The selection of case studies has been guided by a multiplicity of considerations. To start with, the historiographical symmetry in the fact that these states were founded, or transformed, with reference to explicitly religious imperatives unify them paradigmatically. Taxonomically, they all remain nominally “Islamic”, notwithstanding radical divergence in constitutional structures (respectively monarchic, theocratic, and democratic). Second, an assessment of their relative importance in the Islamic world, measured with an assemblage of yardsticks, from political geography, to political economy, to demographic, technological, industrial, military, and natural assets (which are all variables that influence foreign policy preference), render them analytically salient. Third, the emphatic and discernible interests of these (founder) states in the body politic
of the OIC and, by way of exertion, their predominant importance within the Organization engender that the effective dynamic of the OIC is defined by the political intercourse of this virtual triumvirate. Given the historical lack of a single preponderant hegemon within the OIC, the constellation and interposition of the quorum of these three state parties determine the momentum, or inertia, of collective action in the Organization. As regards the ubiquity of analysis, I have considered their diversity in terms of political structures, geopolitical placement, sectarian allegiance, and ethnicity an enrichment of the study. Finally, their respective foreign policy inclinations (in conception, promulgation, and pursuit), in particular their divergent postures vis-à-vis a US-dominated global and regional order, proved to be a cogent criterion in selecting them for further scrutiny.

Since the foreign policy of a state is the reflection of its internal condition as well as its external conditioning, any holistic analysis of policy formation (and expression) must necessarily encompass components that satisfy both dimensions. Accordingly, I shall pursue the task at hand by reference to the following five analytical hooks, representing variables that discharge intermediary, if not initiatory, energies in the process of policy formation: (i) national history, (ii) ideological prism, (iii) domestic rationale, and (iv) the regional and (v) international geopolitical systems. Despite the loci of these constituents, the narrative will flow undisturbed by excessive sub-sections. The findings, though, will be integrated in a comparative discussion in order to facilitate a cross-national evaluation of motives and strategies.

THE OIC AND SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY: DEPOLITICIZING INTERNATIONAL ISLAM

Hosting both the Meccan and Medinite sanctuaries, the Saudi Kingdom is the spiritual heartland of the Islamic creed *par excellence*. Its historical status as the cradle of the faith chronically infuses a position of prestige in its inter-Islamic relations, a position which it has never abstained from exploiting in its foreign-policy construction. The monarch’s titular self-ascription as “Custodian of the Holy Sanctuaries” (*Khādīm al-ḥaramayn al-sharifayn*), albeit clearly a religious innovation with only peripheral precedent in Mamluk and early Ottoman lexicon, displays this game of epithet. That the title was reintroduced by King Fahd as late as in October 1986, subsequent to the Iranian Revolution, establishes its latent political potential.\(^1\) Clearly, though, the Saudi regime has never sought the
creation of an Islamic *Internationale*, but rather relied on pan-Islamism as a liturgy to attain both domestic legitimacy and foreign respectability. Islamic internationalism, then, has operated as a dual counter-strategy, directed against both international insecurity (first from Nasserism, then from Shi‘ism) and internal instability (*inter alia*, from Salafi resurgence).²

If the shrine in Mecca, the “House of God,” remains a strategic asset for the House of Saud, its early alliance with Wahhabiyya protestantism (since 1744) remains an international liability—which, incidentally, stands in marked contract to the internal cohesion that the Wahhabi clerics have added to Saudi civil society.³ Both theological innovation (*bid‘a*)⁴ and civic transgressions (*fitna*)⁵ would suffice to account for the disbelief with which the surrounding Islamic world has perceived Saudi Arabia, the very foundations of which rested on fratricidal misdemeanour together with a very disdainful and self-assured holier-than-thou sectarianism.

The current House of Saud, proclaimed as such in 1932, represents the third Saudi–Wahhabi condominium in Middle Eastern history. The first was established in 1744 by Muhammad ibn Saud (forbear to the present rulers) after a pact with “Imam” Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab (1703–92), a dogmatic and austere zealot who was expelled from his hometown for his inflammatory religious polemics but took refuge at the Saudi court at al-Diriyya. The first House of Saud became the leading power of the Peninsula by conquest and expansion westwards, including a bloody campaign for the Hijaz in 1803 but was destroyed in fifteen years later as Egypt’s viceroy Muhammad Ali Pasha, at the behest of the Ottoman sultan, retook the Hijaz and “freed” the sanctuaries from their new claimants. Subsequently, the new Saudi capital of Riyadh surrendered and late-1818 saw the final dismantlement of the dynasty.

The second House, however, originated already in 1824 with Turki ibn Saud, who retook Riyadh while tacitly acknowledging the suzerainty of Muhammad Ali. After Turki’s assassination in 1834, internal feuds among his successors led Muhammad bin Raschid, a tribal leader of the Shammar, to consolidate his rule by capturing al-Hasa and later Riyadh (in 1891), at which point the Saudi leadership was exiled first to Bahrain and then to Kuwait. The second House, too, had fallen.

Another reincarnation of *āl Sa‘ūd*, however, was in stock with the political emergence of young Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud in the year 1902, as he reclaimed Riyadh from the archrival Ibn Raschid by such unholy tactics as having his opponent stabbed even as he sought
refuge in a mosque—traditionally a place of sanctuary. This fateful (or faithless) event marked the return of the Sausis to Najd. Spiking the heads of his enemies only to display them at the gates of the city as a warning to heedless (though not headless) clan-elders, Ibn Saud had his followers initiate a reign of terror by burning to death twelve hundred people in sheer celebration. No wonder why this tribal patriarch came to earn such unflattering terms as "a lecher," "a bloodthirsty autocrat" and "one of the most corrupt people of all time . . . whose savagery wreaked havoc across Arabia." With the expansion of Saudi power in course of the following three decades the first-ever Muslim inquisition could take place in the heartland of Islam, leaving, according to one estimate, over a quarter of a million murdered or maimed, including tens of thousands publicly executed, and an even greater number of refugees. All this in the name of a new unitarian church, a new *muwahhid* canon.

Fighting Ottomans, Hashemites, Idrissis, and Shi'ites on the accusation that they had all fallen in the ditch beside the normative "Straight Path" (*sirat al-mustaqīm*) and thus were legitimate targets, the Saudi–Wahhabi symbiosis secured an early reputation for bigoted dogmatism. The case was not, of course, as al-Farsy (1990) would have us believe, that "[t]he combination of a deeply held theological conviction and military success proved irresistible to many. As a result, the Saudi state began to spread rapidly." Irresistible only because all unbridled violence is, the fortunes of the Saudi state expanded proportionally to its vigour and militancy. Having subjugated almost the entire peninsula, Ibn Saud, father to all the subsequent Saudi monarchs (he is said to have produced a sizeable number of offspring, totalling forty-two sons and an unknown number of daughters), could in January 1926 proclaim himself "King of the Hijaz" in addition to his erstwhile titular designation as "Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies." With this, political Wahhabism had, once again, produced a dynastic state.

Still, to assume *partout* that religious zeal has guided the Saudi royalty would take liberty with interpretation. Certainly, for the Saudi establishment the concept "over-the-horizon power" has always implied something other than a heavenly Divine. In fact, big-power patronage has provided the very raison d’être for the inception, consolidation, and development of the Saudi dynasty to the extent that "Saudi Arabia in its current form owes its very existence to Western policy." The nativity of the Saudi Kingdom unfolded in a scenario of not only inter-Islamic confrontation but extensive extra-Islamic alliances, involving both British, American
and, until 1938, Soviet connections. Initially, Britain played the key-role in backing Ibn Saud and his conquests, supplying arms and advisers (recall the legendary confidant, Harry St John Philby in the years 1917–53) and a subsidy amounting to two-thirds of the country’s annual income until the first oil discoveries in the 1930s. If, in the first years of the twentieth century, Ibn Sand had supplicated thus, “May the eyes of the British government be fixed upon us and may we be considered as your protégés,” the generous imperial overlord seemed to have granted the plea. In his memoir Sir Winston Churchill noted of Ibn Saud that “my admiration for him was deep, because of his unfailing loyalty to us,” and, in an official memorandum from 1945, Her Majesty’s Government would include this exultant note: “Ibn Saud’s influence in the Middle East is very great, and it has been used consistently for a number years in support of our policy.” At least one writer sees the Saudi expansion as “British-sponsored conquests” and argues that the simple, undeniable fact behind Ibn Saud’s rise to power was Britain’s interest in finding someone to deputise for it on the eve of the First World War, when it was trying to wrest control of the Arabian Peninsula from Turkey’s hands, and after, when the other Arab leaders were not as forthcoming.

But it was not only against external threats that the Saudi autocracy was bolstered; internal dangers too were fought with a helping hand from foreign friends. Along these lines, the Ikhwān rebellion of 1929, led by hot-headed Wahhabi ultras unhappy with the increasing decadence of the royalty, was put down at the Battle of Sabalah with the aid of the British RAF and troops from the British-controlled army in Iraq.

In essence, the extra-territorial alignment has been the very leitmotif of Saudi foreign policy, exemplified first in the 1915 Darea Treaty with the British and later, since 1943, its lease of the Dhahran airbase to the United States. At this point, at least, al-Farsy does not shy away from a frank admission when he, in brackets, observes, “It is perhaps interesting to note that Britain and the United States were the only countries that had serious [diplomatic and military] relations with King Abdul-Aziz in the period from 1915 to 1953.” Already prior to the inception of the OIC, therefore, King Faisal was bound to assure himself (and his foreign guardians) that the “call for Islamic solidarity was totally unrelated to military alliances . . . and
was in no way intended to sow enmity between the Muslims and the non-Muslims.”17 As displayed in the situational context of the emergence of the OIC reviewed in the previous chapter, the fact that pan-Islamic pretences were entirely epiphenomenal as foreign-policy rationales said little, if anything, about the utility of the Islamic invocation in the political game: Double standards amounted to double assets.

**The Peril of Palestine: A Politics of Depoliticization**

The preliminaries to the First Islamic Summit saw Saudi (and Moroccan) insistence on a limited agenda, incorporating the singular issue of the al-Aqsa sanctuary and the future status of al-Quds, but neither the Palestinian grievances nor the intricate, and divisive, Arab-Israeli conflict in toto.18 Although the OIC has since expanded its role as a relatively authentic commentator on the “Islamic” perception of the Palestinian predicament, the Saudi antipathy to the politicization of the pan-Islamic enterprise remains unaltered. Saudi absence from the major policy-proposing committees should occasion no surprise and one must be inclined to see the Saudi backing for the permanent Moroccan chairmanship of the al-Quds Committee (est. 1975) as a tacit bi-monarchical deradicalization agreement. With this, the Moroccan monarch could, as a parallel to the Saudi litany, be decorated with the title “Custodian of al-Aqsa” (*Khādīm al-ʿaqsa*)—an appropriation that only added some zest to his more grandiose title “Commander of the Faithful” (*Amīr al-muʿminīn*). Officially, of course, the lofty mission of the al-Quds Committee is to safeguard the Islamicity of Jerusalem (as per resolution 1/4-P of the Fourth ICFM, Benghazi 1973). Privately, however, most commentators can agree that by segregating the issue, and territory, of Jerusalem from the wider entity of Palestine, the OIC has managed to distance itself from the high-political question of national emancipation and territorial liberation. As a sobering illustration of this policy of distance, let us recall another distance: Morocco cannot conceivably claim frontline status; Rabat is 4,000 miles from Ramallah.

The Saudi credentials, too, are less than compelling. When Jordan’s King Hussein in 1970 decided to initiate a blood-spattered mopping-up operation against increasingly assertive Palestinian radicals—what came to be known as Black September—Saudi troops, stationed in Jordan since 1957, were all-too-willingly party to the massacre. In Lebanon, moreover, Saudi Arabia, circumspect
about the influence of both Syria and Iran, was found backing the Christian Phalange (financially, but also with arms and armoured vehicles) against militant Palestinians, their Lebanese coreligionists, and the Shi’a, whether of Amal or Hezbollah inclination.19

It is, however, worth pondering why the OIC should bestow upon the PLO, alone among non-state actors, full membership when other liberation organizations, representing Muslims in Cyprus, Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines along with the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity, are admitted only as observers. One explanation, of course, is the straightforward one of Palestine, as pan-religious terra irredenta and codified charter objective of the OIC, being the single critical test-case of pan-Islamism: Failure on the sacred soil of al-Aqsa means failure in conception, not only in execution. In addition, the stateless nature of the Palestinian territories under continuous military occupation has disallowed a conceptualization of the problematic as one of international territorial dispute and instead projected the issue to be one that transcends regional or sub-regional spheres of interest—hence the potency of Palestine.

But the simultaneous peril of Palestine derives from the fact that the conflict, if not contained, could destabilize international relations in the Middle East as well as besiege disfavoured regimes of the region by radical domestic detractors. In the final calculation, the PLO is, to many conservative regimes in the region, not only preferential to Islamist, Marxian, or other radical elements within the polyphonic Palestinian resistance, but the continued failure of the PLO is preferential to the potential success of other voices. In a sense, most Arab regimes need the PLO more than the PLO needs them: While the self-installed Palestinian hero-in-history, Chairman Arafat, can travel from capital to capital, dispersing much-needed domestic legitimacy to encircled regimes, they in return need to provide him no other service than sweet talk and, occasionally, anti-Israeli sour talk.

At the same time, a bolstered PLO willing to walk the tightrope of the peace process ensures the deradicalization of the conflict, which is thereby reduced to be a disagreement about the “process” (itinerary) rather than the “peace” (intention) component of the formula. Note, conversely, how the PLO, when it was viewed as a radical and destabilizing force, was left unsupported during the Israeli invasion and subsequence siege of Lebanon in 1982. But times, and the PLO, changed. A deliberate policy of deradicalization explains both why the PLO, and not a broader representation of the
Palestinian people, is allowed into the OIC decision-making process and why the PLO is reified with a full-fledged membership that its quasi-Bantustan credentials do not warrant.

The OIC’s endorsement of the US-sponsored invitation to the Madrid Conference emerges as one example of this political deradicalization, but it materialized only after both Egypt and Saudi Arabia had warned that any opposition to the peace initiative (which was always an attempt at conflict management rather than conflict resolution) would challenge the “international legitimacy” of the Organization.20 The fierce opposition to this approach (of collective peace-processing) from Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati was outmanoeuvred, and the balance of forces led to the prevalence of the Saudi approach. With the further maturation of the peace process, the OIC—to the great desperation of the PLO—partout abandoned its designation of the Palestine predicament as legitimate “jihād.” As the drama unfolded during the Sixth Islamic Summit Conference (Dakar, December 1991), a visibly grieved Yasser Arafat temporarily boycotted the summit, even though it had been titled the al-Quds Summit and Arafat, as a rare honorific gesture, had been elected Vice-Chairman. 21

With the OIC’s departure from Islamic idioms came a largely anticipated withdrawal of the earlier reservations against UN-resolutions 242 and 338 as providing an acceptable base for a “just and equitable” solution. This implied not only an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the land-for-peace mindset but, for Saudi representatives, also an acknowledgement of the Zionist entity as next-door neighbour to the “Most Holy Sanctuaries.” As events were later to reveal, what was conveniently overlooked in the quest for a new Middle East architecture, was the absence of any reference to Palestinian national rights in these resolutions (as opposed to UN Resolution 194 which insists on a Palestinian right to return or, failing that, compensation, together with numerous General Assembly resolutions calling for Palestinian statehood).

Continuing the Saudi legacy since the Fahd Plan of 1981, which had sotto voce argued for the comprehensive diplomatic recognition of Israel (within the 1967 borders), the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs Prince Saud al-Faisal certainly remained a stable de-radicalizer in the OIC as he a priori and unconditionally approved PLO negotiations with Israel.22 During the Madrid and Moscow Conferences (October 1991/January 1992), too, the Saudi representation emerged as a safe, albeit low-key, peace protagonist. In addition, the Kingdom tacitly supported the diplomatic and econo-
mic contacts between Israel and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (especially Oman and Qatar) and agreed to lift the secondary and tertiary boycotts against Israel in 1994. It occasioned no surprise, therefore, when Prince Saud al-Faisal in 1995 assured the 50th session of the UN General Assembly that his country had, all along, “actively worked to advance bilateral talks between the Arab parties and Israel,” notwithstanding the strategic sell-out of this position and the detrimental diplomatic balance in bilateral (one-to-one) negotiations as compared to multilateral (common front) talks. To the limited extent to which the Saudi regime had worked for a multilateral approach in relation to Palestine, this consisted in the formation of largely inconsequential organs within the OIC, like that grandiosely titled Committee of Muslim Experts Concerned with Devising Means for the Combat of the Dangers of Zionist and Imperialist Settlement in the Occupied Arab and Palestinian Territories. To date, no memorandum has been released in the name of the sinecure, perhaps not unintentionally so.

Absent both multilateral initiatives and bilateral goodwill, unilateralism has continually emerged as the default strategy in the Levant. With the failed summit at Camp David between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Chairman Arafat in July 2000, US President Bill Clinton could warn the latter not to declare Palestinian statehood unilaterally, a thought (or threat) which was prevalent at the time, and assured that US sanctions would follow should he decide not to heed the warning. Still, Palestinian unilateralism was a remote possibility even as the Clinton–Barak duo would offer exactly 18 per cent of historic Palestine to a future Palestinian polity, would dismiss the right of Palestinian refugees to return notwithstanding UN resolutions to the contrary, and would unrelentingly maintain the infamous five “red lines.” The latter category included, inter alia, the demand that Jerusalem remain under full and unequivocal Israeli sovereignty, that settlements too remain under Israeli rule, and that no return to the pre-June 1967 lines of control be contemplated.

There was Barak (who had accelerated the construction of settlements on the occupied territories in a quest to alter “facts on the ground” and who, unlike his hardline predecessor Binyamin Netanyahu, did not cede any occupied territory but instead violated the Oslo Accords by not withdrawing the Israeli military from specified territories before the end of the stipulated interim period), and there was Clinton (described, unflatteringly, by Edward Said as a “lame duck president” whose “ideas about the Middle East were
those of a Christian fundamentalist Zionist with no exposure to or understanding of the Arab–Islamic world” 26). While both were inviting Arafat to write off Palestinian national and territorial rights, the OIC again engaged in a conspiracy of silence. Exercising its enduring policy of selective disengagement, it refrained, in an hour of dire need, from offering moral and diplomatic support to the beleaguered representative of a people dispossessed and instead proffered the Palestinians to accept a cantonized Bantustan, consisting of non-contiguous enclaves surrounded by Israeli-controlled borders, with settlements and “Jews-only” bypass roads punctuating territorial integrity. 27

Only with the renewed rage of Intifada II—the al-Aqsa Intifada—which erupted in September 2000 as a result of the disillusionment with the false, or falsified, promises of the Oslo Accords, did the OIC adopt a more proactive stance. While the official policy line since the Casablanca Summit in 1994 had rehearsed the land-for-peace mantra (which initially meant Israel’s return of occupied land in return for a comprehensive peace with its neighbours, but later came to denote Palestinian abandonment of their claim for land in return for a peaceful retreat of the Israeli war machine), the increasing death toll required reaction. The OIC could now easily be seen as upholding a policy that the Palestinian grassroots themselves had rejected. At the Ninth Islamic Summit in November 2000, hosted by Qatar (a Saudi vassal state, which is the second underwriter of Wahhabism), the OIC was duty-bound to “invite member states that have relations with Israel . . . to break them,” but stopped short of calling for a boycott. Of course, this “invitation”—a diluted formulation of the draft-verb “demand”—entailed no compulsion, let alone any sanction in case of non-compliance. “We cannot be more royal than the king,” the Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani apologized. 28 Having perhaps feared the radicalizing impulse that the death of two hundred Palestinian civilians would generate, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia had initially offered relatively junior delegations to the summit and remained low profile during the proceedings, which, as it happened, were called off one day earlier than scheduled to avoid an open contretemps with the different state parties at loggerheads. When, at last, it appeared that the OIC would take a proactive step, prompted by largely self-asserting calls for jiḥād from Iraqi and Sudanese quarters, together with portions of Muslim public opinion, it was important to assure that no punitive measures against Israel were collectively agreed to (exactly as under the preceding Arab Summit), and that no pre-emptive commitment
to an international protection force was made, as this would challenge the humanitarian *laissez-faire* of Western states.²⁹

Nor was the OIC, despite simmering anti-American sentiments during its proceedings, specific in its critique of the American role in the Near Eastern region, even as the American chapter of Amnesty International had just days earlier called on the US government to cease all transfers of Apache and Blackhawk attack-helicopters to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) until the latter would be willing to demonstrate that such aircraft would not be used for human rights violations in Israel, the occupied territories, or the areas under Palestinian civil control.³⁰ United States weapons sales “do not carry a stipulation that the weapons can’t be used against civilians,” a Pentagon official was reported to have said in response, although he did acknowledge that “anti-tank missiles and attack helicopters are not traditionally considered tools for crowd control.”³¹ Ironically, soon the weapon-of-choice was to escalate to F-16s in a first-ever application to civilian targets. To the ruling palace of al-Yamama in Riyadh, and most of the sheikhdoms party to the Gulf Cooperation Council, the fact that military hardware was used for internal repression rather than external defence must have occurred as a theme not altogether unfamiliar. The auxiliary fact that such hardware should be American supplied, and materialized in the face of massive humanitarian opposition, too, was a replay of earlier episodes in which they had themselves occupied not-too-glamorous roles.

Six months later, as foreign ministers met for an extraordinary conference in Doha, the rhetorics were accelerated: Now the OIC had “decided to halt all political contacts with Israel,” but not to reverse them.³² Nor was any Islamic protection force forthcoming, notwithstanding the fact that Israel did not, and did not claim to, exercise sovereignty over the occupied territories and could not therefore, in terms of its privileges under international law, veto a decision to deploy observer forces or peace-enforcing troops in the area. But, of course, the Palestinian quandary had rarely been a matter of legal niceties. As the heat was turning up in the Middle East both Saudi Arabia and Egypt seemed to realize that they could no longer determine the (dis)course and, despite intense last-minute lobbying by the PLO, both states declined to send their foreign ministers to the Doha Conference, assuring thus that they would not, when viewed from Washington, be guilty by association. In the end, Mr Arafat announced that the European Union, perhaps, would be a more productive partner in the quest for peace, thereby subtly revealing his disillusion with the increasingly Americophile Arab nexus.
Two Sources of Security: Religion and Other Riches

The House of Saud has always sought its political disposition justified with reference to political correctness per Islam. Indeed, the religious establishment in the form of the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ remains a necessary (but not sufficient) source of legitimacy for the kingly sub-clan of the Sudairis. Tacitly, a division of labour has emerged in the political domain: dynastic preponderance in foreign affairs in return for the clerical upper hand in civil society, including the educational system.33

Not only has the cooptation of the ʿulamāʾ in the Saudi state provided for a “watchdog guarding against aspects of modernity deemed iniquitous,” but the conservative modality has extended also to less philosophical challenges to the political establishment, at times approaching a speedy dial-a-fatwa mode in the service of the status quo.34 Hence, when the Gulf War challenged the Islamic semblance of the ruling dynasty, having attached itself to American infidelity to tame Saddam, the green-light fatwa of the chief Saudi court cleric, the late Abdul-Aziz bin Baz, was a due instalment. Departing from traditional juristic correctness, the fatwa declared the Iraqi President a greater infidel than any Saudi ally and, therefore, a more imminent hazard. Unsurprisingly, Riyadh never considered turning to the OIC (for alliance, alignment, or endorsement), although the very Charter of the Islamic Conference in a potentially anti-anti-Saudi clause promulgates that it be responsible for coordinating action “to safeguard the Holy Places.”35 Instead, the OIC secretary general was asked to ignore Iranian and Pakistani proposals for a regional settlement and, with the Sixth Summit in December 1991, autarkic resolutions were entirely foreclosed as the implementation of UN resolutions became the only stock-in-trade. The holy places at stake in the Gulf War, it seemed, were not the Islamic sanctuaries but oil wells (and perhaps refineries and the international corporations that prosper from them).

The state-backed (and state-backing) ʿulamāʾ are, however, helpful both in war and peace. Thus, by playing the Islamic card again in 1993 in relation to the Saudi jump on the peace bandwagon, south of Oslo, some sense of Islamic legitimacy, however spurious, was upheld.36 In domestics politics, too, the twenty-one member Saudi Council of Senior Clerics has been constantly in action: In 1991 when eighteen religious leaders called for the creation of a consultative council and the Islamization of the economy, media, military, and foreign policy; in 1992 when over one hundred professionals and clerics signed a
memorandum calling for the end of governmental corruption and an end to the Arabian–American axis, and in 1993 when the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (Lajnat al-difa’ ‘an al-huqūq al-shar’iyya) was formed to lobby for greater transparency and accountability, the grand ‘ulamā could in each case supply a fatwa that censored political assertivism and required conformity plus gratitude for the stability and prosperity the gracious rulers had brought the nation.

Alongside spiritual imagery as one recurring pillar of Saudi policy in the domestic and international realms, the material assets, derived directly from the Gulf’s natural resources, form a stable second pillar. While hydrocarbon has, given its divisive effects, been a mixed blessing for the Islamic world, āl Sa’ūd has certainly found in this resource a hard-currency addendum to their image-related approach to international affairs. As the mightiest petroleum producer on the globe, revenues generated from geological exports have propelled the Saudi plenipotentiaries into a position of international “oil-igarchy.” Resultantly, a cash-for-compliance tactic of managing foreign relations has been ubiquitous.

In addition to its permanent dominance in the Islamic Development Bank (IDB, est. 1974), which finances development projects as an aid donor and interest-free development agency, Saudi Arabia has used its bilateral aid policy to stabilize friendly states against subversive forces, whether springing from the Marxian left or the Islamic right. Thus between 1970 and 1991 Saudi Arabia offered OIC countries no less than $96 billion in loans and grants and, more than once, it has bankrolled the organizational budget (with on average an annualized deficit of $20 million), surging after 1993 when the total arrears owed by member states reached $60 million.37 That a cheque should arrive in the cash-starved OIC secretariat in April 2001 with the unassuming amount of $1,137,200 (note the exactitude of the amount) was typical for the calculated largesse of King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. In the process, the affection—and allegiance—of the new Secretary General, Abdelouahed Belkeziz of Morocco, was obtained, revealed subtly in the new convention of adding the courtesy phrase “may Allāh preserve him” after the name of the kindly king. As political waters would turn truly unruly after the events of September 2001, King Fahd finalized the endowment of 25,000 square metres of land and ordered the construction of a lavish new central headquarter for the OIC. Instant cash, too, was available as the King donated an amount of 2,800,000 riyals ($750,000) for inventory alone.38
Riyadh’s policy of cash-for-compliance (and the adjacent Wahhabi politics of cash-for-creed) has extended also to more adventurous undertakings, namely, support of Iraq during its confrontation with revolutionized Iran, support of the Afghan mujāhidin, particularly from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, during the anti-Soviet campaign, and support of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, known by its acronym FIS) in Algeria until Desert Storm during which the latter, without forewarning, turned against its benefactor. Having both in Egypt and in Algeria been unable to constrain, let alone control, Islamic movements, the mid-1990s saw a turn of the Saudi modus operandi, and indeed locus operandi, from organized religion to disorganized religion: That is to say from patronizing well-established movements to sponsoring lay-preachers in individual mosques, pay-as-you-go backyard bullies, and impressionable youth at university campuses. By such means, a newfound Islamic Calvinism, centred around theological secession (ipso facto, wholesale excommunication) coupled with political acquiescence, is loudly propagated, backed with travelling missionaries produced in self-styled seminaries and piles of glossy leaflets, with compliments from the United House of Saud and Abdul-Wahhab. In short, financial virility has been and remains a chief asset in seeking to maintain both a balance of power in a multipolar regional order and continued ideological penetration worldwide.

Two Faces of Security: Double Trouble

As an outcome both of regional volatility and domestic omens (whether in the form of the non-quietist ‘ulamā, the Salafi radicals, the Shi‘ite minority, or the aspiring democrats), Saudi Arabia has pursued a determined defection to low politics in the institutional context of the OIC, notwithstanding the latter’s high-political genesis. A very visible hand of the patron-host has steered the massive proliferation of agencies and institutions since the establishment of the OIC Secretariat in the Red Sea port-city of Jeddah in 1973. In so doing, however, the Saudi government was seeking to exercise selective leadership, without an identifiable overall responsibility: It did not seek hegemony, but its sole purpose was to prevent others from achieving it. With dynastic survival as leitmotif, Riyadh could rally around the pan-Islamic flag at opportune moments, without ever being the flag-bearer; never the leader, it could at times be the cheerleader (but that too with soundless gimmickry). In essence, the Saudi leadership has consciously pursued a “functionalist” strategy.
of managing the OIC, i.e. a deliberate emphasis on institutional ramification to facilitate interaction in finance, research, and commerce.

This self-conscious secularization of international Islam has, in turn, been conditioned by the systemic constraints on Saudi security policy which, in particular after Desert Shield turned to Desert Storm, have posed a strategic “prisoner’s dilemma.” As its abandonment of the “6+2” regional design of the Damascus Declaration (March 1991) lucidly illustrates, it has sought to see the dilemma resolved not by a regional design of collective security, in which Egypt and Syria (the “2”) assist in maintaining the security balance in favour of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the “6”). Rather it has readily subscribed to what I call the “Bush (Sr.) Doctrine,” a doctrine of American mercenary service, which has in time converted to a “Clinton Doctrine” in which the United States has attained residual status in the Persian Gulf. Given its ubiquity of American land, air, and sea-forces in and around the Gulf, the United States has become an enduring constant in the strategic equation of the Middle East, much to the advantage of Saudi Arabia. Little wonder why King Fahd could in 1994 hail the American ambassador to the Kingdom as “a member of the family.” For reasons of security, and oil, the United States was in the Peninsula to stay.

To be sure, ever since the Saudi (oil-)shock treatment in 1973, its political leverage in Capitol Hill has grown—very much in correlation to the oil price and Saudi purchasing power. The war industry being the single most important economic activity in the contemporary world order, the United States together with a number of other military merchants have benefited greatly from Saudi shopping habits. Having purchased more than $38 billion worth of military merchandise in 1991–5 alone (out-buying Israeli purchases in the same period by a factor of four), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia figures prominently—as an unrivalled apex—in any list of top US arms customers. Yet the “close and curious liaison” with the American guarantor of the existing (oil) order, has implied a deceitful refuge in as much as the Islamic Custodian has been constrained by its own (and less Islamic) custodian.

Domestically, the ostentatious lifestyles of the Sudairis coupled with this extra-regional, and extra-religious, clientism to foreign masters has bred widespread resentment. Characteristic of rentier economies, as that in Saudi Arabia, is not only the socio-economic asymmetry caused by geological wealth but the externally derived (largely Western) rent and the associated interest in maintaining the
polity as the personal fiefdom of the Sudairis to secure the stable access to oil.\textsuperscript{45} Often reactionary, the umbrage is marked in those Islamic quarters that, departing from official historiography, saw Desert Storm not only as a bad strategy—it landed a bill of $56 billion on the Saudi table for multinational mercenary services—but as a despoiling of sacred soil by infidel forces.\textsuperscript{46} Religion, thus, is instrumental both in building legitimacy and in bulldozing it. As Faksh (1997) reasons:

It is ironic that, in using Islamic ideological rhetoric as the medium of public discourse, the Saudi leaders have become vulnerable to religious opposition now holding them accountable to the Wahhabi ideals and values they espouse . . . The Saudis had legitimized Islamic discourse in politics and in the process had lent some degree of legitimacy to opposing groups who spoke the language of Islam.\textsuperscript{47}

This friction was displayed all-too-bombastically in November 1995 when an implanted explosive went off at a US–Saudi military training mission in Riyadh. The following year another bomb, this time in a housing complex near the Dhahran compound, home to some 30,000 US military personnel, claimed the lives of seventeen American servicemen. Both incidents were, albeit never attributed in public, assumed to be the work of disenfranchised Salafi radicals, possibly associated with the \textit{mutawwa'in}, the Islamic vigilantes or self-styled religious police (although often ex-convicts) attached to the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{48} Products of the Islamic universities set up by King Faisal to propagate the Wahhabi creed, the new radical outgrowth seems entirely home-grown as, often dreadfully unemployable, graduates engage in questionable self-employment schemes—sometimes inspired by the war veterans who, with American and Saudi blessings, had fought as part of the Afghan resistance.\textsuperscript{49} To some this probably seemed to be a replay of two previous revolts against the unworthiness of a royal family that had betrayed the founder-pact of the Saudi–Wahhabi condominium: The militant Ikhwān backlash in 1929, which was defeated only with the military involvement of the British, and the messianic Salafi occupation of the Meccan Grand Mosque in 1979, which was brought to an end only with a French-aided commando raid. In September 2001, the final manifestation, and hitherto culmination, of Saudi Arabia’s domestic mosque–palace estrangement unfortunately landed on American soil. Of the nineteen hijackers initially identified as perpetrators of the
vehement act of terror, fifteen were Saudi nationals, hailing primarily from the economically poor, but religiously fierce, southwestern region of Asir.

Among military analysts it is no secret that the armed forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by its military doctrine and posture, are meant less for external security and increasingly more for internal security. This is particularly the case with the 75,000 strong National Guard, a latter-day Ikhwan division, traditionally consisting of loyalist Bedouin tribesmen. As opposed to the National Guard, the regular fighting forces are perceived as potential agents of disruption, not least due to the numerous precedents of anti-royal military coups in the political history of the Middle East. To minimize its proclivity for involvement in a nationalist overthrow or, worse, Islamist revolution, the army is situated at remote bases, located distant from centres of population and government, again unlike the National Guard which now matches the army in many weapons types and armoured vehicles.

Distinctive about the Saudi defence structure is also its undermanned character: As a matter of quantifiable fact, its aircraft-to-personnel, tank-to-personnel and naval vessels-to-personnel, ratios remain the very highest in the world. To minimize the independence of the armed forces, moreover, the Royal Saudi Land Forces and the Royal Saudi Air Forces have a deliberately fragmented command and control system (a deadly liability should it ever come to interstate warfare), while the hardware complex provides for a disintegrated amalgam of military commodities from sundry British, French, and American suppliers. Yet, despite its multi-billion-dollar annual procurement budget (averaging $18–22 billion in the last decade) in addition to undisclosed multi-billion dollar arms-for-oil deals, Saudi Arabia spends little in the way of manpower training and the upgrading of military skills. Instead it hires skilled personnel (“software”) from Western, notably American, or Eastern, notably Pakistani, partners in combination with an uninhibited shopping spree for high-tech military hardware which remains weird but wonderful to most Saudi officers.50

Thus, for the Saudi establishment, sadly, no direct correlation between weapons acquisition and security applies. When a top Saudi financial advisor opines that the United States does not know “what it’s doing by shoving weapons down the Saudis’ throats,” given that arms purchases increase both debt and dependence, he reasons erroneously.51 In a political order characterized by interest-pursuit and interest-maximization, the United States knows exactly what it’s
up to. In Riyadh, however, there is well-founded cause for concern. When, in 1995, Prince Khaled bin Sultan, the Saudi Joint Forces Commander, would state that “Saudi Arabia’s relation with the West—and especially with Britain and the United States—is our single most important strategic asset,” he would, to be sure, tell a half-truth only. In effect, its exact assiduous client status vis-à-vis Washington, whether in a Nixonian “twin-pillar” or a Clintonian “dual-containment” edition, remains both an asset and, no less instantaneously, a liability for Saudi Arabia. It was this creeping realization that prompted Crown Prince Abdullah to plea for a greater distance to the United States amid the anti-Taliban air campaign, lest the Palace be viewed as an American pawn. Indicating perhaps a desire for the United States to trim, or entirely shave, its military presence in the Peninsula, he suggested, “It is time for the United States and Saudi Arabia to look at their separate interests. Those governments that don’t feel the pulse of their people and respond to it will suffer the same fate as the Shah of Iran.” Clearly, few in the West, and fewer still in the Saudi royal circle, wanted to replicate the Iranian experience and provoke the fall of the Saudi Shah.

But the US–Saudi defence (and, in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, offence) nexus had inter-Islamic repercussions in addition to its precarious domestic ramifications. While the supply of security has maintained a favourable balance of power, and balance of terror, in the region, the implied political patronage of the United States has been both an inhibiting factor in policy formation and, equally, a modifying (i.e. self-censoring) factor in the voicing of alternative policy-options, particularly so when pertaining to a (potentially maverick) pan-Islamic system of alignment. The close and costly liaison with the United States, therefore, has exacerbated the Saudi depoliticization of the OIC into a loose association of states, rather than a purposive and unitary actor in international equations. Incidentally, Ibn Taymiya, the contentious fourteenth century jurist who dismissed the relevancy of the Caliphal institution, remains the referent-of-choice in Saudi seminaries and could be mistaken, pares paribus, for the patron saint of Saudi Arabia—were it not for the Wahhabi aversion to saints and sainthood.

THE OIC AND IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
UNILATERAL MULTILATERALISM

Ever since the Safavid dynasty (1501–1732), when Shi‘i Islam graduated to an officially-enhanced state religion, faith and polity have
been intimately intertwined in Persia, if only by cooptation and silence. Many an emperor ruled in the name of the last imam (the twelfth according to the *ihna-‘asharî* tradition), who had gone into occultation (*ghayba*) in 874 CE only to return as the righteous saviour at the eschatological end—a convenient narrative, which allowed for unrighteous rule in the interregnum. In the hands of the Shi‘a ‘ulamā, typically more stratified and organized than their Sunni counterparts, *Shi‘at ‘Alî*, the wronged but truthful Party of Ali, became a scholastic, quietist, and almost fatalist tradition. Although always a latent political force, Shi‘i themes and institutions would only rarely be utilized for political mobilization, the exceptional cases being the Tobacco Protest of 1891–2 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11. It had to be a nationalist, rather than Islamist, movement headed by Muhammad Mossadegh, which first drove dynastic rule into exile. With the return of the Shah, courtesy of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a range of laity intellectuals from Jalal-i Ahmad and Ali Shariati to Mehdi Bazargan, all critical of the clerical establishment, came to epitomize radical reformism. If it was the ayatollah Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini who would capitalize on the growing discontents, he could do so only by departing from the established trajectory, rather than extending it. Only thus could Iranian Shi‘ism go from quietist apoliticism to revolutionary activism.

As the new synthesis of Khomeinism incarnated in 1979, the Iranian metamorphosis amounted to no less than a “twin revolution,” for its target was both the domestic establishment and foreign politico-cultural penetration. By practical prolongation, clerical Iran very early managed to estrange itself from both the Western bloc and, critically, the Islamic world. Amid the inaugural hostage-drama, the dual impasse was made manifest in the twin tracks of condemnation: UN resolutions in December 1979 and OIC resolutions in January and again in May 1980.

In its all-inclusive rejectionism, the Khomeinite slogan “neither East nor West” ceased to be a customary declaration of non-alignment (which it clearly was for Mossadegh) and developed proportions of an ideological rejection of the global order, an epistemological bid to innovate alternative heuristics, and an ontological attempt to redefine political values. In the formulae of the Iranian conversion to political Islam “little stress was placed on Iran as a national entity,” for its “universalism was more pronounced than that of the French or Russian revolution[s].” Indeed, to the Chief Ayatollah frontiers were ideological not territorial:
Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers is against Islam and the interests of the Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed by the spread of [revolutionary] Islam.\textsuperscript{60}

The development of what may be conceived as a Shi'ite version of ultramontanism, requiring transnational submission to faith as opposed to polity, was echoed in Khomeini’s habitual proclamation: “In Islam there are no frontiers.” This was true also for the mechanics of the revolution; although Iran was its mother-country, the Islamic revolution was for global, or at least regional, consumption. “Our revolution,” Khomeini would ascertain, “is not tied to Iran. The Iranian people’s revolution was the starting point for the great revolution of the Islamic world.”\textsuperscript{61} The programmatic horizon, messianic in undertones, entailed a global politics of redemption.

The domestic Iranian transformation was only the immediate manifestation of the new revivalist impulse of the ideological and political counter-offensive. The extended manifestations, dubbed the “people-to-people” stratagem, arrived in a bewildering variety of forms: The sporadic Shi’i insurrections in Iraq in 1979, the Salafi seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca later that year, the Shi’i insurrection in Qatif on the Saudi east-coast in 1979–80, the Shi’i upheaval in Bahrain in 1981, the activities of Hizbollah in Lebanon from 1982 onwards, and possibly some Shi’a involvement in the bombings which befell Kuwait in 1983–5.\textsuperscript{62} Having chased off “Carter’s running dog” (\textit{sag-i karter}, the Shah) from the domestic scene, Iranian eyes had turned to the entire Gulf region. The early announcement (by enthusiasts and antagonists alike) that the Islamic march would spill over by “apostles of the revolution” emerged as a geopolitical Pandora’s box in the rank of the Muslim states and indicated, in a sense, an Islamist parallel to the Communist-conditioned domino-theory. Pre-Khomeini revolutions were either nationalist or socialist and almost always administered by an “enlightened” élite in the name of the popular will; post-Khomeini revolutions could turn Islamic and therefore frighteningly anarcho-popular.

Was this militant third-worldism painted green? Much pointed in this direction, for it was world imperialism itself (\textit{istikbär-i jahānī}, lit. world arrogance) which was the foe. It was, with Qur’ānic parlance, a cosmic battle—the browbeaten had to rise against their oppressors.\textsuperscript{63} But, of course, Khomeini’s referents were less than scriptural. When asked which historical event the Islamic Revolution was a reaction
to, Khomeini would surprise: The Napoleonic inroad into Egypt, this most dramatic imperial assault on Islamdom two hundred years past, was the answer.64

The subservient Islam of the Saudi brand, prostrating to the idol of superpower patronage, emerged as a particularly perverted form of “shirk” (polytheism), anathematic, as it were, to the pristine pact with the Almighty. In addition, the eschatological Shi‘ite “Kingdom of God” was, needless to say, no monarchy. The teleology of the new discursive configuration was predictable: The forces of darkness, of plutocracy and perversion, would fall, for the ultimate iconoclast (bot-shekan)—Khomeini himself—was at hand, able and ready to smash the fake idols (tāghūt). Thus the discourse of Iranian Islam, faithful to its Manichaean pedigree, formulated itself as a dualistic binary to the Saudi monarchy: The latter’s reactionary disposition was contrasted to its own revolutionary capacity, and the latter’s “westoxified” regression contrasted its own Islamic emancipation.65

The accent on ecclesiastical institutions and their preponderance in the domestic polity, unlike their subservient role the Saudi system, was one way of asserting this emancipation. The ‘ulamā were not to back the power of the state; they, in combination with the perennial authority of the religion, constituted the very power of the state. Indeed, external ultramontanism was only complemented with an internal papacy, legitimized in the new jargon of velāyat-i faqīh, the guardianship of the infallible jurisconsult. “For the first time in Muslim history,” Bernard Lewis (1995) notes, “we find functional equivalents of bishops, archbishops, cardinals, and—some would argue—even a pope.”66 In the hands of the historically independent Shi‘a clergy, the Islamization of the polity suspiciously resembled its institutional Christianization and paralleled a pre-Reformation episcopacy, but politicized in as much as ecclesial functions were simultaneously merged with the governance of the nation and the administration of the state. As per the view of Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), from whom Khomeini had drawn inspiration for his novel political theory, the Islamic state was Islamic first and foremost in its personnel.67 To a Shi‘a, or imāmiyya, audience the new structures could be justified, as they were in the very constitution (Art. V), with reference to the guidance of the ever-living Imam in Occultation (imām al-mahdi or imām al-ghayb), transmitted in dreams and visions, unsurprisingly, to the knowing faqīh of the age.

For an international audience, however, the presentation was to be noticeably modified. And here the OIC seemed useful. Where the Saudi utility of the OIC lay in its provision of legitimacy, neo-Iran
wished to use the OIC as the exact delegitimizer of the culturally contaminated Household of Saud. Alas, all too soon was the revolutionary lethargy of the OIC recognized as an instrument of reaction. The Iraqi attack on Iran in September 1980 and the ensuing eight-year war posed, as an intra-*umma* confrontation, a conceptual oxymoron for the OIC. Here were two countries both nominally committed to the cause of unity under the Islamic banner, yet so conditioned by alternative agendas that military confrontation was an almost fatalistic conclusion. For the Shiʿite theocrats the OIC displayed not only whimsical ineptitude but, more seriously, also an inscribed pro-Arab bias. Thus the extensive, and expansive, pan-Islamic aspirations of Iran were from the very outset countered by a defensive pan-Arab parochialism within the OIC.

Having failed twice to rid themselves of the turbaned menace by first a failed assassination attempt and then an attempt to instigate a counter-revolution (this time in clandestine alliance with Israel and the United States), the Saudis had to resort to less dramatic diplomacy. Where Saudi Arabia had in the pre-1969 period used pan-Islamism as a counter-discourse to Nasserite pan-Arabism, it now reversed its allegiances by promoting pan-Arabism to counter an increasingly assertive pan-Islamist outgrowth from the pulpits of Persia (and, not to forget, the international radio broadcasts of the Voice of the Islamic Revolution, a noteworthy inversion of the Voice of America). The ironical volte-face, which took the Gulf Arabs back to that very pan-Arabism from which they had earlier distanced themselves, was amplified by the fact that one aide in this act of discursive power-balancing was the exact erstwhile bête noir: Egypt, which was incidentally under suspension since May 1979 for having gone solo with Camp David (whereby it was alleged to have “deviated from” the Charter), was thus hastily, and without any justification, readmitted to the OIC at the Casablanca Summit (January 1984)—half a decade before it was invited back into the Arab League.

Significantly, Iran had boycotted that very summit for reasons of perceived political partiality within the OIC, a perception vindicated by the summit’s delinquent elevation of the official Iraqi statement to OIC communiqué.

Nothing—least of all the acquiescence with the Iraqi aggression—indicated that the OIC was in a hurry to end the fighting in the Gulf, in particular as the troublesome Iranian genie seemed to be in for a good beating. While the outbreak of hostilities between the second and third largest exporters of oil would have made the oil price skyrocket, Saudi Arabia pre-empted any such sequence, doubled its oil
output, and kept world prices low. This was indeed new tones for a country that was not only a founder-member of the politicized Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) but had actively coordinated the anti-Western oil embargo in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Minimizing the cost of the conflict also assured its stable perpetuation and provided, in effect, for a reticent policy of weakening both countries simultaneously. For Khomeini, as well as for many dispassionate observers, the peremptory favouritism of the aggressor in the conflict provided evidence for the praetorian, certainly devious, manipulation of OIC obligations. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, reiterated the distrust by a direct disclaimer: “We do not accept the current configuration of the OIC and have a fundamental objection to the way it works.”

Cognitively, the first Gulf War, in posing a threatened Persian identity against a homogenous Arab front, motivated a decline of the Islamo-internationalist component in the construction of Iranian national selfhood and rather reinforced religious and cultural idiosyncrasies. The ethno-historical discourse of the beleaguered nation with the beleaguered tradition was rediscovered as Persia and Shi‘ism were reinstalled as mythological foci, very much in a departure from the early revolutionary clarion call to transcend national and sectarian divides (but even then only to expand the realm of the revolution). Once again, religion was embedded in and sustained by parochial narrations about the virtue of the tradition-select and the virtuosity of the community-elect. With this, Irano-Shi‘i self-representation came full circle. The exact inability to penetrate overseas markets to which the revolution, as an idea and a structure, had to be exported amounted to a glaring failure on the part of Khomeini’s action plan so indiscreetly declared in that constitutional clause which called for the “perpetuation of the revolution at home and abroad.” A strategic, or perhaps merely tactical, retreat was called for.

**Taming the Ayatollahs: Virtue vs. Necessity**

The Saudi–Iranian rivalry in the OIC was fuelled by incidents during the pilgrimage season of 1987, where some 400 pilgrims, hereof 275 Iranian, had been massacred by Saudi security forces subsequent to anti-Saudi slogan-chanting and analogous provocations. In Tehran, angry mobs retaliated by ransacking the Saudi embassy; they detained and maltreated several diplomats, including one Saudi official who
subsequently died from his injuries. On the rebound, Riyadh decided for the immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Tehran, thereby obstructing the primary channel by which Iranian pilgrims obtained Saudi visas required for the \textit{hajj}. Attempting again to utilize the multilateral forum of the OIC, Iran indefatigably insisted on a public apology and a confession of guilt; after all, the Saudi government was responsible for the security of pilgrims. Undeterred, Saudi Arabia ingeniously manipulated the OIC mechanism to draft a resolution calling for solidarity with the Saudi regime in its capacity as “Custodian of the Sanctuaries” and, \textit{ex cathedra}, privileged to take any measures deemed necessary to protect the “safety and security” of the universal pilgrimage in the face of disruptive conspiracies.\textsuperscript{74} A clearly frustrated delegate, Mohammad Ali Taskiri, was, prior to a staged walk-out, categorical in his condemnation of “the Hejaz regime and other reactionary Arab rulers” and their envy towards the (aspired) Iranian leadership of international Islam.\textsuperscript{75}

The Rushdie affair as it unfolded in the assemblies of the OIC also displayed the clear limitation of Tehran’s Islamization project. While many analysts have taken the anti-Rushdie consensus of the OIC—the issuance of a declaration condemning \textit{The Satanic Verses} and reproaching its author with heresy—as a twin victory for Khomeini’s lobby (or cult) which had thereby achieved both internal mobilization and external confrontation, my reading inclines to see a Saudi-sponsored appeasement strategy rather than Iranian-impressed \textit{casus belli}.\textsuperscript{76} To be sure, the infamous extra-territorial \textit{fatwa} of February 1989, calling “all zealous Muslims” to liquidate not only Salman Rushdie but the (ir)responsible publishers, had in all its rhetorical vigour monopolized the Islamic response, already tainted by the self-induced hysteria of die-hard Islamist groups in most Muslim-majority countries.\textsuperscript{77} Yet for the OIC the hawkish approach of clerical Iran, in what was a radical form of literary criticism, was not only politically counter-productive but potentially suicidal. An unqualified endorsement of the die-hard stance of the Chief Ayatollah would have alienated principal member states, not only from the United Nations, under the shadow of which it has always sought legitimacy, but also (and more significantly) from the United States whose virtues, if less than virtuously applied, of liberty and freedom of expression were at stake. The Saudi moderation of the Iranian draft was modelled to echo the repulsion of the Islamic peoples, while not inviting the wrath of world opinion (and international policy-makers). Thus, once again, the OIC functioned
as a neutralizer, or at least balancer, of Iranian cravings, however staged and dramatized.

The Second Gulf War illustrated the final pacification of the larger-than-life ideological push of Tehran and confined Iranian foreign policy behaviour almost exclusively within the realm of self-conscious national interest. Their neutrality posture aside, the silencing of anti-American rhetorics, the approval of the UN mandate, and the compliance with the international embargo signified a deferral of the clerics to the international credibility (and workability) of non-Islamic paradigms. In case of doubt, Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, could spell out the new logic of disengagement and self-preservation: Given that Islam was not at stake in the anti-Iraq campaign, apathy became a legitimate option. But acquiescence and apathy was hardly the operational policy. Rather, Tehran took advantage of the new geopolitical configuration to re-establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom; in a gesture of goodwill it further dispatched firefighters to Kuwait, helped negotiate the release of American hostages in Lebanon, and expressed an interest in becoming a (non-permanent) member of the UN Security Council after years of boycotting the organ. As a loyal lieutenant rather than a rough revolutionary, Tehran insisted that, counter to Saddam Hussein’s demand, no linkage should be established between Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and Israel’s withdrawal from occupied Palestine (although it had no hesitation in agreeing to the equally disjointed linkage of Kuwait’s liberation and Iraq’s demilitarization independent of any regional security framework). The pragmatic, utilitarian trend continued in the autumn of 1998, when Iran requested UN involvement in the crisis over its killed diplomats (-cum-military advisors) in the Afghan city Mazar-i Sharif, thus laying down ideological weaponry and abandoning unilateral approaches for a secular multilateralism.

Still, within the OIC, Iranian self-projection continuously demands a perpetual activism against the forces of evil. In a sense, one could argue, Tehran has always seen the OIC as a multilateral venue in which it could adopt unilateral postures, i.e. an international space in which it could promote (or present) its national aspirations, whether prompted by interest or ideology. As such a two-track foreign policy has developed in uneasy limbo, one based on the dramatic discourses of Islamic self-sufficiency and the other affected by an inevitable pragmatism necessitated by sustained political praxis and foreign relationships.
Iranian Internationalism: Interests vs. Ideology

Textually, the Iranian limbo between pan-Islamic pretensions and insular national identity is codified in the very constitution of the Islamic Republic. While heavily loaded in ideocratic terminology—with statements such as “all Muslims are of one and the same single religious community,” wherefore “Iran is bound to base its general policies on the coalition and unity of the Islamic nation” in its role as “a crystallization of political idealism based on religious community”—the constitution nevertheless proceeds to define an ethnic criterion for leadership. Any aspiring president, we learn, must be Iranian not only by birth but also by ancestry, thus laying down a stricter criterion than found in Western democratic polities. In addition, he must, as any other representative aspiring to ministerial rank, belong to the Twelver-Shi‘i denomination, a clause which the various Sunni minorities (at the very least one-sixth of Iran’s population) have found difficult to accept.

Iranian self-identity, as reflected in the constitutional provision, therefore engenders patriotic rather than pan-Islamic allegiance. In this, the Islamic Republic emerges as an extension of the ideas of nationhood which were fostered under the Pahlavi era, partly as a deliberate policy of national (and therefore pro-monarchic) centralization, partly because of the inimitability of the Persian cultural and linguistic realms, and partly due to the historically adversarial relationship with Arabs and Turks alike. The Islamic Republic, despite its anti-Western rhetoric, thus accepted the existence, and legitimacy, of the modern nation-state—indeed, the very use of the designation “republic” for the polity betrays this. But in the Iranian case the Islamic nation-state became a mono-nation state, subjugating, sometimes violently, autonomist movements among the Azeri, Baluchi, Turkmen, Afghan and, in particular, Kurdish minorities, who were only incorporated into the new, but equally imperial, Iranian state “by the sheer use of force” and kept in that centralized system by the Islamic regime with “unbridled terror.” By shah and imam alike, non-Persian linguistic or cultural assertion have been denied in an increasingly paranoid obsession with cultural invasion, tahājum-i farhangi.

If this challenges the republican element of Iran’s self-designation as an Islamic republic, a parallel inquiry into the constitutional conceptualization of sovereignty questions the validity of the Islamic prefix. To start with, unlike the case of Saudi Arabia, where the (non-existent) constitution is described as coinciding with the Qur’ān itself, Iran’s constitution certainly privileges the shari‘a as one source
of legislation but in so doing betrays that other juristic sources have constitutional validity too. That these other juristic sources are partially parliamentarian (in the form of Majlis-enacted law) is hardly sacrilegious, in particular when balanced by the Council of Guardians, a committee of jurists, equipped with veto powers and tasked with ensuring that legislative output (as well as legislators) conform to sharī'ī requirements. Still less surprising is the unbridled authority of the chief Guardian Jurisconsult (faqīh), whose interpretive powers of canonical sources remain absolute, thus conflating the legislative, juristic, and executive powers in what can only be described as an imamocracy so alien to the tradition of Islam. In his subscription to the primacy of politics—that politics could reconstitute not only itself but society and culture too—Khomeini was doing to Shi‘ism, mutatis mutandis, what Lenin had done to Marxism.

But this would be a critique exterior to the discourse and foundationally at variance with the assumptions of the political paradigm of Shi‘ism. What is genuinely surprising is that the Iranian structure falls short of its own criteria for legitimacy, in that its subscription to divine law is self-admittedly circumscribed by situational utility. In January 1988 an ostensibly innocent assertion of the then-president Khamenei (a middling ecclesiastic at the rank of hojjatol-islām as distinct from ayatollāh) to the effect that Islamic governance be regarded as subservient to sharī‘ī injunctions, led to a refutation by Khomeini, the chief ayatollah (although he too was rarely rated at the normative and emulative rank of marja‘-i taqlīd). Per Khomeini’s remarkable, and remarkably little-noted, ijtihād (deductive jurisprudential reasoning), performed in response to the above assertion, the primacy of public/national interest was an authentically Islamic tenet. Invoking the prudential juristic principle of maslāha (or maslāhat ‘amma), he insisted that the Islamic state could prevent any “devotional or non-devotional affair if it is opposed to the interest of Islam and for so long as it is so.” The state, thus, was empowered to abrogate any sharī‘a principle (“all peripheral divine orders”), not excluding the practice of the most basic pillars as the fast and prayers, when they contradicted or curtailed the vital interest of the government (that “supreme vice-regency bestowed by God”). In addition to introducing the theological puzzle of how any divine order could be “peripheral” (and how to identify such lower-order revelation), the new exegesis amounted to no less than a tectonic shift in Iran’s new politics of Islam: Where the legitimation of the ecclesial state had earlier derived from fidelity to divine statutes, this exact derivative
legitimacy was now inverted to override Islamic provisions in the name of regime sustenance. The purpose of the Islamic state was no longer the preservation and protection of the sharī‘a; instead the regime was empowered to curtail provisions of the sharī‘a in order to ensure its own preservation and protection.

To bring home the point that what was at stake was the formation of policy rather than the philosophy of governance, Khomeini soon initiated the founding of a new governmental, later constitutional, body under the ornate title of the “High Council for the Discernment of the Interest of the Islamic Order” (also known as the “Expediency Council”) which would balance and, if necessary, neutralize the Council of Guardians, usually lost in the abstraction of canon and textual sanction. What reigned supreme in the calculus of the senior mujtahid, thus, was not heavenly exhortation but worldly expediency, exactly as has been prescribed as proper behavioural incentive by theorists as diverse as the Chinese Sun-tzu (544–496 BC), the Athenian Thucydides (c.460–404 BC), the Florentine Machiavelli (1469–1527) and the Prussian Clausewitz (1780–1831), indeed all the most hard-nosed realist thinkers.

But such resecularization of the Islamic polity had one other consequence: The removal of the frontier of the sharī‘a as a demarcation of the operative boundaries of the Islamic state not only severely tainted its Islamic credentials but, in a situation where no other constitutional clause constrained or circumscribed the power of the executive, allowed all manifestations of statecraft, virtuous and vicious alike, to be both possible and acceptable. In the process, systemic totalitarianism or simply practical opportunism were sanctified—not as realpolitik but as idealpolitik.

Contemporary Iranian self-identity and foreign policy, therefore, are best understood through a binary optic: As an uneasy dialectic of ideology (Islamic internationalism) and interest (secular nationalism). Two teleologies—one inclusive and accommodating, the other exclusive and rejectionist—thus stand in segregated juxtaposition and are not integrated or synthesized, for different norms become operative contingent on the area of policy. As one example of the rejectionist mode of operation, Iran’s fierce, and very solitary, opposition to the Madrid-turned-Oslo approach to a Middle Eastern settlement is well-known, epitomized in Rafsanjani’s submission that this opposition remained a “basic source of pride” for Iranians. Accordingly, as the OIC was disposed to endorse the US-sponsored (and US-defined) peace trajectory, Iran, with its characteristic comotion, convened an antithetical Palestine Conference in Tehran,
A GEOPOLITICAL GENEALOGY OF THE OIC

subsequent to which it granted Hamas a “diplomatic office” in
Tehran and pledged it $30 million in support.91 But also here, the
imamocratic leadership has been prudential when defining its “red
lines” in a contingent engagement. To be certain, already in 1982
Khomeini had personally intervened to block the Iranian Revo-
lutionary Guard from actively recruiting warriors to fight Israel’s
invasion of Lebanon. A senior aide could reveal to an Iranian daily,
incidentally the pan-Islamic Jahan-e Islam (“World of Islam”), that
the Imam had explained his inhibition by reference to both political
geography and ethnicity: “It was not appropriate for Iran to confront
Israel from a long distance without any common border, and to do a
job that the Arabs themselves should do.”92 Hotheadedness, as hot
air, was reserved to the domain of public rhetoric alone.

Naturally enough, the ascension of Sayyed Mohammed Khatami’s
prudential leadership from May 1997, when he took 70 per cent of
the popular vote and trounced the hard-line candidate Ali Akbar
Nateq-Nouri, has effectuated a discursive turn with the call for an
Iranian equivalent to a mild glasnost.93 Bidding for a “dialogue
among civilizations,” rather than a clash between them, Khatami
invited the UN (led by the US) to enter into a cross-cultural
dialogical process with the Muslim world (led, needless to say, by
Iran). While overt confrontation by discourses on dualism and
liberation theology is avoided and the expression of re-integrative
goodwill is eagerly displayed, it would be erroneous to assume a
holistic paradigm change in Iranian political cosmology. In the
Iranian Second Republic, the post-Khomeini polity, fundamental
foreign policy objectives (viz. the expansion of the Islamicate and the
dissociation from the “westoxic” world-order) have remained
unchanged in important strata of the clerical establishment. The
Iranian take-over of the OIC presidency in 1997 should be viewed
through this prism.

As a grand public-relations exercise, Tehran hosted the Eighth
Islamic Summit in December 1997. In his capacity as President of the
OIC, Khatami reminded his diplomatic audience that to terminate
the “painful state of passivity vis-à-vis the ostentatious dominant
civilization of the time . . . it is incumbent upon the Organization of
the Islamic Conference to assume a more active and innovative
presence in international equations.”94 Illustrating the uneasy co-
habitation of the president and the spiritual leader in the Iranian
policy, Ayatollah (hon.) Khamenei, for whom a fire-and-brimstone
lexis is still stock in trade, was clearly in favour of activism, but a
somewhat more targeted one: To utilize the OIC as “a medium of
Islamic power and dignity to force the aliens to dispense with... improper presence,” namely “the presence of foreign warships and more importantly the US military muscle flexing in the Persian Gulf” which is, of course, “an Islamic sea.”95 Notwithstanding the difference in discourse, the Iranian leadership seemed united in attempting to employ the OIC as a vehicle of expanding political relations, thus departing from Khomeini’s thinly veiled contempt for international organizations as instruments of reaction. Certainly, Khatami’s instrumental vision of the OIC was unmistakable when he reminded the delegates to the Eighth Summit: “There is no problem which cannot be solved through understanding and fraternity; and the OIC is the most suitable base for friendship, fraternity and resolving of the existing indignation and disputes.”96 The declaratory policy, it appeared, was the exact operational policy—before the end of the summit, Khatami received the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, Abdullah al-Nuaymi, to seek a rapprochement over their bilateral territorial dispute over three strategic islands in the Strait of Hormuz (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb).

The cognizance that the OIC was to be used both as a mantle (signifying pietistic aspirations) and as an arena (allowing the pursuit of raison d’état) led the Iranian leadership to optimize its leverage in other fora related to the OIC. Thus, already in late July 1998, as the al-Quds Committee met in Casablanca, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi approached his Iraqi counterpart (an erstwhile nemesis) to develop bilateral ties, while in early August 1998, Khatami, in his capacity as the new President of the OIC, met the Jordanian foreign minister to foster a Tehran–Amman alignment.97

From the Balkans to the Caucasus: Betrayal in All but Name

Few policy postures during the Iranian presidency of the OIC have been distinguishable from the preceding trajectory, even in the face of major Muslim tragedies in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. Initially, though, the intensification of the (post-)Yugoslav crisis in the Balkans came as an opportune moment where Tehran could display compelling Iranian internationalism in the vacuum caused by Desert Storm, after which both Iraq and Saudi Arabia had joined Egypt on the pan-Islamic periphery. Conditioned to enter a rare, but ad hoc, partnership with Tunisia and Turkey, Iran called an emergency meeting for OIC foreign ministers in Istanbul, June 1992. The Iranian proposal to aid the Bosnian mujahidin with men and (military) machines, however, was benched by the Saudi-led majority
of the OIC, not wishing to trespass the demarcation-line of UN methodology. In an ironic twist of events six months later, the Saudi–Iranian contest for the pan-Islamic aura led to a similar (but in this round Saudi-sponsored) conference, convened in Jeddah. Displaying its high-Islamic credentials, Saudi Arabia now backed a resolution calling for the repeal of the international arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims. Critically, though, the conference did not endorse the provision of military aid without UN endorsement, thus castrating the resolution into an oratory gesture to the Bosniaks and, more cynically, an attempt to beat the Iranians at their own game of political exhibitionism. Instead the summit issued the so-called “Jeddah Ultimatum,” which gave the United Nations a deadline of 15 January 1993 to provide relief for the encircled Muslims, and promised that unspecified collective measures would be forthcoming from the (allegedly united) Muslim world in the event that international responses were deemed unsatisfactory. Still, when no proactive policy seemed in sight from either Washington or New York, the subsequent Twenty-First ICFM (Karachi, 25–29 April 1993) decided to do little more than to bite its lip and adopt a silent spectator posture, notwithstanding earlier assurances to the contrary: The Jeddah Ultimatum had clearly fizzled out.

Instead the OIC, this supposed incarnation of global Islamdom, was found producing a string of supplications to the UN Security Council during the Karachi Conference of 1993; it “requested” the latter to “act decisively . . . to uphold and restore the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and unity” of the afflicted republic, to “guarantee safe routes” for humanitarian relief, and to “exempt” it from the arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia (incidentally, in contravention of the stipulation about the right of self-defence in the UN Charter’s Art. 51). None of this, unfortunately but unsurprisingly, was forthcoming. Hence, perhaps as a self-styled catharsis, the true ambition of the OIC revolved around the humanitarian side of the equation. But this, too, provided for a multiplicity of unilateral multilateralisms with different state actors seeking to outbid others in pledging emergency assistance to the extant Bosnian government: The host-country, Pakistan, itself a relatively impoverished country, offered $35 million; Iran came to the conference having remitted $80 million; and Saudi Arabia had set up the “Saudi Popular Committee for Support to Bosnia,” which collected a total of $235 million to which the Palace, generously, promised a further $20 million (subsequent to which Tehran, not to be outdone, also pledged another $20 million).
The pan-Islamic perception of the Bosnian crisis was as edifying as it was silent: The battle for Bosnia remained essentially a European conflict and, as such, did not affect the interests or security of most OIC states. At best, the bulk of member states wished for the OIC to “assist the Western-led peace process; not to disrupt it, let alone challenge it.” In abdicating responsibility for the strategic reality in the Balkans, the OIC confined its ambit to that of a policy think-tank, even if a timid one, or a flashy charity organization. But in its dual capacities, the OIC was concerned much with symptom management and little with seeking to terminate a violence unmatched on European soil post-Holocaust. To the extent that Muslim states were proactive, they could be so without, rather than within, the OIC, exemplified best by the large Pakistani and Malaysian contributions to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1993.

In the end, continued atrocities combined with the perpetuation of the novel concept of “ethnic cleansing”—not least with the fall of the UN-guaranteed “safe areas” of Gorazde (April 1994), Bihac (December 1994) and Srebrenica (July 1995)—led to popular indignation in Muslim countries, sometimes accelerating to public (out)rage. The bloody siege on Sarajevo, which had begun in 6 April 1992 and which was to last till 29 February 1996, was, according to a lawyer of the prosecution at the subsequent Hague Tribunal, “an episode of such notoriety that one must go back to World War II to find a parallel in European history.” At least 10,000 inhabitants, mostly children and elderly, were sacrificed on the altar of Serb neo-fascism in what was historically the epitome of multi-cultural tolerance in the Balkans. Meanwhile, Muslim and non-Muslim governments alike saw it fit to oscillate between a moral-relativist stance (“there are no clear aggressors, it’s part of their history”) and a defeatist stance (“we cannot settle this by intervention, it’s got to run its course”), while merely adding the Sarajevo tally to an ever-growing number of casualties that would, eventually, exceed 200,000. Bosnia, not Iraq, became the litmus test of the new world (dis)order, which, it appeared, was not at all new in its ideals or application but instead age-old in its selectivism and exclusion.

By the autumn of 1994 the credibility of many Muslim governments was at stake, if entirely for domestic reasons. Indeed, the OIC had little legitimacy as a distilled representative of the umma, if it did not heed the voice and consciousness of the less-than-virtual umma as expressed in Muslim public opinion. And, certainly, the rhetorics accelerated. At the Seventh Summit (Casablanca, December 1994), held in the immediate aftermath of the Bihac atrocities, the OIC, by
commission and omission, agreed on questioning the efficacy, and therefore legality, of the arms embargo enforced by UN Security Council Resolution 713 (1991). Finally in July 1995, almost four years after fighting had first broken out in Bosnia–Herzegovina, the Iranian foreign minister, visibly disgruntled with the previous public relations defeat, called the OIC to consider “serious practical measures against the Serbs,” implying thereby military involvement by an axis of Muslim powers. Now, then, this was a proposition that in a radical rhetorical turn allowed segments of the OIC (including also the Malaysians) to pledge “defence assistance” to the Bosnian fighters, albeit only with UN consent and only after consideration in the new OIC “Assistance Mobilization Group.”

The (in the dual sense) vain war of words, however, merely served to distract from the long-standing deadlock within the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia–Herzegovina of which both Iran and Saudi Arabia were constituents. Before long, the Assistance Mobilization Group turned to be a de facto assistance repression group. By way of exposure, this dual policy of containment (of Tehran by Riyadh and of Riyadh by Tehran) has been both self-defeating for the idealists and self-revealing for the realists. At least one commentator was candid in his attack on disunity and passivity: “Had the OIC acted with unity and strength, instead of as a toothless bulldog, and made it clear that such blatant aggression and genocide were unacceptable, it is doubtful whether the world would have behaved so casually and callously.”

Three years after the Dayton Peace Accords (14 December 1995), which remunerated Serb aggression with 49 per cent of Bosnia–Herzegovina, the Balkans was boiling once again. As the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina received the titular addendum of “Kosovo,” a cautious optimism could be traced among the afflicted Muslim people of the rump Yugoslavia in the dark spring of 1999. But not for long. A draft resolution presented before the 55th session of the UN Commission of Human Rights solemnly expressed the OIC’s “solidarity” with the persecuted people, but apologetically reiterated the unwavering qualifier that “the [UN] Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” As the Contact Group convened in Geneva in the spring of 1999, “grudgingly organised” by President Khatami after Pakistani pressure, it, “specialising in moral bankruptcy,” not only refused military support but (again with the exception of Pakistan and in a departure from the gung-ho gymnastics preceding Operation Desert Storm) declined even moral support for NATO’s air-campaign at a time when most European
Muslims were actively lobbying for the strategic participation of allied ground-troops.\textsuperscript{109} The organizational inertia became exceedingly apparent, with the most eager states having to pledge bilateral financial aid for the reconstruction of Kosovo after no more than $150,000 could be raised from the OIC’s Islamic Solidarity Fund during the height of the Serb atrocities in April 1999.\textsuperscript{110}

Typical for the no-presumption policy of the OIC, the Twenty-Sixth ICFM, convened in the summer of 1999, again sided for “upholding the role of the UN in the peaceful settlement of disputes”\textsuperscript{111} and viewed in a magical return to the US-brokered Rambouillet Accords a definitive design for the future Kosovarian settlement. Reflecting domestic concerns in the multi-nation states of the Middle East and West Asia (not excluding Iran), the conference could certainly not endorse the Kosova Liberation Army (UÇK) nor would it, regardless of the serial experiences of near-genocide in the Balkans, agree to secession as a legitimate political ambition of the Kosovo Albanians.\textsuperscript{112}

But such go-slow contrivances could have come as no surprise for those well-versed in organizational semantics: That a mere “contact group” had been devised for the Balkans, as opposed to an “ad hoc committee” for West Asia (that on Afghanistan) and a full-blood fifteen-member “permanent committee” on the Middle East (that on Jerusalem, which also has had its own Assistant Secretary General since 1981), said something revealing about their respective regional significance in the organizational, and thus political, hierarchy of the OIC. If traditional Islamic doctrine could espouse that all men (and their mates) are born Muslim, and all Muslims are born equal, the OIC had turned Orwellian in adding that some Muslims were born more equal than others. The salience of the “Islamicity” of a given political conflict, in brief, remained contingent on its potential rewards, or repercussions, for the regional order in which key Islamic players found themselves positioned, whether by cartography or choice.

With Chechnya yet again, the Iranian-led OIC adopted a low, almost no, profile stance. Jihadism itself was martyred as OIC officials assured the Russians (with whom Iran was negotiating arms and aircraft deals) about their adherence to Russian territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{113} In a spirit of compassionate comradeship, the ministerial delegation headed by the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Javad Zarif arrived in Moscow in late January 2000, only to announce its “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and non-interference in its internal affairs.” Rejecting “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” the delegation was
certain in precluding any secessionist reorganization and rather offered a reinvigoration of the 1996 power-sharing accords as a preferential basis for a possible political settlement.\textsuperscript{114}

If the ghost of Stalin seemed to be haunting the Caucasus, the OIC leaders were certain that an appeal for humanitarian aid (neither military nor diplomatic injections) would suffice as ghost buster. A further, and more paradoxical, typification of the non-interference resolve of OIC members emerged as their humanitarian aid, mostly in bilateral form, was directed not to the afflicted region, but instead to Moscow.\textsuperscript{115}

The Checheno–Dagestani impasse apart, in which official OICdom led by Iran remained silent in the face of Russian atrocities, Iran has unilaterally chosen to establish a closer relationship with Christian Armenia instead of largely Shi‘i Azerbaijan, a relationship which escalated in level of enthusiasm by the Iranian support of Armenia in the disputed enclave of Nagorno–Karabakh. Azerbaijan, consequently, has turned to Georgia for diplomatic backing, although the latter was warring Muslim Abkhazia in a standoff not too dissimilar to that surrounding Nagorno–Karabakh. According to one informed observer, a tripartite trans-Caucasian entente has been developing between Russia, Armenia, and Iran (interestingly, one Orthodox, one Monophysite Christian, and one Shi‘ite entity).\textsuperscript{116} No less notable is the fact that Iran was among the last Muslim countries to lend its support to the independence of Azerbaijan, ostensibly because of its sensitivities about the potential spill-over effects among its own Azeri minority, and was generally reluctant to back the secession of the Central Asian states, preferring instead to shore up the Bush–Gorbachev vision for a unified transition of the Soviet Union. In addition, in predominantly ethnically Iranian and largely Farsi-speaking Tajikistan, Iran has supported the militantly pro-Russian, anti-Islamist regime of Imomali Rakhmonov rather than the Islamic opposition, although, with perhaps 20,000 members, the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party has remained the most potent Islamist enterprise north of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{117} Likewise, Iran has—as is also the case with Israel—joined forces with Uzbekistan’s President, Islam Karimov, to crush the Taliban-inspired domestic opposition, in particular in the Ferghana valley.

Indeed, a pronounced secularization of the geopolitical pursuit has emerged, lucidly exemplified by the rivalry of the three players in the reinstalled arena of Transcaucasus and Central Asia, a heterogeneous (but largely Muslim) swamp. The absence of any “Islamic” rationale (and, of course, a pan-Islamic rationale, too) is striking;
and, at most, cultural predilections have informed an otherwise secular extension of financial, rather than ideological, markets.\textsuperscript{118} In candour, therefore, Karabell’s (1996/7) observation to the effect that the policies of Iran “toward the Muslim world are not foreign but rather [domestic] . . . aimed at reconstituting the \textit{umma}” ignores the ontic reality that Iranian policy makers have departed from viewing global Islamdom as a community of common interest.\textsuperscript{119} Post-Khomeini Tehran has increasingly accepted that the necessary corollary of the quest for international acceptance (and international trade) is conformity to a contracted sense of interest: The \textit{umma}, if suffering, must suffer in silence.

\textbf{Getting Close: The New Politics of the Gulf}

Given the political and religious geography of the Middle East, cross-Gulf dialogue was, from Tehran’s perspective, to remain deficient until and unless closer ties to Saudi Arabia, its main detractor, could take shape. Nor has the Saudi leadership, doctrinal antagonism notwithstanding, been unresponsive to Iran’s increasing political appeal in its post-Khomeini garb. Despite normalization of bilateral relations since 1991 (just after Desert Storm), it was only after a lag-time of seven years that Riyadh would approach post-revolutionary Iran to extend its very first invitation for an official visit. As the appointed delegate (ex-President) Rafsanjani returned to Tehran in March 1998 subsequent to a bi-Islamic meeting with King Fahd, he could assure the local press about the goodness of the Saudi counterpart in an encomium which would surely have been dismissed as foul fiction during his own presidency: “They like Iran, and we like them.”\textsuperscript{120} His successor’s policy, clearly, had occasioned a change of heart—or at least a change of tack.

Further political rabbits were to emerge, as from a magician’s turban. Displaying, according to Khatami, “the strong will of the two sides to remove their differences and expand their relations,” Iran and Saudi Arabia took the unforeseen step of signing a bilateral security agreement in April 1998, which included issues such as border surveillance and territorial waters but was directed primarily against drug trafficking and terrorism.\textsuperscript{121} Whether Saudi Arabia was acting out of strength (confident that it could define the terms of engagement with its erstwhile nemesis) or weakness (in seeking to pacify internal opposition by taming the critic most likely to manipulate domestic discontent) is difficult to estimate. In any case, the Saudi minister of interior, Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz, would
clearly have his cake and eat it too, for he was emphatic that the new alignment was related to internal security only and was to have little impact on “the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf,” nor was it to prejudice the territorial dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates.\(^{122}\) Strategic cooperation, too, was declared “low politics” in an \textit{ad absurdum} extension of the policy of inter-Islamic depoliticization.

Even so, there should be no illusions about the real(ist) security dynamics of the newfound partnership. In fairness, the Irano–Saudi \textit{entente cordiale} was urged neither by a wish to establish a pan-Islamic partnership nor an attempt to revitalize the OIC by way of synergy. Clearly, the Saudi desire remained that of establishing a \textit{status quo ante}, given its domestically precarious and regionally exposed situation after Desert Storm. For Iran a desire to break its diplomatic isolation, partially self-adopted and partially US-engineered, was the prime incentive. But another, more immediate, concern took the form of a rudimentary mathematical calculation based on the fluctuation of the oil prices on the global energy market and the unfavourable oil balance within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Oil remains the lifeblood of the national economies of both Iran and Saudi Arabia, representing about 40 per cent of GDP in each case. When Riyadh in 1985–6 flooded the international market with abundant oil and thereby created an oversupply that dramatically reduced the index price and drastically reduced Tehran’s revenues, this was seen as an act of economic warfare. Indeed, Iran’s deputy foreign minister at the time had stated that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was “guilty of the greatest treason ever committed against the oppressed and deprived countries.”\(^{123}\) If oil had been a martial instrument, so too did it have to become a peacemaker in fiscally troubled times. The collapse of oil prices in 1997–8, in which prices fell on average by one-third and reached their lowest levels since 1973, further betokened both a sincere charm offensive from Tehran and a receptive Riyadh. Interestingly, the Saudi regime did reduce its oil production by 300,000 barrels per day only a few days after Iran’s official request in March 1998 and, in a striking act of compliance, suspended the popular, but polemically anti-Shi‘a, imam of the Medinan sanctuary, Shaykh Ali Abdul-Rahman al-Hudhayfi.\(^{124}\) The fraternal politics of petrodollars continued through March 2000, where prices reached a new high (in excess of $31 a barrel on London’s International Petroleum Exchange). By way of assurance, Iran remained on common ground with its Saudi brother in faith
(and trade), by insisting on lucrative market stability over redistributive strategy, departing thus from advocating the revolutionary overthrow of what was thitherto framed as exploitative structures.  

Add a couple of months, and suddenly world history was witness to a firm Fahd–Khatami handshake in Riyadh, a truly groundbreaking touch, which His Majesty assured would perpetuate an open-door policy between the two countries. After all, this was the very first visit by an acting president of Iran since the Islamic revolution, more than twenty years prior. Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, meanwhile, proclaimed that “there are no limits to cooperation with Iran.” Revealing the metabolism of the “new honeymoon”—religion and other riches—President Khatami performed religious rites at the Holy Sanctuaries in the Hijaz only to proceed to a guided tour of the less-than-sacred oil company Saudi Aramco in the Eastern Province. The second-largest oil producer in the OPEC was thus paying homage to the largest.

Petroleum revenues, too, are explanatory of the determined indifference to the disastrous plight of the Iraqi population post-Desert Storm, a military campaign so violent that its death-toll according to the International War Crimes Tribunal reached 125,000 immediate casualties. With further 800,000 dead since 1991 as an unmitigated consequence of sanctions, perpetuated by Anglo-American obstinace, and a monthly death toll of 9,000 children due to malnutrition and disease, at least the resigning UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq could in 1998 lift the veil: “We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral.” Two years later, as the death toll had crossed a million, he, now an anti-sanction activist, would exclaim: “There’s no better word I can think of. Genocide is taking place right now, in Iraq’s cities. To say it’s a passive thing is not correct. It’s an active policy.”

Yet, with the mammoth increase in profits for Iranian and Saudi suppliers (the latter having doubled their profit to at least $50 billion p.a. since the Gulf War), the OIC could reflect little more than an unholy alliance of closure and silencing. Both Tehran and Riyadh were fully cognizant of the likelihood that Baghdad’s diplomatic rehabilitation and its unrestrained return to the international oil market could lead to significant downward price pressure to the detriment of their newfound ascendancy. Thus during both the Tehran Summit of 1997 and the ICFM meetings the following two years, Iraq was, not without a certain ir-Islamic cynicism, directed to comply with UN instructions, regardless of the unbearable humani-
tarian disaster such compliance had continuously entailed. Only as Qatar took over the presidency of the OIC in the year 2000—by which several Muslim countries, including Iraq's archrival Syria, had unilaterally broken the embargo and offered humanitarian assistance to Iraq—did the OIC begin to question the sanctity of sanctions and called for a “comprehensive dialogue” between Iraq and the UN, albeit only after calling on Iraq to complete its UN-stipulated obligations. In having shelved the entire issue of the justice and legality of sanctions against its neighbour during its three-year presidency of the OIC, Iran had wished to avoid encouraging any step that would be tantamount to re-energizing a sleeping giant on its western frontier (and, with it the age-old border dispute in Shatt al-Arab), regardless of the solidarity expected by pan-Islamic protagonists. In truth, therefore, national interest (however defined) has remained the leitmotif in its international relations also for the Islamic Republic.

Undoubtedly, the OIC has been utilized as an instrument to counter the perceived encirclement of Iran as imposed by the comprehensive American embargo (legitimized first in the form of the D’Amato–Kennedy Bill of 1996, in which the United States unilaterally extended its domestic legislation extra-territorially to any party involved in trade with Iran, and later with Clinton’s Executive Order 13059 of 1997). In relation to the D’Amato–Kennedy Bill, Iran managed to secure the backing of the OIC; the latter declared that it could “sympathize with the Islamic Republic of Iran” and condemned the bill as “against international law and norms, as null and void.” But this implied no international radicalism, as the bill, in penalizing any foreign state or company which undertook transactions with Libya or Iran in excess of $40 million (later lowered to $20 million), was in actual fact in violation of international law, and palpably so, as leading European states had already protested. In addition, and this was the subtext, the bill would harm the national interests of those regional states (including the Gulf monarchies), which had established trade-relations with Iran.

Notwithstanding the momentary pleasure the counter-American gain of Iran must have elicited, the Islamic Republic retains no fantasies about converting the OIC into an Islamic security alliance. The continuing confrontation with the United Arab Emirates over Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, having escalated with the Iranian occupation in 1994, displays steadfast adherence to the Shah’s policy. In attempting to create a strategic milieu congenial to Iranian
interests and aspirations, continued skirmishes in Bahrain, too, would qualify for imperial *raison d’état* rather than intra-Islamic fraternity. Conversely, Iran’s single comrade in the Arab Middle East, Syria, is the exact state in which a secular Ba‘athist regime could allow the cold-blooded levelling of an entire city and the elimination of perhaps 20,000 Islamists (as was the case in the city of Hama, 1982) without notably straining the camaraderie. Expediency—neither humanitarian ethics nor pan-Islamic ethos—thus seems to determine both confrontation and accommodation.

In sum, then, the pacification of Iraqi capabilities after Gulf War II has led to an increasing, and increasingly proactive, utilization of the OIC in Iranian foreign policy. While its early distrust (even disgust) with the OIC has clearly been abandoned, its activist approach, given the internal leverage of die-hard clerics, has been precarious. Thus Iran has utilized the Organization both as a *venue* in which to expand its diplomatic sphere of contact, and a *voice* with which it has sought ideological influence, or leadership, in an assertive, if self-tributary, quest for global Islamdom. The two-fold elevation of Khatami in domestic elections, most recently in June 2001, has simultaneously acculturated the Islamic Republic to the dictum of business-life: Money (not mullahs) makes the world go round. According to one perceptive observer, the rubrics in Iran’s preference hierarchy have been re-ordered, signifying the increased salience of Iranian national interest: From Islam–Islam, to Islam–Iran, and then to Iran–Islam. If the post-Rafsanjani period has seen a realignment of Iran within the OIC forum, in particular vis-à-vis Saudi officials, such reposturing sprang out of the purchase of this-worldly projects, not otherworldly precepts. Perhaps Tehran’s next phase would be entirely post-Islamic: Iran–Iran?

**THE OIC AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY:**

**A SEARCH FOR SECURITY**

The very raison d’être of the Pakistani state is that Islamic episteme which transmuted a politico-religious impulse of Muslims under the British Raj into a state-building venture. Being “qualitatively different” from struggles for national emancipation in other countries, where ethnicity informed demands for territoriality, the (pre-) Pakistan Movement rather insisted on religious orientation to form the *sine qua non* of its “two-nation theory.” Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the architect and principal of Muslim separatism, verbalized this theory—or ideology—thus:
India is not a national state; India is not a country but a subcontinent composed of nationalities, the two major nations being the Hindus and the Muslims whose culture and civilizations, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, law and jurisprudence, social and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, outlook on life and of life are fundamentally different, nay, in many respects antagonistic.\textsuperscript{133}

From such ethnological cultural-relativism grew a nationalist thought, which defied the multi-creed pluralism of many a Mughal emperor (1526–1857) and insisted not only on differentiated socialization, but equally on segregated institutionalization: two nations, two states.\textsuperscript{134} For the British post-Raj administration—in particular under the last viceroy, Lord Louis Francis Mountbatten—this theory provided an easy escape route: From “divide and rule” to the new dictum, “divide and run.”

Based on the wisdom of what I see as “confessional apartheid,” or the institutionalization of different religious communities into separate states, Pakistan was carved out of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947 as the then most populous Muslim state on the globe and an Islamic state per birthright. Insofar as Pakistan was born at the juncture between Muslim nationalism and Islamic internationalism, neither ideologues (like Iqbal, the “Poet of the East”) nor practitioners (like Jinnah, the “Father of the Nation”) could concede to a sterile ethnicality or even communal Volksgeist as rationale for the political project.\textsuperscript{135} For Pakistan, thus, both national identity and political culture were from the very outset moulded in the mirror of religious creed—the very same religious creed that anticipated a wider political paradigm than the national state.

Witnessing the faltering fortunes of the Ottomans in serial war against Russia (1877), Greece (1897), and Italy (1911), succeeded by its unfortunate indulgence in the Balkan quagmire (1912–13) with the adjacent weakening of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, far-away Indian Muslims had already prior to partition displayed pan-Islamic sentiments. As the “sick man of Europe” was lying on his deathbed, the passionately pro-Ottoman Khilafat movement sprang up, forcing the imperial overlords to augment its ties to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{136} Furthermore, the All-India Muslim League had turned decidedly pro-Palestinian even before the issue was recognized as a pan-Islamic litmus test. Indeed, the first premier of independent Pakistan,
Liaquat Ali Khan (1947–51), was a dedicated architect of Islamic self-sufficiency, his project extending not only to Pakistan but, with little inhibition, to all Muslim dominions. In seeking to describe the correlation between national Islam and Islamic internationalism, he spelt out the premises of the Muslim equivalent to the “city-on-a-hill” discourse:

Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the [Indian] sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where [the] Islamic ideology and way of life could be practised and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries.137

Consequently, the new Muslim homeland emerged in the summer of 1947 as a natural, if hyper-inflated, pan-Islamic protagonist. Pakistan, so the argument was promoted, was after all only a local instalment in the pursuit of a wider Islamic agglomeration; the global renaissance was still to come. Indeed, “Pakistan regarded its advent as at once the outcome of and stimulus to a great Muslim resurgence throughout the world.”138 Thus in the immediate aftermath of independence, Pakistan could lend its moral and diplomatic support to the decolonialization of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Palestine, Indonesia, Eritrea, Somaliland, and the Sudan, even when this contradicted its narrow national interest (as it learned to its cost when France, the erstwhile colonial overlord in North Africa, was alienated and decided not to back Pakistan’s Kashmir grievances in the UN Security Council). Of course, as part of imperial India, Pakistan had itself—unlike Saudi Arabia and Iran—been subjected to colonization, an experience that augmented its anti-colonial fervour.139 But the post-colonial rhetorics, far from Marxian, remained as poised and gentlemanly as any Oxbridge education would instruct. Hence the appeal to the UN General Assembly in each case remained to “be more generous . . . to . . . the indigenous population” and allow them, please, “to shoulder the responsibilities of self-government.”140

Pondering on the early chronicle, a subsequent diplomat offers a monologue which is less intriguing for its analytical quality, or lack of such, than its typification of the Pakistani self-imagining. Here is
his narrative (note the recurrent self-censorship that leads to the omission of the Indian prefix in describing the geographic location of Pakistan):

The Muslims of the [Indian] subcontinent are noted for their strong attachment to Islam and its ideology both in their public and private lives. They also have strong bonds with the Islamic ummah. They have never tired of showing their unqualified and consistent support and extending their fullest cooperation and assistance to the hopes and aspirations of the world of Islam; they make no distinction between Arab and non-Arab Muslims nor between Asian, African or western Muslims. They are noted for their zeal and enthusiasm for the unity and universal brotherhood of the Islamic ummah.141

As a minority amid predominantly Hindu Subcontinentals, the Muslim community in the new Islamic fatherland was clearly not content to see merely the domestic institutionalization of Islam, as epitomized in the belated first constitution (1956), proclaiming Pakistan an Islamic state under the suzerainty of the scripture and the shari‘a. Instead, the drive to institutionalize Islam spilled over into a demand for the establishment of international regimes that could safeguard the interest, most fundamentally the physical integrity, of Muslim states—chiefly, of course, the Muslim nation faced with immediate threats of re-absorption into its pagan Other.

The utopian quest for a pan-Islamic block began with the first Islamic Economic Conference in the port-city, and first capital, of Karachi in November 1948, barely one year into the life of the nascent state. This was followed by two further conferences in 1951 and 1954. Elucidating the new meta-Islamic agenda, Premier Liaquat Khan stated that in a world dominated by both capitalist and communist blocks, Muslim integration should serve to “show the world that they have [a separate] ideology and way of life.”142 In a parallel development, 1949 saw two government-sponsored assemblies of international Muslim peoples’ organizations, one meeting under the revived name of Mu‘tamar al-‘alam al-islāmī, a defunct organization with roots in the late 1920s, and another non-governmental umbrella organization, promoting itself with a more aggressive posture under the dramatic slogan “Break the boundaries.”143 In an attempt to organize an international body of ‘ulamā, the Palestinian Grand-Mufti and Pan-Islamic éminence grise,
Hajj Amin al-Husseini, cooperated with the Pakistani government to initiate a trans-Islamic assembly for teachers, preachers, and legal scholars in 1952.

At the geopolitical junction between the volatile regions of South, West, and Central Asia, Pakistan was the first country to suggest a regular and institutionalized consultation among Muslim countries. Already in a 1952 summit, the young Muslim homeland suggested to Arab, West Asian, and Southeast Asian states to develop a common system of policy-convergence on a pan-Islamic as opposed to parochial basis. Being rebuffed with the accusation that this was all an attempt to pilfer the Islamic mantle and take the leading role from the more traditional Islamic core states, Pakistani aspirations were cold-shouldered in governmental as well as non-governmental fora. At one point, Egypt’s King Farouk (r. 1936–52) had to remind an international Muslim gathering, not without a measure of sarcasm, that Islam in fact antedated Pakistan: Islam was not born in 1947—nor, indeed, was Islam to be regarded as an orphan in need of a godfather. Having achieved emancipation from one transnational model, that of colonialism, Muslim governments were cautious not to plunge into another trans-state project, however high-mindedly pan-Islamic. Antipathy, and a measure of scorn, notwithstanding, Pakistan continuously prided itself on being the “laboratory of practical Islam” (as said the Premier Liaquat Khan), insistent that “Pakistan and Islam are the names of one and the same thing” (formulated thus by General-turned-President Zia ul Haq).

As regards the OIC, at least, any fair-minded observation is bound to lead to the conclusion that Pakistan has been the single most activist entity within that organization. It hosted the Second ICFM and the Second Summit, the First Extraordinary ICFM and the First Extraordinary Summit, the First Session of the Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs, the First Ministerial Consultation on Industrial Co-operation, and the First Assembly of the Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, which it currently chairs. Pakistan is a member of all OIC subsidiary, affiliated, and specialized organs, was a founder member of al-Quds and Afghanistan committees, hosts the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and chairs the Council and Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Union of member states. It was Pakistan’s proposal that the OIC seek observer-status at the United Nations and it was a Pakistani president, Zia ul Haq, who first represented the OIC before the UN General Assembly in its thirty-fifth session.144

Often Saudi and Pakistani incentives have converged and allowed
the conception of an ad hoc partnership. Thus both have been expansionists in matters regarding the institutional ramification of the Organization, starting from the very first debates (in 1971–3) about the inauguration of a permanent secretariat and an independent bureaucracy. Arguably, however, the pragmatic and pur- posive union has seldom reflected identical concerns. For the Saudis, the incentive has primarily been to counter the politicization of the OIC by expanding its functional departments (such as specialized committees and subsidiary units) whilst Pakistan, at the receiving end of these projects, has seen tactical advantage in their formation.

The advantage, however, has also been strategic, for Pakistan’s activism has secured it high-ranking positions within the OIC (the secretary general in the period 1985–9, Sharifuddin Pirzada, was Pakistani) and has simultaneously facilitated that, in the ebb and flow of world affairs, important member states would attribute active and dynamic leadership qualities to Pakistan. Image (and the ascribed power which goes with it) has, in other words, been the guiding principle for Pakistan, exactly as in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Economic spin-offs apart, Pakistan has, with its bouncing involvement in the OIC, been able to position itself in the heartland of the pan-Islamic project, notwithstanding its geographically tangential location.

“Will Someone Please Listen?”: Seeking Security

Most transparent in Pakistan’s self-serving, or self-preserving, equa- tion has been the perpetual question of national (in)security. Born with four-fold demographic and geographical inferiority relative to its unwelcoming Indian neighbour, the consistent leitmotif for Pakistani foreign policy had been a parity-seeking balance-of-power maxim. In due course, the trauma of the 1971 Bengali secession (which in the breakaway and subsequent secularization of the eastern wing of Pakistan suggested that pan-Islamic identity could not override or undermine parochial allegiances) and the constant Indo-Pakistani cold war, thrice bursting into hot war, ensured a paranoiac obsession with national security. From the outset, accord- ingly, Pakistan has been eager to utilize the OIC as an anti-Indian instrument in which it did not have to compete with its arch-foe—unlike the case within other international fora such as the United Nations or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

The very first Islamic Summit in 1969 saw the Pakistani delegation taking a die-hard stance in relation to the admission of any Indian representation, although the now 160 million strong Muslim
minority in India remains probably the biggest religious minority in any national state (and, incidentally, outnumbers the population of post-bifurcation Pakistan).\textsuperscript{147} The rejectionist stance of Pakistan remains indicative of how national considerations have overruled, or undermined, transnational pan-Islamism to the continuous disadvantage of the Indian Muslims (relative to whom their Pakistani coreligionists remain an ethnic and cultural sub-category).\textsuperscript{148}

But the political quandary has also turned structural. The exclusion of the Indian Muslims from the OIC remains near-total, as is the case also with the Russian and Chinese (Uyghur-Turkish) communities because, unlike the case with numerically much smaller minorities in Europe and East Asia, the Secretary General is not assigned the duty of their representation. Such selectivism reflects less the Pakistani agenda to bar Indian entry than the reluctance of the Organization to incite powerful third countries, all nominally democratic, with a move that could be interpreted as a claim to represent part of their citizenry. Yet by writing off these exact minorities, the OIC has, in effect, expressed disinterest in the affairs of more than a quarter of the \textit{umma}. Consequently, the OIC’s critiques of Indian policy has pertained only to the latter’s foreign relations—in particular vis-à-vis Pakistan—not its apathy, and sometimes active collusion, in the face of interior violence against Muslim subjects (this remained the case also during the Gujarat riots in the spring of 2002, the most fatal communal violence in India’s post-partition history, when at least nineteen hundred Muslims were butchered and burned by Hindu zealots with virtual impunity).\textsuperscript{149}

At times Pakistan has convinced the OIC to pass preventive declarations, alleviating fears about the territorial integrity of Pakistan, whether threatened by potential Soviet ambitions or during the prolonged Indian asperity.\textsuperscript{150} Following the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, with the secession of what came to be Bangladesh, the OIC threw its weight firmly behind Islamabad, continually referring to “two wings of Pakistan” and appointing a six-member committee to promote reintegration. But what was done could not be undone and a truncated version of Pakistan was bound to seek more dependable alliances to brace the South Asian balance of threat.

But, even if desperate, Islamabad eschewed a bearing devoid of moral magnificence. When the chilly winds of the Cold War reached Pakistan’s shores with the Soviet invasion of its neighbour, the Pakistani head of state, General Zia ul Haq (r. 1978–88), revived the Iqbalian legacy and reminded Muslim state-leaders, that “Nationality is irrelevant within the \textit{Ummah}, within the universal brotherhood of
Islam, or the commonwealth of Muslim nations.”151 Perhaps the military ruler was both affected and inspired by the Iranian Revolution, but whatever the immediate context, Pakistan had always been exceptional in that the military apparatus had been an overt or covert ally of Islamist groups rather than their adversary (inversing cases like Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey) and also in that the military had in many cases defined all democratic activism as a threat to a purportedly Islamic order (rather than defining Islamic activism as a threat to a purportedly democratic order).

The Tenth ICFM, incidentally convened in Islamabad in January 1980, saw the same leader extrapolating from his moral axiom a defence strategy, stressing the (normative) notion of Islamic self-sufficiency in security and advocating a grand scheme of intra-Islamic security alliances rather than reliance on external powers: “Muslim countries must consider ways and means for the collective defence of the Islamic umma rather than the defence of individual countries.”152 But as the umma is segregated into a plethora of states, the Pakistani proposal visualized an expansion of the purview of the OIC, forestalling the entanglement in mutually exclusive and divisive alliances and seeking to develop a self-reliant security community.

Starting from the Third ICFM in 1972, Pakistan has been successful in attaining OIC resolutions either in condemnation of the government of India or in the support of the Muslim secessionists of the Kashmir Vale (or, if extraordinarily fortunate, both).153 Pakistan’s attempt to internationalize the bilateral conflict did seem to bear fruit in the early post-Cold War era. During the Cairo Conference (August 1990), where even Prince Saud al-Faisal seemed preoccupied with the conflict in and around Kashmir, this sustained activism led to the adoption of a sweeping resolution that expressed the Organization’s “deep concern at the violation of human rights and violence against the people of Jammu and Kashmir” and called for “the respect of their human rights.”154 But the ground motivation was probably the following disinhibition: Pakistan was, at long last, moving in the direction of a low-risk UN-brokered peace, in accordance with resolutions that demanded popular plebiscites, rather than the futile, frustrating, and therefore potentially explosive bilateral wrestling that had been the outcome of the Indo–Pak Simla Agreement of 1972. With the mounting crisis in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia could not afford to alienate another strong Muslim military power and the new Pakistani approach, having discarded the risk of a military confrontation with India, had made support of the Kashmir controversy gratis.
Still, the support Pakistan can muster is far from reliable. While thirty-five African and Arab states voted in favour of Pakistan’s resolution condemning human rights abuses in Indian-held Kashmir during the 1994 OIC conference in Islamabad, only seven (one-fifth of the original number) voted for a similar Pakistan-sponsored resolution in the UN General Assembly, and only four (down to almost one-tenth of the original endorsement) were willing to support a Pakistani draft resolution on Kashmir in the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, which therefore had to be withdrawn for lack of support. The case is symptomatic. Despite OIC member states constituting well over a quarter of the UN General Assembly its latent leverage is rarely translated into actual political dynamics.

Not to be discouraged, five years and 5,000 lives later Pakistan was still at it, as General Musharraf, the post-coup Chief Executive, announced that “Pakistan was looking towards Muslim rulers and people all around the Muslim world, particularly the Organization of Islamic Conference, to support their brethren in Kashmir and put economic and political pressure on India.” And once again, at the Ninth Islamic Summit in Doha (2000), he could warn against the “hegemonic aspirations” of India, forgetting perhaps that the official Pakistani take on the Kashmir quandary had centred on human and civil rights violations in the brutalized valley, not geopolitical rivalry.

Although security has thus been the constant theme in Pakistan’s foreign-policy activism within the OIC, the revelation has periodically recurred that no “special relationship” could be cultivated by virtue of religious virtue alone. Proponents of instrumental rationalism had always called for a halt to the teleological policy of chasing what increasingly appeared as emasculated Islamic state-partners and encouraged instead the seeking of the national fortunes elsewhere. With time, initial pan-Islamic enthusiasm did turn to disillusion and, occasionally, matured to cynicism, typified by the fifth Pakistani premier H.S. Suhrawardy’s (1956–7) plea for an era guided by raison d’état, in contract perhaps to raison d’umma. His calculation was at once direct and disdainful: “The Arab world is divided amongst themselves [sic] and even if they were united, zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero.” Such creeping realism invited Pakistan to aspire to a position as “America’s most allied ally in Asia.” By default, then, Pakistan entered the Western-sponsored alliance system by accepting military aid from the United States (February 1954). In no uncertain terms, it succumbed to the pactology-rush characteristic of the time by accepting membership in
A GEOPOLITICAL GENEALOGY OF THE OIC

SEATO (September 1954), while becoming party to the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO (September 1955). This last act, even erstwhile political associates in Riyadh would decry and it was to be described as “a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states.”

Yet Noor Ahmad Baba’s (1994) propositions that “1952–3 marked the end of Pakistan’s activism in the area of neo-pan-Islamism” and that thenceforth the Islamic Republic “paid only lip service to the cause of Islamic solidarity” remain somewhat overcooked constructions. In fact, the early reorientation of foreign policy signified, rather than an abandonment of pan-Islamic activism, a conversion of the rationale of Pakistan’s pan-Islamism from a holy idealism to an increasingly irreverent realism. Islam was not shelved, it only was to become less seductive. The continued pan-Islamic credentials of Pakistan were thus rendered issue-sensitive and always subjected to a prudential cost–benefit computation.

Even so, the Pakistani political oscillation has seldom attained the desired security homeostasis. The end of the bipolar Cold War—expressed embryonically in the retreat of Leninist Communism from Afghanistan and, finally, in the total abdication of the “Evil Empire”—entailed a diminished role for Pakistan as a strategic brick in the grand scheme of containment. Given its preoccupations in Southeast Asia and Europe, US interests in South Asia had always been sporadic, triggered by immediate crisis conditions as the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1965 Indo–Pakistan war, and the 1971 Bengali secession. It was only with the Soviet venture into Afghanistan from December 1979 that a strategic partnership with Pakistan gained currency in the Western bloc. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan nine years later, the pendulum returned to its equilibrium and Pakistan’s value as a strategic partner underwent devaluation.

As the tide turned, the “hovering giant” (to borrow Cole Blazier’s characterization of US tactics elsewhere), no longer seemed that hovering. In 1991, the Pressler Amendment, initially passed in 1985, was activated against Pakistan (until then presidential waivers had ensured continued military cooperation), thereby proscribing economic and military cooperation with this nuclear-aspiring nation. Adding insult to injury, the United States, despite multiple appeals, displayed foul business ethics by declining to deliver military merchandise already paid for (as twenty-eight F-16 aircraft worth some $658 million) and also the alternative of returning the payment. The erstwhile allies were so severely estranged that US Secretary of State James Baker would in June 1992 warn Pakistan openly about the Republican administration’s deliberations on
placing Pakistan on a watch-list of states supporting terrorist networks, should its support to Kashmiri militants not cede.

Parallel to this disaffection, the increased fraternalization of the Indo–American relationship reached a renewed momentum with the waning of the Cold War and, consequently, the relative insignificance of India’s leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement from 1991–2, while India, incidentally, was a compliant member of the UN Security Council. Concurrently, India’s new economic policies under P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991–6) initiated pro-market reforms that magnified the importance of India to American private investors and, adjacently, American public interest. Such domestic liberalization and privatization clearly endeared India to the Clinton Administration that had come to power, waving the curious catchphrase, “It’s the economy, stupid!” As icing on the cake, New Delhi’s foreign-policy reorientation, which also led to full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, was hailed in the White House. A visit of the American Secretary of Defence William Perry to India in January 1995 resulted in the signing of an unprecedented military accord between the two countries, disclosing thereby that the future template involved not only economic co-prosperity but a “new era in our security relations.”

With Pakistan unable to be an effective partner to the Clinton administration in relation to either of the latter’s twin conceptual pillars in foreign relations, namely trade and technology, Islamabad was not only left without an American ballast but saw its erstwhile advantage shift into the very Indian hands it had sought to constrain. At this critical juncture, the saliency of Islamic internationalism had to increase, even for the historically West-centric Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). What opinion-makers and policy-shapers had long ruminated was finally verbalized by President Farooq Leghari, as he, during the 1995 meeting of OIC’s Standing Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH), decried the “total dependency of Islam on the West.” It was time for yet another change.

“May I Have this Dance?: Changing Partners

Pakistan’s political parataxis between extra-Islamic and inter-Islamic connections could have provided for enough policy dilemmas; yet its inter-Islamic relations in and of themselves have been saltatory. The Riyadh–Islamabad relationship, in particular, has been in constant flux. While Crown Prince Fahd in December 1980 could assure that
“any interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan would be considered interference or injury to the [Saudi] Kingdom,” a mere five months after his statement the Gulf Cooperation Council arose, displaying what in its regionality might well be regarded as an Arabian equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine. Yet Pakistan has found a convenient supporter of its India-bashing campaign in Saudi Arabia, in return for which it has provided a permanent military presence in the Gulf, both in combat forces and in a technical-cum-advisory capacity. During the first Gulf War, Pakistan assigned a military division to Saudi disposition in order to help the pro-Iraqi war effort, and during the second Gulf War it presented the numerically largest Asian contribution to the anti-Iraq coalition.

Saudi and Pakistani interests have converged also on the issue of regional non-proliferation, albeit, as ever, with different incentives. When Pakistan during the Eleventh ICFM, back in May 1980, proposed a resolution urging the establishment of nuclear-free zones in South Asia (a manifest counter-Indian manoeuvre, for by then India had already detonated its first nuclear device), Saudi Arabia enthusiastically added “and in the Middle East” (thus countering the Jewish and the Persian pariahs of the Middle East, both suspected of being opaque proliferators). Yet the OIC, due in part to its kaleidoscopic nature, has not been able to provide unambiguous support to Pakistan’s security appetite.

One excellent illustration of OICinian evasion tactics is the South Asian nuclear spectacle that unfolded in May 1998, when both India and Pakistan departed from a policy of opacity and amid dramatic political posturing militarized their nuclear programmes. Subsequent to India’s nuclear detonation—but prior to the Pakistani tit-for-tat retort—the OIC Secretary General, Azeddine Laraki, solemnly assured his “support and solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan against the serious threat to its national security” with the explanation that “the security of each Muslim country is the concern of all Islamic countries.” Even so, as Pakistan too made itself guilty of nuclear proliferation and thus invited both the wrath of world opinion and sanctions of US origin, the Secretary General’s “deep concern” targeted both India and Pakistan. Notably, he disallowed any Islamization of Pakistan’s security search by calling to mind that “the Islamic Ummah” had “always supported the comprehensive elimination of all types of nuclear armament.”

Such duality must not be taken to illustrate a confusion or indeterminacy in OIC policy; rather, it illustrates the quintessential policy of the OIC, namely what might appropriately be termed “impolicy.”
OIC methodology, in other words, involves a de-engagement in matters that can adversely affect the interests of one of the pivotal member states. But since the OIC, as the incarnation of global Islam, cannot remain silent it must utter words deprived either of sense or, at least, of direction. By expressly lending support to, or sympathy with, Pakistan’s nuclear venture, principal member states enjoying Western patronage would have alienated themselves from their very source of security. Thus while the first statement of the Secretary General displayed a costless pan-Islamic solidarity, the second promulgation (based on a revised political calculation) expressed the primacy of national interest.

This Janus-faced methodology, whilst providing a buffer of flexibility for the OIC, has remained a constant irritant for Islamabad, in particular at the dawn of a new global (and with it regional) order. As we have seen already, security assurance, rather than security evasion, has been Pakistan’s persistent plea. Within the OIC, however, such dramatic notions are not only high-flying but also high-risk, for in the Middle East more pan-Islamic security does not mean less national insecurity. Readily more sensitive to the respective risks and reservations of other key players, Pakistan’s vague thoughts on a trans-Islamic security architecture has, while never meeting outright rejection, always been manipulated into a reactive ploy.

Given, though, Pakistan’s strategic leverage—derived from its “privileged” status as the only nuclear power and the largest conventional power within the Muslim world—the OIC has been reluctant to ostracize or estrange it. The Twenty-Sixth ICFM (Burkina Faso, July 1999), while remaining adamant in calling for all nuclear-weapons states to denuclearize, departed from precedent and deleted South Asia from the resolution heading so as not to challenge Pakistan’s strategic sensibilities. Instead the only reference emerged in the form of “welcoming” Pakistan's proposals for “nuclear and missile restraint [rather than reversal] in South Asia,” a formulation which in effect encouraged national arms control rather than international disarmament.\(^{176}\)

In a sense, the US tactics of isolation (vis-à-vis Iran) and neglect (of Pakistan) has provided some centripetal logic for bilateral cooperation along an Islamabad–Tehran axis. If nothing else, and there has been plenty else, the identical designation of the two states as “Islamic republics” provides cues about their ostensibly similar pan-Islamic predilections. But the new politics of pan-Islam has never been that simplistic, for countervailing diplomatic and military alignments have provided an opposite, centrifugal, force. Thus Iran’s
relationship to India (as a source of military technology and a
customer of hydrocarbon) as well as Pakistan’s ties to the Gulf
monarchies (as a market for mercenary services and a source of
finance) have restrained fraternal excesses.177

In the Afghan predicament, too, the two Islamic republics have
differed. Interestingly, the Extraordinary ICFM convened by Saudi
Arabia (but hosted by Pakistan) in response to the Soviet invasion
had, while condemning the invasion, not expressed its support to any
party in the heterogeneous Afghan guerrilla resistance, apparently
because of Iranian reservations vis-à-vis hard-line Sunni groups and
Pakistan’s frontline sensitivities. Overtly partisan rhetoric in the
favour of a particular group of mujāhidin would simply have
alienated other, potentially important, client-groups and could, if
pitched in excessively antagonistic tones, possibly have provoked a
further Soviet incursion into Pakistan. With a carefully drafted
resolution, major OIC players could line up in congregation against
the Soviet puppet-regime in Kabul, whose membership was later
suspended—critically, though, without agreeing on a directly anti-
Soviet phraseology, without agreeing on collective sanctions, and
without pledging support to the counter-revolutionaries. Instead,
the OIC formed a working committee with the intention of
cooperating with the UN Secretary General, to whose universal
representativeness the OIC wished to subscribe, while vaguely
reiterating (as an assurance to Pakistan) that “the security of any
Muslim state is a matter of concern for all Muslim states” (ICFM,
Islamabad, 1980). This resolution notwithstanding, the OIC’s self-
confessed conception of security remained pronouncedly apolitical;
the free flow of goods and services (but not ideas) had become the
quintessence of an Islamic order.178

A decade later, post-Najibullah Afghanistan emerged as an
indubitable subject of discord between Iran and Pakistan, who
backed different parties in an increasingly Balkanized civil war.179
Iran, widely assumed to be backing the Hezb-i Waḥdat umbrella
organization of minority guerrilla factions, had voiced concerns
about the security of their Shi‘i coreligionists in the Afghan
Hazarajat region. A secondary disquiet revolved around the alleged
sanctuary certain Afghan factions had provided for militant
secessionist groups from Iran, while a tertiary concern pertained to
the large, and growing, number of Afghan refugees in Iran (perhaps
1.5 million). While Afghanistan holds substantial Uzbek, Tajik,
Turkmen, and Shi‘i communities (and, as a matter of demography,
holds no overall ethnic majority), Pakistan had consistently backed
groupings that were Pashtun-dominated and Sunni-supremacist in that peculiar South Asian Deobandi coloration, whose uncompro-
mising stance against religious unconformity can be traced back to the much-maligned fourteenth-century Indian philosopher–historian, Diya al-Din Barani. After 1995, the Taliban scholars-turned-rulers had been the sole beneficiaries of not-insubstantial Pakistani treasure and volunteers, plus intelligence and logistics. With only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates having joined Pakistan in the premature recognition of the Taliban as the rightful represen-
tative of the Afghan people, even as Kabul kept changing hands, the OIC remained adamant in not extending recognition to any self-declared government. Due to the countervailing pressure from both Iran and the West, the Organization also retained the previous suspension of Afghan membership.

As the Taliban captured the city of Mazar-i Sharif in the mid-
summer of 1998, a new killing frenzy cost the lives of hundreds, including eleven Iranian diplomats who had remained in Afghan-
istan to perform advisory services for the Hezb-i Wahdat alliance after the Iranian embassy in Kabul has been closed down by the Taliban and the ambassador declared persona non granta in June 1997. With the fall of another anti-Taliban stronghold (Bamiyan in September 1998), panic broke out in Tehran. Threats of war were sounded by the Chief Ayatollah and, wishing to flex its muscles, Iran staged the largest military exercises ever along its eastern border in October of that year, involving some 200,000 Iranian troops backed by tanks and aircraft. The Taliban’s few thousand part-time fighters were no match for this organized military machine but their guardian in Islamabad, at this point a declared nuclear power, certainly was. A cold war in Southwest Asia was taking shape, involving two Islamic republics and one, contentious, Islamic emirate.

Unsurprisingly, the Taliban regime in Kandahar/Kabul had emerged as another incentive for Indo–Iranian alignment to the exclusion of a powerful bi-Islamic axis between Pakistan and Iran. The ever-closer Indo–Iranian relations were enhanced in part by the US drive to isolate Iran regionally, which had forced Tehran to look for economic partners beyond the Gulf, and in part by New Delhi’s attempt to encircle Pakistan and its Afghan cohort. As it turned out, Iran, rather insensitive to Islamabad’s dismay, signed a defence cooperation agreement with India in January 1997 and maintained its multi-sectoral agreements with New Delhi (involving an exchange scheme of computer technology in return for gas supply) even subsequent to the latter’s nuclear advent and the Kargil confron-
tation of 1999.\textsuperscript{182} In May 2000, India’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jaswant Singh, undertook a five-day visit to Iran, during which close ties between the two states were codified by cultural, commercial, and strategic agreements. The following year, on the backdrop of an increasing fear of the “Talibanization” of South Asia and recurrent anti-Shi‘a violence in Pakistan, Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee himself, to Indian advantage, set his foot on Iranian soil. Iranian foreign minister Kharrazi came to describe this as a “turning point,” even as, in the final calculus, it entailed a further setback in the sour standoff between Iran and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{183} Earlier, Iran had sided with the Clinton administration in opposing Benazir Bhutto’s attempt to initiate UN-controlled monitoring of human rights violations in Indian Kashmir, probably in order to maintain sociable relations with the larger South Asian power. While preferring Delhi over Islamabad was a logical choice (opting for Indo-asset, rather than Pak-liability), it unashamedly stripped Iranian foreign policy of Islamocentric pretensions. Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that for both players the Afghan antagonism is derivative from other geo-strategic concerns: In the case of Iran to contain Americo–Saudi penetration on its eastern frontier, and in the case of Pakistan the wish to counter India’s geopolitical dominance by securing a strategic regional ally and thereby gain “strategic depth” to compensate for its elongated geography.

From Riyadh, the expansive “unification” of Afghanistan under the Taliban, with its adjacent religious (not ethnic) cleansing, must have evoked memories of its own subjugation or “unification” of the Arabian Peninsula. Not only were wild-eyed Afghan warriors conveniently intimidating to the Iranian, being, as they were, on the doorstep of the Islamic Republic, but their support provided a chance to be anti-Communist, pro-West, and pan-Islamic at the same time. But with time the moral and material support flowing from the Gulf waned proportionally to the intransigence of the Taliban, first in having provided safe haven for the renegade anarcho-Islamic terror-baron Osama bin Laden and second in disallowing the complete Wahhabization of Afghanistan (although the destruction of the ancient Bamiyan Buddhas in the spring of 2001 revealed, bombastically, a degree of ideological penetration). When Saudi Arabia de-recognized the government of the Taliban in September 2001, after the dual terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington DC, this amounted to a ceremonial termination of a relationship long estranged.

Contrary to such incremental change of heart, Pakistan had
remained imprudently more pro-Taliban than the Taliban themselves, notwithstanding the resultant international isolation and the deterioration of domestic law and order as smuggled goods and bads (in particular narcotics and firearms) flooded the country from across the border. With the cataclysmic terror attacks on the cultural and political, if not geographic, epicentre of America and the resultant system shock in international relations, Islamabad could no longer ignore the peril of its Afghan stepchild. Given its longstanding moral, material and logistical support of the Taliban, Pakistan was the state that was most implicated in the sudden Afghan débâcle and, simultaneously, the country that had most to lose from a turn of events in Afghanistan. Islamabad, moreover, had to walk a tightrope, balancing “the political pressure from the United States with the ethnic and cultural propensities of the population, laced with a strong admixture of Islamist mujahidin sentiments from twelve years of the Kashmiri conflict.” In the final calculation, however, Islamabad could do little but to first distance, and then entirely divorce, itself from the Taliban.

Although he had already prior to September 2001 banned two militant Islamist groups, General-cum-President Musharraf's re-alignment with the United States and de-alignment from the Taliban emerged as an unmitigated volte-face. The Taliban–Islamabad axis had been sustained by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) less as an ideological endorsement of purist Islam (which had always been anathema to an Islamic state that from the outset aspired to the soubriquet of being avant-garde) and more so as an assurance of having at least one stable strategic partner in a hostile region of a hostile world. But September 2001 unfolded as a wake-up call for a strategic community in Islamabad that had far too long relied on a shaky and obscurantist non-regime for stability. As Pakistan jumped on the anti-Taliban bandwagon, domestic opposition was silenced either by internal or external compulsion: either by sympathy and resultant self-censorship or, on Washington’s demand, by the General's exchange of relatively tolerant policies on public assembly and a free press with an iron-fist pose expected from a military ruler. In this way, Pakistan was, after a long diversion, reunited with the Islamic mainstream, in particular the Arab mainstream.

Pakistan’s oscillating position between the Saudi and Iranian camps portrays both an extensive orbit of influence (an asset) and a lack of intimacy (a liability). As a generic condition, Pakistan has often found itself to be a balancer, almost by default, in the Tehran–Riyadh equation, making close ties with either a liability. On the
other hand, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia has been in a position to decisively distance itself from Pakistan as this would be detrimental to the delicate division, and balance, of interest between them and their wider leverage in the OIC and the Muslim world at large. Reactions to the spontaneous coup d’état in Pakistan serve to illustrate this point: As the military coup unfolded in Islamabad in October 1999, Tehran was unduly hasty in condemning the coercive ousting of the (purportedly) Islamic coalition government of Nawaz Sharif, a clearly incompetent manager with ever-growing appetites for autocratic privileges, material self-indulgence, and institution-breaking (as opposed to institution-building). But as a charm offensive of General Musharraf seemed to attract welcoming appraisal by King Fahd during a rapid post-coup visit, the Iranians, on the very same day, reversed their early mistake and prompted the self-designated Chief Executive to accept an official invitation to visit the Iranian capital—at earliest leisure, of course. Nonetheless, the new politics of the Gulf in the form of the Irano–Saudi rapprochement have by and large weakened Pakistan’s bargaining position, a fact that probably contributed to its secessionist policy of nuclear self-sufficiency.

Islamabad’s lessening leverage within the OIC became abundantly clear in late 2001, after the terror attacks on the United States and, amid a scenario of dramatic conflict escalation in South Asia, the very different (and possibly staged) armed attack on the Indian parliament. While the OIC had been keen to fend for Pakistan vis-à-vis Soviet-occupied Afghanistan during the Cold War and had supplied much diplomatic capital in support of the Kashmir standoff, it now declined to hear Pakistan’s case in a proposed extraordinary summit or even an extraordinary ICFM. In effect, the OIC, having adopted a play-dead posture in the aftermath of 11 September, declined to provide diplomatic support even as Pakistan was facing an angry, and mobilized, military great-power. Instead, the thwarted Pakistani General-turned-Chief Executive-turned-President resorted to assembling an assortment of Pakistan’s political leaders, intellectuals, and diplomats, and peppered them as “special envoys” to state leaders across the Muslim world.

Should Pakistan’s OIC-strategy be assessed overall, it must be deemed to evince a vigorous adherence to the realist paradigm of political behaviour. For Pakistan the pan-Islamic quest has translated into attempts to balance the regional hegemony of India by alliance-formation and, in the second instance, attempts to increase its prestige (which, I assert, is latent power) by projecting itself
as a dynamic actor on the Islamic scene. Its early enthusiasm, however, has declined (very much as an exact inverse of the Iranian experience) and a hyper-inflated pan-Islamism has turned into a veneration of the primacy of national interest—an ideological conversion that culminated so dramatically in its nuclear solo.

**TRIANGLE OF NEUTRALIZATION: A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY**

An analytical integration of the political behaviour of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the two Islamic republics, Iran and Pakistan, displays a non-benign register of rationales, ideas, and intentions. If we are to refer to such discrepancy as a dealignment of *purpose*, we may add a dealignment of *perception* as its primary source. These dealignments signify the lack of unanimity, or shared thought-pattern, in determining the very raison d’être of the OIC in an international cosmos governed by states seeking to identify and promote national self-interest. The distinct design and divergent pursuit of each player follow from the premise that few common denominators (ideational or material) have informed collective perception, much less collective action. As the pan-Islamic story has unfolded, it has revealed not a fusion of political capacity but its inverse, a fission. Indeed, the triad of the most powerful Islamic states within the OIC has rarely, if ever, amounted to a troika.

Cumulatively, one could surely argue for a *triangle of neutralization*, that is a tripartite relationship which is aimed at counter-poising the interest-expansion of other states while still upholding the masquerade of Islamic internationalism within the OIC. In suggesting a triangular construction, one does not mean to imply an equitarian trifigure, in which all angles are equally wide and the gravitational pull of each player is equal at all times. Rather contingent on the arena, the rules of the game (constitutive and regulatory) have developed with context-sensitivity. In other words, different issue-areas have conditioned different distributions of power within the triangle, dependent on the political prize at stake plus the nature of intra-OIC pull and extra-OIC push. Within the triangle, though, Pakistan as an outsider to the regional sub-system of the Persian Gulf, and yet in the very heart of the pan-Islamic panorama, has largely occupied the role of the joker in the game, a role reinforced by its sudden ascension as the only Muslim nuclear power. Albeit with the partial exception pertaining to the standoff in the Kashmir Vale (given much pro-Pakistan sympathy in the Himalayan enclave), Pakistan’s position remains as precarious as
raw military power must be when not buttressed by theological metanarratives or an international web of sub-state organizations, like those bred by germane Saudi and Iranian state sponsorships.

As displayed in Appendix C (p. 147), the geometric corners of the inter-Islamic triangle are defined by the diverging concerns of the three players and, by extension, the different strategies utilized in the pursuit of such concerns. Thus the explicit Saudi aim with the inception and expansion of the OIC was to create a framework that could bestow legitimacy (sub-state as well as trans-state) to the regime. For post-Pahlavi Iran, on the other hand, the OIC was no instrument of stabilization, but rather a potential venue for both political expression and, if successful, ideological expansion. As my reading of post-Khomeinite Iran suggests, the second (and extended) objective has largely been discarded. For Pakistan, geo-strategic security, rather than legitimacy or ideology, has provided that template which informs its foreign-policy behaviour. This consistent theme has given its political approach to the OIC a marked twist toward a proactive pan-Islamic security alignment, dogmatic variances notwithstanding. Conversely, the overall Iranian tendency has remained that of ideological exhibitionism—courtesy of its idiosyncratic liberation theology—either in its early revolutionary zeal or more recently in a self-projection as (in a psychoanalytical sense) the global Islamic superego. Weary about its security lease with the “Global Arrogance” (the early Irano–Islamic designation of the United States), Saudi Arabia has, as a diversion from its foreign-policy ties, insisted on an institution-building approach within the OIC and thus engendered a massive proliferation of organs and agencies.

It is thus clear that the political mechanics of the three players are immediate derivations of their respective geopolitical inclinations. To be sure, the status quoism of the House of Saud readily informs a reactive pan-Islamic strategy. On the other hand, Iranian ambitions of preponderance (at least as pertains to its political ideology), inculcates an assertive quest, which only recently has been conceptually separated from an offensive stratagem. For Pakistan, the Islamic link was always conditioned by its balance-of-power policy, which rather than desiring preponderance (the assertive mode) sought equilibrium and was thus defensive. By theoretical extension, then, it appears that the normative application of the transcendental concept of umma remains an economic community for Saudi policy-makers. This signifies less a trade-community than an orbit accessible for moneyed influence. For Iran, in turn, the
**THE NEW POLITICS OF ISLAM**

*umma* is a pronounced *political* (arguably, politicized) community, which in its Pakistani casting translates into nothing less than *security* community (albeit stripped from ideological monism). The entrenched state-centrism of the three corners in the triangle has disallowed the formation of any synthetic pan-political rationale and has retarded the development, conceptual as well as practical, of a unitary pan-Islamic foreign policy.

The integrative inhibitions, too, remain the outcome of three distinct sets of centrifugal ratiocinations that have inhibited the conversion of the OIC body politic into a transstate asset. For Saudi Arabia the fear of international delegitimization and marginalization in ummatic affairs, together with the attached threat of domestic subversion, has provided the primary reservation for developing the OIC into a suprastate entity. Iran to some extent faces the exactly opposite hesitation: that the OIC as an instrument of reactionary Arab dynasties (whether monarchic or republican) will deprive it from its chief international asset, namely that of ideological virility. Where Pakistan’s cardinal reservation earlier was its disillusion with half-hearted geo-Islamism, its newly-attained nuclear privilege signifies that dividend of deterrence which it had earlier sought in alliances with the Middle East and the Far West. It is, however, not certain whether a loss of incentive, per se, is a disincentive. Probably, Pakistan’s nuclear explosions have bifurcated its OIC activism into (henceforth unilateral) high politics—the realm of war, diplomacy, and peace—and (continually multilateral) low politics, thus aiding its fiscal, rather than geo-strategic, balance.187

As the ideational and material milieu remain in restless dialectic in the psychology of most policy-makers, one must inject the contrasting religious paradigms into any evaluation of realpolitik. Doctrinally, Pakistan, with a traditional, low-church Sunni majority of bona fide Sufic—and *ipso facto* anti-Wahhabi—orientation together with a substantial “Twelver” (*ithna-‘ashari*) Shī‘a population and sundry Islamist-supremacist groupings, falls in an eclectic pick-and-mix category. Whatever advantages such an apolar position might render, Pakistan—due to its geographical location on the Islamic periphery, its non-Arab ethnicity, and its status as historical novice—holds inadequate credentials for pan-sectarian leadership.188

On the other hand, the ecclesial establishments in Riyadh and Tehran (both important interpretative communities), by their very dogmatic make-up, disqualify themselves from ecumenicist attraction. Not only does Saudi Arabia, unlike both Pakistan and Iran, bar Christians and Jews from obtaining citizenship and permanent
residency, but, on the basis of nationality or denomination, Muslims too can be subject of exclusion (and, sometimes, excommunication). As such, Saudi Wahhabism with its self-proclaimed sectarian animosity clashes forcefully with its Iranian Other which in turn, as a global minority (the only Shi'a state), lacks merit as a unifying regime, notwithstanding its universal aspiration. In effect, the many claims to Islam weaken rather than strengthen global Islamdom.

**New World Order: Regime and System**

If religious variety readily emerges as a vocalized source of tension for Islamological observers, the two dimensions of *system inertia* and *regime consensus*, informing the turbid geopolitics of the OIC, have remained largely unpronounced. By system inertia I mean to suggest the secular(ized) geopolitical structure which may condition (or constrain) the political actor. By regime consensus I mean to imply the related ontological consensus as to the incentives of the political game, viz. the Westphalian framework and, in its negative definition, the zero-sum assumptions underlying intra-OIC mechanics (i.e. the “winner takes all” assumption). I shall engage with more far-reaching incursions into these two dimensions in Chapter 5, but having registered them, let me outline some preliminary thoughts as they relate to the role of Western dominance, and specifically American unipolarity, in the current discussion.

For those who have taken the “non-block” rejectionism of the OIC at face value, a manifestation of the Khomeinite dictum of Islamic self-sufficiency may well be found in OIC documents in the form of a “fair warning to all to abstain from attempting to set up foreign military bases whether naval, air, or land-based in the territories of Islamic states.” To the (limited) extent to which Tehran has indeed succeeded in its global Islamization project, this has been reflected in the incorporation of verbal attacks on the United States in OIC resolutions, albeit neither as the “Evil Empire” nor “Great Devil,” nor indeed “*dār al-ḥarb,*” but instead as a global power with policies adverse to pan-Islamic interests, whenever identifiable.

At no stage, however, have resolutions called for any drastic diplomatic action against the United States and, critically, while the OIC has at times linked US foreign policy to its “pan-Islamic interest” (however defined), it has never embarked upon a policy of counter-hegemonic secession. Such clemency, incidentally, stands in vivid contrast to the calculated American obstruction of pan-Islamic representation in international fora. For instance, the United States
has denied formal recognition to the Permanent Observer Mission of the Islamic Conference, despite its presence in New York for more than two decades, and has thus as the host country to the UN Headquarters deprived the OIC from enjoying the privileges guaranteed to recognized intergovernmental organizations. In earnest, then, the OIC has never displayed a determined course of non-alignment, even less so as the Cold War has become a chapter of past history. Despite the pretensions of otherworldly maxims, key member states are themselves entangled in spheres of worldly influence and certainly behave as if they were fully cognizant of both the privileges and reciprocal duties related to the memberships of their respective in-groups.

Seemingly, the US–Saudi relationship readily acts as an inhibition to intimate Irano–Saudi relations and the Pakistan–Saudi fraternity inhibits the development of a Tehran–Islamabad entente. This, then, is the generic feature of how the Islamic world finds itself divided by the embrace or ejection of its constituent parts vis-à-vis the remaining superpower. By design or default, therefore, American amity or enmity carves up the Muslim polities into competing categories. If Madeleine Albright (1998) is certain that “[e]ffective coalitions are a consequence of, not an alternative to, US leadership,” dysfunctional coalitions, too, remain the outcome of US involvement.

This is not to imply that the diverse placement of Islamic states in the political geography of the “New World Order” (or the assertive expansion of Pax Americana) is the only inhibition for inter-Islamic cooperation. Lack of common institutions, common ideology, and common interests (apart from the absence of a single benign mover-and-shaper) has, in accumulation, provided structural constraints on intra-ummatic integration. Undoubtedly, therefore, the barriers to greater Islamocentricity arise inside as well as outside an Islamic world in which the persistence and growing power of the state has subverted the trans-state episteme. The principal policy of the OIC “impolicy”—a paralysis, perhaps, mistaken for a policy—is directly or derivatively the outcome of the persisting volatility in individual polities (forming a cumulative non-entity), reinforced by the Western political penetration. Left, thus, is the single push-factor of domestic legitimacy, which (not only in the Saudi case) solicits the sustenance of Islamic internationalism, but perhaps only on a quid pro quo basis. The question arises, are we talking “business as usual”?
The previous chapter of our inquiry closed not in a dismissive note about the meaningfulness, or meaninglessness, of Islam in foreign policy, but rather in a question about the norms (and forms) of the Islamic ingredient in the making/shaping of policy. To be sure, the praxeological approach to foreign policy has displayed neither “Islamic” rationale nor any extra-logical (e.g. theo-logical) determinant of preference pursuit. Indeed, a grand rejection is inviting, for as Fayez Sayegh (1964) has so brusquely stated, within the sphere of international affairs, “the reasoning of the contemporary generation of Muslim leaders is indistinguishable from that of non-Muslims.”

Yet to revert to a traditional realist paradigm, in which neither ideology nor theology remains more than fanciful, and often ex post facto, representations of power-games, would amount to nothing short of analytical regression. The temporal factor, too, is important, for, writing in 1964, Sayegh was unaware of the revivalist backlash, “la revanche de Dieu,” soon to unfold.

Even if Enlightenment thinking, whatever its idiom, insisted on religion as “false knowledge” and, equally anthropocentric, Marxism dismissed it as “false consciousness,” at times escalating to hallucinatory “opiate,” the contemporary resurgence of Islam has disallowed any grand dismissal. Whatever its origin, religion remains a forceful political catalyst (or, at least, accelerator), illustrated both in terms of the Hitlerist atrocity, the (derivative) Palestinian diaspora, the Rwandan genocide, the two Balkan crises, the anti-Chechenian campaign and, in the heartland of Anglo-Saxondom, the dispute surrounding Northern Ireland. In the historiography of the Islamic non-West, the explanatory ineptitude of unqualified (or vulgar) realism stands out in the paradigmatic historical happening of the Iranian revolution, which illustrated that Islam “as an ideology of
state power” was to “confer enormous importance upon religion as a
factor in . . . international and internal politics.”4 Thus the adroit
pairs of post-Enlightenment binaries such as rational–affective,
positive–imaginative and logical–sentimental, may well be con-
sidered under attack.

With the fall of Communist godlessness as the USSR dismantled,
this cognitively transcendental trend was reinforced and secular
ideological schisms (the capitalist–communist division of the global
North) left the discursive arena only to allow a religious replace-
ment—stemming predominantly, but not exclusively, from the global
South. Rather than designating any “end of history”—as that
messianic era of ideological monopolism when ascendant Western-
style liberalism would become the terminus at which all societies
would, sooner or later, arrive—the period after the Cold War
betokened a revived role of religious (self-)identity in inter-state
affairs.5 Indeed the exact “end of history” triumphalism, as popular-
ized by Francis Fukuyama (a US State Department official) in his
article–turned–book, by its newfound elevation of secular dogmatism
unwittingly comes to reinstall new religious contenders in the
ideational space of dispersion: Free market capitalism and liberal
democracy become expressions of a civic religion, a civic religion
which clashes forcefully with opposing claims to “truth” or “good.”
The endgame of historicist eschatology itself inaugurates a new-
fangled game and the end of history becomes the end of geography,
as a vindicated claim of socio-political universalism, styled “made in
USA,” is out to redeem the world. Rather than the overspread of a
universal liberal discourse and the dispossession of alternative
heuristics, localized cultural axiologies seem reinforced as a
constituent of the political cosmos.

Building upon this cautious premise, the present part of the study
is dedicated to a critical analysis of how religion, as norm and
identity, is operative in foreign policy. It shall take its point of
departure in Samuel P. Huntington’s (re-)discovery of the “Clash of
Civilization” (1993, 1996), but avoids any ideological critique of the
clash-of-civilization optic—this has been done, undone, and redone
since its first appearance and thus allowed the Huntington hypo-
thesis more publicity than its immediate intellectual qualities would
warrant.6 Instead I shall venture to unveil the underlying ontological
premises of Huntington’s argument, hailed by some as the post-
Soviet parallel to George Kennan’s decisive “X” article (1948) in as
much as it could shape future policy as the latter, in an epochal
preview, came to introduce the policy of anti-Soviet containment.
Indeed, in October 2001, five years after its publication, even *The New Statesman* would succumb to the work’s popularity and belatedly pick it as the book of the week. My assessment of the conceptual soundness of the Huntington hypothesis in relation to the present study shall serve as a basis to deal with religio-cultural identity in foreign policy, in particular in a “postmodern” setting. Enriched by the emergent theoretical findings, we shall subsequently be able to rethink the OIC and contemporary pan-Islam with the aid of an integrated theory–praxis prism.

**THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: REINVENTING “GEO-CULTURALISM”**

As political analysts have become increasingly weary of the power-political spectacle in foreign-policy analysis, new formations have arisen on the intellectual landscape. A certain eschatology first echoed in Walker (1984), who sensed, and reasoned, that “we are entering an epoch that will be characterized increasingly by a clash of civilizations.”7 With the vacuum in the political cartography following the Cold War, theorists were keen to recycle this notion. Thus in May 1990 the Moroccan futurologist Mahdi El-Mandjra wrote, “Culture is the most strategically important element in relations between nations. More than political and economic problems, those related to cultural communication are likely to cause conflict.”8

Three years later, Samuel P. Huntington, in what came to be a quintessential piece in IR-literature, repeated: “[T]he fundamental source of conflict in this new [post-bipolar] world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”9 Thus for Huntington, the post-bipolarity threat lacuna is exhausted by a scenario of Glaubenskrieg, wars of doctrine and civilizational confrontation, conditioned by atavistic ethno-religious revivalism in the political sphere. Civilization, a somewhat dated figuration, typically refers to “a contemporary claim about the past . . . to justify heritage.”10 Yet for Huntington, the past credentials of civilizations are less important than their future political potential. In essence, where neorealism identifies power-pursuit as the driving force of the competitive anarchy in the international arena and neoliberals are inclined to perceive (largely economic) interest as the determinant of conflict and cooperation, Huntington opts for an alternative energy: “Civilizational identity will be increasingly
important in the future” and “the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.” What Huntington reinvents is then what I shall refer to as “geo-culturalism” in view of its character as a security problematic constructed around cultural identity.

Such a fusion of identity and politics, and the politicization of the former into a “politics of identity,” is by no means an innovative assumption. For centuries race, religion, and culture had provided a veil of justification for doubtful political ventures, thus turning “The White Man’s Burden” into the white man’s privilege. For the colonial societies, too, religion and culture did provide a source of identity, an identity that had helped them define the adversary and, via a binary-opposition constellation (a negative mirror-image), provided impetus for the emancipatory struggle. Although politically expedient, cultural and religious self-identity has remained analytically unsolicited in mainstream IR. A contemporary political analyst has thus observed that “religion as the prime communal identity has, until recently, been too often neglected.” On one level, then, Huntington’s hypothesis, albeit clearly representing an analytical overkill, is in order.

As an intersubjective narrative, cultural values certainly tend to transcend material interest, for their nucleus is both trans-historic communal consciousness and socialized individual identity. Idiosyncrasy (or perceived uniqueness) in matters pertaining to religion, tradition, institutions, language, ethnicity, and history rather come to represent those “totems of self-identification” which in their broadest classification, amount to civilizations, or what have variously been described as “cultural titans” or “supercultures.” Culture, in turn, is to be understood as a “set of norms operative within a particular, specified community,” leading to specific constructions of selfhood.

Ali Mazrui’s *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (1990) provides a relatively refined enumeration of the functions of cultural identity. Culture, he suggests, provides lenses of perception and cognition, and criteria for evaluation. Both, in turn, translate into latent motives for human behaviour. Beyond this, culture provides a basis of identity and, in terms of interaction and didaction, a vocabulary and medium of communication. Not only is culture a way of summarizing what is shared within a collectivity, it simultaneously represents that which is not (entirely) shared outside it. For Huntington, a simplifier, the civilizations of the world remain static, rigid and unambiguous: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Orthodox-Slavic, Latin American, “possibly” African and, certainly, the Islamic. Note that
his list of eight civilizations (give or take one) provides a curious cocktail of ethnic markers, territorial conditions, and religious signifiers in a somewhat arbitrary application, all of which only accentuate his reification, rather than exploration, of the notional civilizations and their respective promises and perils.

Critically, though, Huntington shies away from developing a potent successor paradigm of international politics by underwriting the realist premise of states as key-actors: “[S]tates will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs” for even civilizational differences “are the product of countries.”18 By implication, he suggests that states somehow embody cultural communities—a premise that would surely require all states to be nation-states (with few migrants or minorities); would disallow any differentiation between civil society and state apparatus (for the latter must be the functional incarnation of the will of the former); would further insist that civic culture fall neatly into a civilizational category (implying, inter alia, no multi-religious or agnostic states); and, finally, would entail that all state-action be conditioned, more or less exclusively, by the imperatives of cultural characteristics.

In Huntington’s cosmology, culture escapes both Kluckhohn’s (1962) definition as a “design for living” and Geertz’s (1973) understanding as neither a typified pattern of behaviour nor attitudinal or institutional idiosyncrasy, but a “system of shared meaning,” and develops into an iron-cast determinant of behaviour.19 He simply equates identity with action: What you do is a function of what you are and, recalling the civilizational premise, what you are is a function of where you are. In reality, Huntington’s theoretical linkage, and logical leap, is that of joining an independent variable of civilizational placement with a correlated variable of behavioural produce, notably, without any intervening variable. By implication, Huntington relies on neither “rational man” nor “economic man” but in our case a Homo Islamicus, an incarnation of Islamist utopia, driven by atavistic instincts and conflict-prone savoir faire: “Muslim bellicosity and violence is a late-twentieth century fact which neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can deny.”20 It is here the Huntington hypothesis develops to be no less (and certainly no more) than a cultural essentialism so unrefined that it is barely distinguishable from cultural determinism: Natives of a particular civilization (a “mega-tribe”) are, as social zombies, cognitively and behaviourally subjugated to it.

Such paradigmatic flaws only help to illuminate Huntington’s agenda as a vindication, albeit abusively primitive, of the immediate
correlation between civilizational identity and national proclivity in geopolitical equations. Since he provides no conceptual segregation, however, it remains uncertain whether the clash-of-civilizations construction seeks to evoke a historical epoch, a geopolitical system or a policy blueprint. As it stands, and falls, one is inclined to use the multiple prisms of a (post-bipolar) epoch, a (balance-of-power) system, and a (sphere-of-influence) policy.21

Indeed, Huntington speedily signs up as a subscriber to the conception of “the hidden cultural agenda in world-order problems”22—not, of course, as a theory of conspiracy but as an acknowledgement of the tacit parameters of the political perception that underlie and inform political order and political action. In effect, he exceeds such a claim and sees the universe inflated (or constituted) by pneumatic impulses of cultural scripts, which are both intransitive and self-subsistent, as Herder’s Kräfte, and yet despite their transcendentalism somehow lend themselves to immanent political-cum-strategic translation by the policy-maker. Thus the flow of history, as Machiavelli’s fortuna, requires cultural differentiation to be conceived as a permanent constant, which must be faced (by the politically potent) rather than evaded (by the flower-power idealist).

As such, Huntington emerges as a closet Kiplingian who would, were he inclined to poetry rather than prose, possibly contend that “East is east and West is west and never the twain shall meet.” Yet no culture, let alone “civilization,” can rightfully be perceived as static and atemporal, for cultural conceptions of authenticity and identity are based on the selective reproduction of transmitted precedence. Few writers have put it as eloquently as Barrington Moore in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967):

Cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history. To explain behaviour in terms of cultural values is to engage in circular reasoning. The assumption of inertia, that cultural and social continuity [or discontinuity] does not require explanation, obliterates the fact that both have to be created anew in each generation, often with great pain and suffering. . . . To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one generation to the next.23

Far from perennial, traditions are continually evolving hermen-
eutics, caught up in constant social construction: They are, as one commentator has argued, “invented and reinvented, produced and reproduced, according to complex, interactive, and temporally shifting contingencies of material conditions and historical practice.”24 Contra compelling grand narratives—like the direct leap from Plato to NATO—traditions do not penetrate spatiotemporality unaffected but are dependent on enabling circumstances.25 Certainly, at times, traditions, as evolving and continuously recast symbolic orders, are invented by a process of formalization and ritualization.26 Given this hybrid phenomenology of culture (even as causal energies in matters political) civilizations (as clusters of cultures) emerge as dynamic assemblages in time and space, rather than chimerical composites of impermeability. Even if one privileges space over time, as the Huntington hypothesis does (thus my label geo-culturalism), one remains at fault, for the cultural “fault lines” are themselves contingent.

This, then, amounts to the naturalistic fallacy of those allowing for no intervening variable between self-identity and behavioural outcome: the impact of ideational forces is contingent on enabling spatiotemporal contextuality.27 Thus while identities and ideas may well be powerful signifiers of preference, they cannot plausibly be regarded as master-variables that penetrate the contingencies of a given strategic calculus. Mazrui (1990) again is illuminating as he reminds us that the evaluative function of culture need not always correspond with the behavioural.28

Seemingly it does not occur to Huntington that identity is a variable, which due to its constructed (or acquired) phenomenology can be manipulated to camouflage “the naked pursuit of wealth or power.”29 For the political agent, a rational actor who has to behave and explain, the cultural velvet curtain is naturally not the wall against which he bangs his head. Rather it is a construct, used (also by himself) to obscure more complex incentive-structures. Of course, states remain reflective agents, rather than mechanized robotics, somehow victims of mono-causal macro-determinants such as civil-ization or religion. In essence, then, religion is no master variable which overrides all other considerations, for, in defining political actors, religious identities are only “part of a bundle of identities” which “acquire greater or lesser saliency depending on the ebb and flow of historical events and actors’ attempt to situate themselves” within their spatiotemporal context.30

“Civilizations” are (political or analytical) constructs, and the moment the political actors involved are sought to be specified, the
imagery of monist monolithism (as the “Islamic world”) and homogenous self-representation (as the “Islamic interest”) tend to collapse.\textsuperscript{31} Islam must not be understood as an ideational or behavioural monolith but rather as an invocation that may illuminate (or obscure) the incentives of political action. Nonetheless, Huntington, in the expanded version of his thesis (1996), refers to the OIC no less than six times in the course of his argument, so as to suggest the making of a grand alliance—in essential essentialism, a Concert of Islam.\textsuperscript{32}

While the “clash” consortium posits or predicts antithetical monologues of different civilizations, it is not clear why an intercivilizational dialogue cannot emerge, nor why cultural synthesis remains absent in the thesis–antithesis dialectic: “As civilizations encounter one another and as people migrate, meanings mingle and are discordant.”\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, a departure from the \textit{sui generis} characterization of civilization proffers that an inter-civilizational dialectic, urging both dialogic, exchange and syncretic unions remain a plausible prospect, if, at all, we are to endorse a \textit{Weltanschauung} that dictates “civilizations” to be chief referents in international interaction.

While Huntington’s (excessively) acculturated analysis contains an identification of a factor intervening in policy formulation, it provides no methodological commensurability index with which the analyst can measure when (i.e. under which circumstances) and to what degree (i.e. with which effect) this factor is operationalized. This very process of operationalization, on the other hand, must be the key concern of analysts wishing to think about thinking—and those, too, who wish to bridge the ideational–material divide. In earnest, the conceptual segregation between “world view” and “circumstances of explication” is vital not only to maintain, but equally to \textit{bridge}, if we are seeking to attain empirical verifiability within a project incorporating extra-empirical injections.\textsuperscript{34}

Having thus established the inadequacy of grand narratives as historical endism and civilizational chasm, I shall now turn to a discussion in prolongation of my final considerations, namely the methodological interconnectedness between religion and realpolitik.

\textbf{“RHETORICAL ISLAM”: THE DIALECTICS OF RATIONALE AND DISCOURSE}

Given that Islam is a forceful vector in both civil society and domestic politics, Islam is almost certainly bound to influence foreign policy.
Such influence, in turn, can affect the phase of *formulation* or the subsequent process of *implementation*, two altogether different propositions.\(^3\) Since foreign policy, unlike domestic policy, materializes in an anarchic realm over which the policy-making élite has little, if any, control, the implementation of a bona fide Islamic foreign policy would require a *Pax Islamica*, understood either as a hegemonic preponderance of a strenuous Islamic power or alternatively as a *modus vivendi* among Islamic states, ensuring that the implementation of foreign policy among them will remain authentically communitarian. The geopolitical excavation already conducted suggests that the international order does not (even remotely) constitute, or contain, any integrated *Pax Islamica*, nor does any *modus vivendi* appear to prevail in the bi- or multilateral relationships of Islamic states. By default, then, it is Islam as an influence either on political preference or political codification that must be considered. Both have extensive cognitive and socio-psychological properties, posing methodological problems. I shall deal with both in turn.

**Islam as Policy Rationale: Thinking about Thinking**

In relation to Islam’s influence in policy preference, policy-makers (perhaps themselves a product of socialization in a Muslim environment) may well be influenced by Islamic imagery and perceptual categories when assessing foreign-policy choices; they may thus embark upon a course of action prescribed by scriptural imperatives or, more plausibly, abstain from a religiously proscribed course (as, perhaps, the recognition of a Jewish-dominated polity on Islam’s *terra irredenta*). The underlying proposition is that the measure of power and the meaning of interest are largely a function of ideas Islamic.

“Ideas,” we learn from Goldstein and Keohane (1993), “order the world. By ordering the world, ideas may shape the agenda, which can profoundly shape outcomes.”\(^3\) In short, conceptions matter and conceptions about conceptions matter, too. Ideational structures, including also sovereignty (a legal fiction) and civilization (a cultural imagination), shape the particular characters of actors on the international stage and their interpretation of the operational rules (i.e. behavioural logic) that apply to them. In other words, the web of cultural norms is not only *constitutive* (by shaping the particular identities and interests of political actors) but is also *regulatory* (in that it shapes the available, and preferable, instruments for achieving
goals). The conceptualization of the umma as a transnational epistemic community may affect the rules of the game—both the constitutive rules of the system of international relations (relating to how units are defined) and the regulatory rules that prescribe or proscribe actional dynamics within that system. In more than one sense, then, ideational forces may readily overrule, or undermine, the imperatives of cool-headed (but empty-minded) utility search.

In rationalist approaches to international regime theory (game theory being a case in point) international regimes help otherwise self-centred states to coordinate their behaviour in avoidance of collectively sub-optimal outcomes. Rationalist accounts of primarily material, rather than moral/spiritual, interests are narrowly located on assumptions about the mechanically deculturated agent, the sterile political android, in an eternal quest for pre-programmed values. Both neorealism and neoliberalism thus theorize on the premise that self-serving actors, subject to constraint, seek to maximize utility. Since attributes of actors are given (by assumption) rather than treated as variables within these approaches, both preference and belief-structures remain predetermined. Consequently, traditional analytical foci invariably revolve around the influence of constraints rather than desiderata. By treating state actors’ preferences as a pre-theoretical given, rational theory operates in an extraneous vacuum, unaffected by rule-governed praxes or institutions born out of cultural-cum-religious imperatives. If, however, politics is at all about values, rationalist approaches entail a restriction, a de facto depoliticization, of policy formation: “Taking objects, identities and interests as given means naturalizing what are contingent political consequences, thus masking the political nature of international action.”

But the foundational problem in rational theory is, tragically, its conceptualization of rationality. That the most rational way to connect two points is a straight line is a well-known maxim—but it is true only as long as the purpose of the exercise remains cost-minimization and resource-optimization. If the analogy holds, rationality in foreign policy preference must be linked to perceived objectives, perceived options, and perceived inhibitions. Max Weber pointedly distinguished between instrumental rationality, insisting on matching means to an axiomatic end, and normative rationality, as the acculturated and norm-sensitive assessment of desirable outcomes of social/political interaction. An oft-quoted metaphor of Weber in his Social Psychology of World Religions (1920) seeks to explain the premise:
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of [either kind of] interest. “From what” and “for what” one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, “could be” redeemed, depended upon one’s image of the world [not capability alone].

Although the metaphor takes the railway tracks as givens (the ideational order already in place), where track-laying is arguably a continuous process, its insight lies both in espousing two forms of interests and in calling for an intervening variable (switchmen) that decides which track will define, and limit, the journey. Yet it is possible to go beyond the binary, for interest-pursuit based on values and identity neither defies nor defeats instrumentality. Both instrumental and normative rationality imply and require interest-satisfaction. In fact, the moment a state has defined its idiosyncratic aspiration, short of national suicide, it moves instrumentally in the pursuit of this purpose. The (motivational) assumption that a reified rationality defines preference is clearly discernible from, and more problematic than, the (operational) assumption that rationality is necessarily instrumental in seeking to satisfy preference. In sum, the reflective capacities of the state actor induce an element of volition in the definition of national purpose, rather in contrast to the mechanical phenomenology of essentialist and consequentialist approaches alike.

Absent the social and cognitive framework, the analyst is left with little more than a pre-social, ideal-type interest satisfaction, which is unaffected by norm-sensitive and acculturated policy preference. To refer to this mechanical assumption, albeit euphemistically, as “actor rationality” is according to Alexander George (1993) exceedingly dubious, for attributing irrationality to an adversary is a questionable way of filling in the vacuum of knowledge about him [i.e. his ideals, principles, and preferences], just as attributing a basic, oversimplified rationality to him is a questionable substitute for a more refined, differentiated understanding of his values, ideology, culture, and mind-set.

In effect, the rationality of policies may well be determined less
adequately by querying how much they contribute to enhance such hollow categories as power or prestige than by tracing the trajectory of the ideational agenda of the polity or policy-maker and then asking how political preferences serve that agenda. I mean to suggest that action is contingent on the a priori perception of reality (comprising, perhaps, an otherworldly ontology) and a posteriori rule-application (comprising, for instance, a philosophy of obligation). This entails no relapse to the essentialist/primordialist view which holds that identity flows unmitigatedly from shared symbols or cultural values. Instead the present analysis invites a modification of that instrumentalist perspective which claims that individuals or groups consciously assert (or eject) particular identities as a means to maximize their individual or collective interest without simultaneously conceding that these interests under pursuit are themselves contingent on malleable cultural and social contexts.

A cognitive (subjective) or cultural (intersubjective) approach to international politics challenges the given, axiomatic, taken-for-granted realities of orthodox theory; it rejects deterministic models of power, interest or threat balancing as obscuring a foundational question pertaining to the ideas and norms that render meaning to the values under pursuit. Instead of denying, in the name of social or political science, intellectual access to a significant facet of the human experience by the forced circumscription of the analytical “rules of engagement,” the disciplinary denomination must encompass both the basic question of what actors want (preference) and, its corollary, the question of what actors regard themselves to be (identity). What is lost in such “reflectivist” expansion of regime theory is the puritanical positivist approach to social science in which a Cartesian division between object and objectification remains valid. This, however, has always been a rather spurious premise, given its methodological negligence of contextualization, of meaning and “mentifacts,” of perceived purpose and, by extension, of engaged empathetic understanding of the social actor. One early manifestation of this insight, the social science method of verstehen, privileges intersubjective understanding over objective explanation and continuously reverberates the Weberian call for an enriched scientific cosmology by coming to terms with “subjective experiences, ideas, and purposes of the individuals concerned.”

Islamology—here perceived as a conceptual scheme, however indeterminate—inflates this exact vacuum by its reference to ummatic orthodoxy, whether as inter-state (descending) imperatives or sub-state (ascending) imperatives. “Islam,” we are reminded by
Ali Mazrui (1990), “seeks to reintroduce God in international relations, a partial return to a sacred world order.” The theocentrism of Islam seeks to curtail the anthropocentric excesses of statecraft. Granted that the invocation of metaphysical agendas in interstate relations are not mere escapism or shadow boxing, they may translate into an authentic rationale. Significantly, though, it does not follow from this that an authentic rationale further extends into a concise imperative of action (or inaction). Put differently, professed orthodoxy does not mean definite orthopraxy. The behavioural contingency of Islam—the fact that it cannot be defined unambiguously in any interactive setting—invalidates claims that “Islam” can reliably specify, let alone dictate, a politics. This indeterminacy, in turn, reveals a contingency in the operationalization of Islam in foreign policy: On the one hand, it remains a latent ideational and civic resource of policy-makers and, on the other hand, its relationship to the material contextuality of international relations is far from uncomplicated.

To recapitulate, my proposition is three-fold. First, that relative to interest, ideas (in this case self-professedly Islamic) function as an independent variable. Second, that the dialectics of Islamic normativity and realworldly deliberation characterize the process of interest definition and, with it, preference formation. Third, that this process, admittedly, is resistant to behavioural analysis. As a methodological cul-de-sac, the (personal/national) identity approach leaves the observer with little empirical validation as to whether Islam, in a given instance, did function as a catalytic motivator of policy. Yet the inverse equation is both possible and meaningful: that the analyst seek to establish Islam not as an autonomous vehicle of policy but as a retrospective legitimator of political preference. Methodologically, this would emerge as a plausible empirical exercise, the requirement being an analysis which could validate that a given number of policies undertaken by a given number of Islamic states remain inherently un-Islamic or at least a-Islamic and that they emerge dressed in Islamic vocabulary, their antithetical or agnostic credentials notwithstanding. I have hypothesized in this study that the single dimension of umma-centrism (or otherwise) in policy-making renders this exercise credible.

**From Thought to Talk: Discursive Dilemmas**

A theoretical distinction can be drawn between Islamic rationale and Islamic rationalization. Here, then, emerges the analytical
significance of discourses in preference explication. Discourse is understood, in basic contrast to passive silence, as an articulated reflection on, but not necessarily appropriate reflection of, ontological “reality” as perceived and differentiated by the speaker—such that the speaker can usurp (or monopolize) the definition of epistemic reality and associated values. As powerful “acts of social magic,” discourses may actually “contribute to producing what they apparently describe or designate.” As with Doty (1993), the proposition seems to be that policy-makers “function with a discursive space that imposes meaning on their world and that creates reality.”

Or, to quote from another well-known text, “In the beginning was the word.” Not to say, of course, that Islam’s linguistic genealogy would differ, for, in the Qur’anic perspective, language was both an Adamic potential and a divine creation: It was God who taught man the speech-act (al-Qur’an, 2:31). At it simplest, Islam becomes the way (mithāj) of the word; indeed, the archetypal model of the creative magic integral to the art of articulation derives from the divine act of creation itself: For He said “be” and it was (e.g. al-Qur’an, 3:47, 6:73, 16:40, 19:35, 40:68).

The theology/technology of the word, or logos, has immediate ramifications in the social and political realms—as an act of “social magic” it can engender a construction, or destruction, of a moral category, or an immoral one. Constant in the evolving constellation, simultaneously, is its propensity to formulate, or be, what Émile Durkheim, writing a century before Doty in his Rules of Sociological Method (1895), referred to as “social facts,” denoting thereby methods of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the person but inculcated, sometimes coercively, to constrain or control the individual in a social or political context.

Islam is both social fact and social magic, pace Chubin (1997), thus, it would be difficult to assert that, “Iran and Saudi Arabia’s different versions of Islam have been one of the principal new causes of division.” Having invoked a causality that is doctrinal and thus beyond the commensurable calculus of utility, Chubin manages neither to explain which methodological application renders such a reading sound nor to account for why this bifurcatory causality should be new (despite a bi-sectarian history spanning some twelve centuries). In candour, the origins and dynamics of ethnopolitical conflict are highly complex. Theories that emphasize the supposedly crucial role of a single determinant such as historical animosities or religious differences should be eschewed, for these factors usually become significant only when invoked by contemporary political
leaders seeking to mobilize support among threatened, disenfran-
chized, or otherwise disadvantaged peoples, not because religious or
historical differences generate a primordial urge to conflict.\textsuperscript{52}

An argument more cautious than Chubin’s proposition, and more
plausible, would propose that while national rivalry seldom ema-
nates from doctrinal differences (for these do not readily translate
into geostrategic differences), national rivalry may well be \textit{expressed}
in religious vocabulary and thereby be \textit{aggravated} by religious
cosmology. Put differently, a distinction must be drawn between, on
the one hand, the milieu in which conflict is expressed or mobilized
and, on the other hand, the causal and facilitative grievance factor. In
bypassing the hypothesis of causality, such a proposition is suscept-
ible to language-games and illocutionary acts. By dressing inter-state
competition in the vocabulary of classical theology or convenient
mythology, national identity, be it religious or otherwise, is “securi-
tized,” i.e. added to the index of strategic instruments.\textsuperscript{53} As such, two
different (verbal) forms of the geo-politicization of Islam can said to
have clashed due to the way they were constructed in relation to a
strategic rivalry. While King Faisal’s utilization of pan-Islam aimed
at a conservative pro-West counterweight to secular revolutionary
ideas, Ayatollah Khomeini augmented a contestant, revolutionary
pan-Islamism that became anti-West because the Shah (and the
Saudis) epitomized all that was decadent and destructive in Western
mores. As Halliday and other commentators have persistently
accentuated, the cross-Gulf conflict, if at all it can be described as an
Arab–Persian antagonism, is a product less of atavistic historical ill-
will and more so of the modern processes of state-formation and
state-preservation with all of its rhetorical and material para-
phernalia from the rise of nationalist liturgy to the development of
bureaucratic and military organizations.\textsuperscript{54}

What is conceded thus is that discourses evolve not in a vacuum
but in response to a set of enabling circumstances:

Popular Islamic discourses are not produced by individuals;
they are collective works, striking a chord with the public
and reflecting their state of mind. Often they are a reflection
of the political culture of Muslim countries, rather than of
the abstract values of Islam. . . . \[T\]he popularity of a
discourse is determined by its capacity to \textit{relate} to the largest
social group, to communicate its message by means of the
lowest [or highest] common denominator and to evoke . . . a
sense of purpose amongst its followers.\textsuperscript{55}
Insofar as it is “truth”-orientated, the “Islamization” of discourse espouses a rule-codex alternative to the prudential dictum of utilitarianism (where the exclusive rule is that of gain-maximization and pain-minimization). The emphatic utility of Islamic vocabulary—from *umma* to *jihād*—in the discursive construction of both individual states and the pan-Islamic forum under assessment has pointed to its status as the grand signifier of the regime’s adherence to normative (Islamic) conduct. Thus Islam, given its permanent/perennial traditionality, gains status of “final vocabulary” in a Rorty-esque sense as that pronouncement used as ultimative signifier/justifier of action.

As such, the sacredness of Islam’s world order lies in its intertextual referent, the Islamological logos, rather than a pre-defined register of action. Said differently, mundane *world* politics is simultaneously described in and produced by a sacral *word* politics. Yet, Islam-centric scripts detail, in their kernel as Foucauldian formations, only an “enunciative function,” i.e. a linguistic ramification of political interpretation. Given the “ontological forgetfulness” of Islam’s moralist-political discourse, the “fundamental presumptions [of the political problematic] become buried beneath the weight of discursive practice.” In effect, and *pace* Rorty, a final vocabulary is always contingent on paradigm (in a Kuhnian sense); for if the desired effects of invoking the final vocabulary do not materialize, the rational actor, instead of engaging in tautology or silence, may well offer an alternative “final vocabulary” which, too, is equally contingent. Thus the political actor can oscillate between invocations of Islamic righteousness and, say, national purposefulness.

What I term “rhetorical Islam” is, without being a political constant, nonetheless a discursive given, and thus “notwithstanding the variety of interpretations, there still exists an ideological force called Islam that has a *symbolic* value.” Potentially, though, the value exceeds sheer symbolism, semiotics, or liturgy.

Given that most post-colonial states have historically emerged as artificially inseminated territorial states, rather than indigenous nation-states, Muslim regimes have unceasingly struggled with their legitimacy. In the process of national self-definition, Islam, although a tradition that transcends the state, has been a potential state-sustainer. In fact, one could argue for an attempted “nationalization” of Islam, an instrumental utilization of Islam as state-asset (e.g. as *idéologie mobilisatrice*) in order to consolidate the position of the regime. Cumulatively, I would suggest that Islam as a discursive
and social formation does, apart from the negative (constraining) function, provide (i) vocabulary, i.e. paradigmatic endorsement; (ii) essence, i.e. civilizational perspective; (iii) legitimacy, i.e. celestial sanction.

The persistence of Islam in Middle-cum-Far Eastern politics derives from this discursive dispersion: its ability to justify and legitimate policies, critically, without at the same time providing predictive imperatives for a bona-fide “Islamic” policy. Thus, when Khomeini plays the Islamic card, much is made of the claim that Saddam Hussein is “Yazid,” the Ummayyad tyrant responsible for the much-mourned tragedy at Karbala fourteen centuries back;63 and when the latter plays it, Khomeini is turned into a magus, a Zoroastrian priest while, in another Gulf war, the quintessential Islamic slogan, the takbir (“Allahu akbar!”), is hastily nationalized and inscribed on the flag. In both cases, “contemporary states, drawing on and reformulating the past, have used tradition to pursue current ends,” be those domestic mobilization or extra-territorial penetration.64

By a metonymical invocation of the trans-historical religious theme, a regime can seek to establish continuity between itself and both history, theology, and mythology.65 For rulers uneasy with “Islam from below,” i.e. political Islam directed against the state, the invocation of Islamic standards (“theoxification” to reverse Khomeini’s vocabulary) in foreign policy captures the chief instrument of the opposing forces and seeks to outbid them in their own language-games. By drawing religion into the realm of political power, they seek to pre-empt those seeking to draw political power into the realm of religion.

Undoubtedly, the “Islam” used as legitimizer (Islam as “descending imperative”) and that version used for purposes of delegitimization (Islam as “ascending imperative”) cannot comprehensively be identical. The particular use of Islamic texts and traditions is variable and contingent on contemporary, usually rather material, concerns. As Gellner (1992) has demonstrated, “In the sphere of legitimation of social arrangements, the old pieties are retained in the social liturgy; in the sphere of serious cognition [and therefore praxis], they are ignored.”66 It is this exact “essential contestability,”67 i.e. indeterminacy in definatory characteristics that leads to a standing consensus about the validity of Islamic vocabulary without seeking to identify the discursive premises. Islam becomes a category of social construction (rather than revelation) and remains, by trial and error, a continuously evolving religious hermeneutic.
POSTMODERN PAN-ISLAMISM: THE SYNTHESIS OF RATIONALITY AND “ASPIRATIONALITY”

Having sought to clarify the way in which Islam does and does not interact with national policy-making and international policy-shaping, I will turn to an exploration of the dialectical relationship between symbolism and activation in this final section, which will also seek to adapt the relevant conclusions to the OIC. This analysis, in turn, must take us back to the very point of departure, namely the post-Caliphal (re-)construction of the ummatic umbrella.

With the fall of the Caliphate and the ensuing dynamic of state-building, the Islamic intellect was depoliticized and Islamic conscience and practice were “privatized” (i.e. confined to the private sphere as a moral marker and method of worship). Western modernism, when imposed on its Islamic subaltern, thus stripped Islam of its quintessential political predilection, however fatigued, and the Islamic entrance to the age of modernity was largely conceptualized as a fake investiture. The transition from colonialism to nationalism entailed an internalization of mandatory modernism, understood not only as the antithesis to traditionalism but, cosmologically, as “the loss or rejection of the divine paradigm” and therefore the “desacralization” of communal existence. Far from homeostasis, nominal independence thus made the post-colonial promise its exact predicament: Muslim societies, trapped in an alien mindset and bullied by its modernizing imperative, came to suffer from a post-colonial stress disorder.

Religion on the Rebound: Remaking Modernity

Mainline (streamlined) secularization theory, especially that of Whiggish pedigree, often suggests that “the modern denotes the period when reason and science triumphed over scripture, tradition and custom.” Yet neo-conservatives from Daniel Bell (1976) onwards have long argued that, contra liberal claims that modernization means the inexorable and progressive secularization of society, religious revival is the inevitable outgrowth of the circumscription and estrangement inherent in post-industrial society. Anthony Giddens (1990), in a diagnostic rather than prognostic study, had also referred to the “existential anxiety” of modernity, due to which “ontological security” (in the sense of parametric reliability of ideals and everyday-life alike) was eroded. Religious norms, or simply religiosity as a symbolic order, could bolster ontological
security, less as escapism and more readily as a recasting of existential, and perhaps axiological, meaning.

Indeed, as one early examination of the power of indigenous authenticity in economic and political development concluded, the fallacy of the modernization argument was its belief that “traditional institutions of society” were “mere obstacles to progress and stability.” Alas, by way of unenlightened policy, the “imposition of centralized state power as a method of modernization without the concept of community-based coherence” was bound to “create a crisis in identity and authority,” especially among Afro-Asian peoples.73 As to Islam, of course, its political impulses and norms were not obliterated with the territorialization of political allegiance; they were rather occulted, obscured from view but patiently awaiting activation by a stimulus that would arouse, once again, its latent energy.74

Expelled from the political zone, Islam had become rarefied, and thereby also radicalized, as a socio-political signifier. Thus secularization (i.e. the functional and spatial division of faith/polity), by detour, promoted the counter-reactive politicization of Islam into Islamism—manifested so dramatically in the paradigmatic revolutionary experience of Iran. As a declared antithesis to the predominant post-Enlightenment Western discourse of statecraft, Iranian Islamism sought an active de-secularization of state power and thus challenged the pretensions of universal applicability inherent in Western modernity. In deconstructing and dislocating the narrative, the successful capture of power by religious revanchism, displayed a “post-modern condition,”75 vocalized in neo-Islamic axioms and metaphors. A decisive ontological rupture, the sacralization of politics came to circumvent (“post”) modern positivity with a valorization of authenticity.76 Thence, the “post-orgy” politics, the ambiguity of which Baudrillard had reflected on, had, to all surprise, turned post-secular.77

If, as Habermas (1983) suggests, Western “modernity lives on the experience of rebelling against all that is normative” and, in particular, “against the normalizing functions of tradition,”78 Islamic post-modernity involves recasting the past, rebelling against the relative, and reinventing traditional(-ized) moral makers. Juergensmeyer (1996) detects the novelty in this configuration: “In a curious way, history has come full circle in the present day. Religious nationalists are now rejecting the ideological underpinnings of Western secular nationalism, the faith in reason, and the social contract expressed by the ideologues.”79

In a sense, then, the Iranian cataclysm was the first postmodern
revolution inasmuch as it sought a decisive ontological “displacement of the West.” In defying Western modernism as “an epistemology that aims relentlessly at control, and thereby rules out the possibility of transcendence in principle,” postmodern Islam sought epistemological emancipation, a counter-liberation from “liberation.”

This is not to say that Islamic postmodernity grows to be either romantic pre-modernity or confrontational anti-modernity, for the reflexivity which underlies the Islamic cultural programme is a quest for a truly, or at least equally, authentic vision of progressive, if insular, modernity—a modernity without “Westicity” and “westoxication.”

Indeed, according to Gellner (1991), Islam’s relationship to modernity is all but tenuous:

By various criteria—universalism, scripturalism, spiritual egalitarianism, the extension of full participation in the sacred community not to one or some, but to all, and the rational systematisation of social life—Islam is, of the three great Western monotheisms, the one closest to modernity.

As a non-ascetic faith, Islam’s dissociation of modernity from Westernization, i.e. the de-Westernization and indigenization of modernity as (de)ontology and institution, heralded no disenchanted neo-Luddite revulsion but instead the desireability of material progression albeit without spiritual digression. Contra what Robert Lee (1997) has sought to establish, the dynamic is hardly such that the search for “authenticity has begun to rival [economic] development as the key to understanding the political aspirations of the non-Western World,” but instead that indigenous authenticity is aspired to as the very pathway to developmental progress. Material improvement, hence, is conditioned by spiritual rediscovery.

Islam’s counter-modernism is thus less a politicization of religion than the inverse: a “religionization” of the political landscape. That Islamic postmodernity involves a post-secular politics is precipitated by the reversal of the secular, dichotomous logic as its ontological monism (“tawhidology”) exercises a subversive policy of merger: In order for man to ascend, he must allow God to descend.

Epistemological Empowerment? Postmodernity, Theology, and Policy

As the political discourse becomes Islamized, the postmodern drama replays both in Muslim states and among them. On its own
epistemological terms, postmodernism threatens to deconstruct all theological accounts of reality into mere mythical metanarratives to be understood in terms of metaphoricality, and perhaps psychosocial function, rather than divine authorship. But where postmodernism has clear epistemological commitments, to the extent that they are deliberately unclear, its ensuing manifestation—sometimes referred to as postmodernity as opposed to postmodernism—interlocks with Islam, but not solely because they both gridlock Western latemodernity. Where postmodernism can be defined in spatial terms, as a disposition in arts and society, postmodernity may be defined in temporal terms, as a period defined by the end of the hegemonic preponderance of a particular “grand narrative.” Indeed, according to one observer, “Postmodernity emphasizes the local, the oppositional, the contextual, and the locally specific.” In one sense, therefore, postmodernity is the externalized social success of postmodernism without the adjacent victory of the latter’s dogmatic anti-cosmology.

Notwithstanding the “discursive distance” between Islamism and postmodernism (for the former’s metaphysical foundationalism is antithetical to the latter’s certitude of uncertainty), one can argue for the economy of interstate pan-Islamism to carry the OIC experience very much in a postmodern direction. Following a—potentially golden—middlepath, postmodernity shall be used both as a temporal duration (of the globalization, but not universalization, of the West) and as a spatial disposition (of geo-cultural counter-assertion). Admittedly, though, one makes no pretensions of scientific accuracy in this label, but relies on the preliminaries of Ernest Gellner (1992), Akbar S. Ahmed (1992, 1994), and Bryan Turner (1994). Still, insofar as the unviable intellectual trichotomy of religious fundamentalism, relativism, and Enlightenment rationalism is challenged as Islam goes postmodern, Gellner and his two students seem to be insisting on a taxonomy long lost. Indeed, Islamic postmodernity comes to stand on the interface of the three, for here, contra the European Enlightenment ethic, intellectual inquiry via empiricist epistemology does not make revelationist truth “morally unacceptable” (i.e. methodologically redundant), nor does the presence of this truth claim entail that it can be known in linear cognitive flight, whether juristically or gnostically, which amounts to a prima facie convergence with relativism.

To proceed, then, the contemporary world of territorial states is not a world of nation-states (a point largely neglected by Piscator and a host of other scholars); and for the world of Islam the
difference is crucial. Given this mismatch between the state as a politico-legal entity and the nation as a communitarian construct, Islam is operative both as a signifier of national aspirations and, curiously, as the ultimate de-legitimizer of national interest. Thus the nationalization of Islamic identity (displaying its statist instrumentality) does, even with manifold claimants, stand in non-contradictory juxtaposition with the classicized internationalization of Islamic identity (displaying its trans-state utility). The co-existence of national Islam and international Islam and their simultaneous inter-oppositionality (in terms of aspirational locus) point to the multiple identities, and roles, of Islam.

But if Islam has a nebulous and chameleon-like, changing nature, so does the state. To follow the constructivist argument of Alexander Wendt (1991), states possess a plurality of faces, although the “commitment to and salience of particular identities vary.” Given the membership of plural in-groups (say, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the concentric circles of Saudism, Wahhabism, Arabism, and Islam), and the further disparity between a state and its nation, a multiplicity of (logically correct) extrapolations between Islam and national action can be drawn. The Islamic tradition—never a single ideology, let alone single identity—comes to evolve in particularly protean directions.

Insofar as states are (security) agents, it becomes possible to conceive of the state as that very political form through which the project of security and of human community has historically converged. With state behaviour formulating or reformulating national identity, rather than national identity dictating state behaviour, raison d’état emerges as more ontologically significant than either raison de société or the socializing structure of Islamic internationalism, raison d’umma. By allowance, the apparent state-centrism of the political actor emerges as an outcome both of the inner logic of self-sustenance and a secular admission of the terrestrial polity, rather than the divine Sovereign, to hold both de jure authority and de facto power.

Within such an amorphous, but not necessarily anarchic, universe, the OIC as an institutionalization of the ummatic idea attributes, in Weberian terms, traditional authority to pan-Islamic norms. “Norms,” we are reminded, “reflect unspoken premises. Their importance lies not in being true or false but in being shared.” Norms, therefore, have a transcendental life of their own, they can certainly “be iterated by behaviour; but they cannot be invalidated.” As Goldstein and Keohane (1993) observe, institutionalization may,
all else equal, act as revitalizer of even decrepit notions. Hence “the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations,” and remain influential “even when no one genuinely believes in them.”96 In fact, the trajectories of ideas embedded in institutions imply that they “specify policy in the absence of innovation.”97 Yet, given the analytical silence pertaining to the origin of ideas, this is true only for declaratory policy (the discursive ramification), not operational policy (the logic and process of action). In effect, then, rationality and what I shall term “aspirationality,” an ontological regeneration of the normative Islamic Weltanschauung, readily cohabit in the post-caliphatic age of the Islamic cosmopol. As such the question no longer revolves around the rationale–discourse divide, but around the synthesis of ideas: Of rationality (instrumentalité) and “aspirationality” (Islamic utopia).

A new pan-Islamic construction of prescriptive rules (however defined, and this is exactly the point) with auto-referential epistemology, turns political hermeneutics relative to an absolute (read, God). This engenders not irrationality, only aspi-rationality, due to its extra-worldly injection. Extra-worldliness, hence, is not an abdication of engagement with the worldly; rather, extra-worldliness provides for an additional (heavenly) horizon, which injects a number of immaterial values into any political assessment. The very existence of that intergovernmental organization called the Organization of the Islamic Conference illustrates this divide between rationality-on-the-rocks, as it were, and that acculturated rationality which is grounded in spatiotemporality.

While pan-Islamism has always been an aspiration, rather than behavioural codex, postmodern pan-Islamism remains at best a Jungian archetype as an expression of the collective unconscious.98 But apart from the innate psychological imperative, by reference to which Jung explains the sustenance of the supernatural in the human condition, the invocative element described as the discourse (of rhetorical Islam) provides for a reproductive mechanism. In effect, postmodern pan-Islamism is sustained in political real-life by the fact that political action is extrapolated from political imagery only via the actor’s volition (although the imagery itself is also externally sustained: by discourse). Thus drawing on what I have called the “intervening variable” in this process, postmodern pan-Islamism is parasitic on the generic legitimacy of Islam (as an absolute) but, paradoxically, not dependent on the (conditional) activation of Islamic imperatives. Such is the international politics of identity, a “new Cartesianism of the irrational”99 which fuses the classical and
the contemporary and which sees identity, in the form of intertextual circumference, to be the bearer of political response.

Walking the Walk: Roles, not Rules

If we take the above argument further and define identity as “role-specific understandings and expectations about [the] self,” where role is understood to be a “typified response to a typified situation,” the OIC emerges as an expedient role-player and, hence, as the very creator of (rather than adherer to) the pan-Islamic template. As a forum, which bestows legitimacy and processes ad hoc “pan-Islamic” consensus (reminiscent of the classical *ijmā‘*), it is a powerful organ, and icon, of authentication. Thus as a cognitive regime, the OIC is in the business of synthesizing pan-Islamic norms. Albeit with questionable pedigree, it can impart those exact ideal-types which mirror the justifiability, or otherwise, of statist preferences.

In this sense, one may conclude that while the OIC may not be an international *system* in the neo-realist mould nor even an international *society* (per Hedley Bull’s conception), it remains a cognitive community—a community of role-enactors. Pan-Islamism, too, may well be defined as a *role* in international relations, rather than an operative *rule* of international politics. And, as with all role-determined behaviour, a degree of stochasticism (based on disposition and capacity) is thus introduced in the political equation in rigid contrast to the deterministic trigger-mechanism of the civilization-driven approach.

The “role-playing” property of states (the reflectivist perspective), however, need not contradict the understanding of states as utility-maximizers (the rationalist account). Given multiple subjectivities, a state actor would be able to manipulate role, and thus resolve role-conflict, according to, say, the political equivalent to a law of anticipated reaction. This, I should argue, has been the very leitmotif for the three actors assessed and, by detour, we are back at a consequentialist calculation (epistemologically, though, behaviour in response to perceived incentives remains a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding the instantiation and reproduction of roles which both inform behavioural preferences and are the product of behavioural choices). If a marked contrast has emerged between preference explication (the discourse) and preference manifestation (the behaviour), this exact divide illuminates the question of political rationale. In essence, the OIC is no synthesizer of policy preferences (only of discourse) and as such it remains a
forum, which may well reflect simultaneous preferences of a variety of key players—time, place, and contextuality determining the final constellation.

This, then, expresses the reality of the OIC, that it remains an embryonic extension of the geopolitical arena, endowing “Islamic legitimacy,” rather than being, as if conditioned by any “Islamic rationale,” the chief Islamic actor par excellence. Surely, the latter would require as prerequisite not only a pre-defined identity and behavioural codex for pan-Islam, but also necessitate the identification of pan-Islamic interests as more than random aggregates of state interests. Understanding the OIC in terms of arena rather than actor, I think, provides conceptual clarity both to the functions and actions (as well as limitations) of the regime.

In effect, then, I have tentatively proposed a synthesis of the realist pursuit of relative advantage, the neo-liberal emphasis on interest (in concert) and a reflectivist appraisal of the dynamics of (self-)identity and (other-)identification in order to explain the paradigmatic progeny of the OIC. Although the foundational premises of these three paradigms may not at all be compatible synthesanda, my determined departure from excessive theoretical boundedness seeks to adopt a pragmatic posture vis-à-vis explanatory efficacy, discarding at once parsimony (otherwise an analytical virtue) and reductionism (its binary vice).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

A MIGHTY MYTH—RISE, DEMISE, AND RESURRECTION

It has been argued that the membership of international organizations “does not involve [the] repudiation of national interests or subordination to an overriding internationalism, but at most it involves the redefinition of national interest.” While this may well be true in both realist and functionalist approaches to inter-state ventures, the OIC experience would additionally suggest the inverse, namely the redefinition of ummatic internationalism in conformity with imperatives of national prudence, a prudence in turn dictated by the constitutive and regulatory mechanics of our contemporary world of states. Although classical sources of Islamic internationalism provide for a mixed, and somewhat malleable, legacy, modern pan-Islamic nationalism (or Islamic pan-nationalism) from the very outset incarnated as a regional strategy of containment vis-à-vis Nasserite revolutionarism and Ba’athist radicalism. What I have called “aspirationality” (in contrast to unqualified rationality) was, with its projection of international affairs unto a pronounced “Islamic” horizon, the immediate pretext for the inception of the OIC and its ultimate post hoc rationalization, rather than its energizing engine.

As the opening part of the present study displays, the very Charter of the Islamic Conference certainly makes no pretensions to challenge the operative expressions of the secular world order and attempts no re-application of siyarite methodology in the pursuit of a nascent Pax Islamica. In fact, beyond the mere recognition, as fait accompli, of the constitutive rules of the (Westphalian) order of territorial states, Islamic states have willingly internalized the regulatory rules of étatism. Thus the absence of pan-Islamic supranationalism, inherent in the design of the OIC, renders the ummatic Gemeinschaft somewhat ghostly—an “imagined community” that is
not only imagined, but equally deprived of community. By extension, the current inquiry has entailed a determined departure from the conventional analysis (the trend I have referred to as anthropomorphization) in perceiving the OIC as an arena, rather than an actor. I have attempted to illustrate both the existence of multiple agendas within the ambit of the OIC and their self-conscious execution as, at best, sub-Islamic (rather than pan-Islamic) schemes.

The behavioural cues of the three (self-declared Islamic) states under assessment in the second part of this study have, it would seem, vindicated a penchant for the centrifugal logic of national interest. Not only have the chief political concerns of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan differed (legitimacy, ideological expansion, and geo-strategic balance, respectively), but so have their modus operandi within the OIC (in the form of reactive, assertive and defensive strategies). Both of these matrixes, however, are derivatives from a more deep-rooted ontological disparity, namely their variant normative visions of the post-caliphatic umma (as respectively an economic, political, and security community). In earnest, the status quoism of the Saudi regime, insisting on a depoliticization of international Islam, has readily clashed (intra-civilizationally) with both the ideocratic exhibitionism of clerical Iran and the security-optimization of the Pakistani republic. In effect, then, the tripartite relationship has, grosso modo, amounted to a “triangle of neutralization,” in vivid contrast to any prototypal Islamic condominium (for a comparative schematic overview of the components in this analytic metaphor, please refer to Appendix C).

The tripartite fragmentation is exposed not only by intra-OIC conditions but equally, and even more so, in extra-OIC conditioning. Arguably, the disparate placements in the post-bipolar political geography and the differing relationships—whether clientelic, adversary, or oscillatory—to the United States, as the enduring global giant, may well have provided an inhibition vis-à-vis the pursuit of an inter-Islamic order. If the strategic maxim is true that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the inverse must be equally true and, thus, the enemy of he I have taken as fellow, by inference, remains my foe. Shireen Hunter’s (1998) words, thus, are sobering:

[T]he international relations of Muslim states have been determined historically not by Islam but mostly by other dynamics and determinants of state behaviour—security, economic needs, ruling-elite interests, and the search for prestige and influence. Commitment to Islam has not been a
bond sufficiently strong to allow Muslims to form a united front against the outside world... Nor has Islam proved to be an unsurmountable [sic] barrier to cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims.\(^2\)

The new geopolitical configuration, a “New American Century” with the United States as the uncontested techno-political power pole, has severely disfigured the remnants of Islam-centricity within the OIC. Stripped of any self-activated umma-conscious rationale, a collapsed pan-Islamism has developed into a rhetoric of reliance and a gesture of goodwill vis-à-vis Washington. Indeed, the final communiqué of the Twenty-Sixth ICFM (Ougadougou, July 1999) was, for one, explicit in its internalization of the secular liturgy. Tragically, the diagnosis of the Islamic way forward was distinctly echoing the new worldism of President George Bush (Sr.), as evidenced in the declaration: “The present situation requires the Islamic States to contribute effectively towards the establishment of a New World Order based on justice and equality.”\(^3\)

Certainly, the sycophantic incorporation of such alien triumphalism seemed untimely (given the impasse in Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, and Kosovo), yet revealed itself as a symptom of the death, and public burial, of any grandiose pan-Islamic enterprise. The OIC was simply falling in line, in an example of political homogenization indicative of the triumphant globalization of American templates. This process—what Antonio Gramsci had referred to as transformismo—signified the incremental hegemonization of peripheral societies by the consensual cooptation of local leadership.\(^4\) Gramsci’s insight is damning in all its simplicity: Hegemony, at some point, becomes so entrenched/overwhelming that élites in subordinate states readily “internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue politics consistent with the hegemon’s notion of international order” without conscious imposition from the hegemonic centre.\(^5\) In other words, hegemony implies less preponderance of power (i.e. primacy-in-anarchy) than the internalization of the dominant Weltanschauung (dependency-in-hierarchy); it is less top-down than bottom-up. Judging from the pan-Islamic discourses of officialdom, Islamic states would echo, word-by-word, the discourses of their North American counterparts and in the process internalize the maxims of a new world equation. From the viewpoint of Muslim state-élites, Pax Islamica was no longer to be viewed as contesting Pax Americana. Henceforth, the message seemed to be, Pax Islamica was readily subsumed in Pax Americana. But the worst was yet to come.
Old World Order: The OIC and the “War on Terror”

With the horrendous attacks on the World Trade Center in the US financial capital and the Pentagon Headquarters in the US political capital by terrorists with anarcho-Islamist motivation, the Muslim world was again, much to its dismay, propelled centre-stage. Even if the neo-kamikazes were hardly pious Muslims in the conventional sense (consumption of alcohol, taking pleasure in prostitutes, and such religiously suspect practices as lap-dancing and homosexual experiences betrayed this), 11 September 2001 emerged from the smoke and debris as a grand signifier of a post-religious fundamentalism: Religious reconstruction had given way to physical (self-)destruction.

But no less disturbing was the declaration of President Bush (Jr.) that a criminal act, albeit one of disastrous proportions (with the highest instant death toll in peacetime), was *casus belli* and would trigger a global “war on terror,” thereby securitizing the problematic and militarizing responses. The American decision not to share with the Taliban evidence of the criminal culpability of Osama bin Laden, its decision not to file a formal extradition request and its decision not to accept a trial under Islamic or international auspices led, in accumulation, to the perpetuation of its preference for war. This, however, could be legitimized only by invoking a principle, however spurious, of guilt by association (or by sheer stupidity) rather than first-degree involvement in planning and executing terror against foreign powers (with the possible exception of anti-Indian activities in Kashmir, but that was never on the table). In this way, a fuzzy conflict between a shadowy non-state actor and “a nation challenged” (repeated tag in *The New York Times*, September–December 2001) was converted into the age-old form of warfare between two militarized opponents.

Given its globally televised nature, its raw and unexpected execution, and its truly historic character as the first time mainland USA was under attack since the British torched Washington in 1814, the strikes jolted the collective imagination inside and outside America as no single event had ever done. The resultant sympathy and, with it, global bandwagoning were predictable, especially as the US president could warn in a Manichean binary mode, “Either you are with us or you are against us.” Pakistan, as during the anti-Soviet campaign two decades earlier, found itself privileged as a frontline state and, despite domestic reservations, signed up as a strategic partner to the United States, a policy that came with a handsome
windfall as Washington modified the three-layered sanctions imposed on the country and promised it financial aid in a measure that would promote Islamabad to the third biggest beneficiary of US aid (after Israel and Egypt). The most significant geo-strategic prize for Washington, however, was the strategic cooperation with Tajikistan, an entirely utopian prospect before September 2001, given the Central Asian state’s close ties to, and dependency on, Russia.

To Iran, of course, the dismantling of the Taliban amounted to a total triumph as long as—and this was a significant caveat—the United States could be prevented from establishing a long-term presence in the region. While chanting “death to America!” (or “marg ba Amreeka!”) certainly remained a favourite pastime for countless ecclesiasts, reformist voices in the Islamic Republic, including powerful members of the Majlis and the Expediency Council, considered the Afghan imbroglio an ideal window of opportunity to open a dialogue with the United States. Foreign Minister Kharrazi cautiously enunciated a new would-be doctrine thus, “Iran could have diplomatic relations with any nation but Israel.”6 Notwithstanding warnings from the conservative clerical quarters, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, Dr Kharrazi had no qualms about shaking hands with US Secretary of State Colin Powell in November 2001 (the first inter-cabinet handshake between the two countries for twenty-two years), while already at that stage speculating whether such acquiescence would lead to a future Caspian Sea oil pipeline being allowed to go through Iran. President Khatami himself was invited to New York for the Six-plus-Two Meeting (Afghanistan’s six neighbours plus the United States and Russia), where he spoke sympathetically about “American suffering” (a new discourse for Iranians) and showed affirmation vis-à-vis Washington’s handpicked interim leader in Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai.7

If the conservative, and the radical, clerics were, for a while, sidelined by Iran’s new pro-American overtures, they had help to restore the balance of threat from unexpected quarters. In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, George W. Bush, as the martial president entangled in the first American war of the twenty-first century, surprised most observers by referring to Iran as part of an “axis of evil” that necessitated the greatest increase in US defence budget for two decades.8 The window of opportunity was shut with a slam.

From the central headquarters of the OIC the Secretary General immediately, and then repeatedly, released press statements,
expressing his outrage at the attack and his condolences to the victimized nation, while assuring that “the Islamic world as a whole was sharing the pain and sorrow of the American people in this terrible and devastating ordeal.” But, beyond speechcraft, there was little statecraft in the OIC. The Ninth Extraordinary ICFM (Doha, October 2001) “strongly condemned” the attack on America and “stressed the necessity of tracking down the perpetrators,” but had no misgivings about unleashing counter-terror on a malnourished and hunger-striken population in Afghanistan, even as the ferocious US military offensive was by then in full swing. The Doha Conference vaguely expressed its “concern over the possible consequences of the fight against terrorism,” including parenthetically, “the death of innocent civilians,” but was rather more preoccupied with the potential political advantage Israel would reap from the new security constellation. Not to become *deus ex machina*, the Tenth Extraordinary ICFM, convened again in Doha only two months later, chose to deliberate exclusively on “the grave situation in the Palestinian territories” (although little had changed in course of the two months except that Arafat was under siege not only by his adversaries but increasingly by his own public). That a civilian population was being targeted by military strongmen in the case of Palestine constituted a problem, but not so in Afghanistan. On that noteworthy day (noteworthy, if only by its rejection), the OIC entirely censored the acute Afghanistan question and stripped the agenda from any point relating to the conflict or the ongoing American bombardment.

Yet at this exact point, in December 2001, it was abundantly clear that the campaign in Afghanistan had caused massive “collateral damage”—an American euphemism for civilian deaths. One independent Western count showed that the US bombing in Afghanistan had, in direct hit, caused more civilian casualties that the number of lives lost in the event for which this was, to all intents and purposes, a retaliation (3767 vs. 3234). By mid-January 2002, US high-altitude strikes on urban infrastructure and civilian centres had caused at least 300 further civilian casualties.

But this was only the tip of the iceberg. The military combatants killed, mostly in defensive positions against what constituted an invasion, were estimated to be 3–4 times higher, while CBU-87 and CBU-103 cluster-bombs, sprinkling yellow bomblets (deceptively similar to the food packages which the United States had mixed in its inventory as part of a goodwill campaign), had or would kill/maim
hundreds of civilians in a country with millions of landmines and unexploded ordinances from previous wars. Clinton’s moral dictum to the effect that “two wrongs do not make a right” was conveniently forgotten (or reserved to special occasions when Third World states had to be lectured). Meanwhile, having barred aid convoys from Pakistan early in the campaign and later blocked pleas of military escort to humanitarian relief-agents, the United States had perpetuated the starvation of at least one million internally displaced Afghans. By January 2002, in one camp alone, 100 displaced Afghans (mostly children and elderly) perished each day, although this in contrast to the Kosovo crisis led to few headlines (perhaps because this could be blamed less on any Serb chauvinism than on US priorities). With the demise of the Taliban came also the rise of local warlords and the resultant power-struggles between factions and counter-factions. Lacking the basic infrastructure of a state, interim leader Karzai’s influence hardly extended a few miles outside Kabul and local militia could ravage the country as long as no international peacekeepers were in sight. Bestial gang-rapes, random killings, and lawless militarization (together with renewed poppy cultivation) once again became the (dis)order of the day—exactly as a decade earlier and exactly in those manifestations that had led to the formation, and success, of the Taliban in the first place. Clearly, when George Bush had changed the label of the campaign from “Infinite Justice” to “Enduring Democracy,” incidentally on the advice of Muslim scholars, he had changed the semantics of the operation only, not its substance. Here was the United States, the only country in the world to been condemned by the World Court for international terrorism (against Nicaragua) and one of two states to have vetoed a UN resolution against terror (with Israel), conducting a redemptive war in the name of anti-terrorism. Although the war was initially marketed with the war aim of bringing to justice al-Qa’ida leaders and destroying terrorist infrastructure, it came, by default, to demand regime change and the political salvation of a downtrodden nation that, as a matter of fact, has supplied none of the nineteen hijackers initially identified as the perpetrators of terror on 11 September 2001. However loathsome, the Muslim world, it seemed, was entirely at ease with the new figuration, cemented as it was with precision-guided, and also imprecise/misguided, mass-death and mass-destruction. From infinite injustice to enduring tyranny, global Islam had given carte blanche to other actors and other ambitions.
What to make of all this? If we are to conceptualize international regimes as “principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour,” the OIC remains exactly that: a principled understanding. Its merit lies in its resistance to religious anomie, in counteracting the dangerous breakdown of the normative superstructure of policy-crafting.

To be certain, though, principled understandings imply neither principled behaviour nor the stabilization of expectations vis-à-vis political interaction among OIC members. Indeed, inter-Muslim solidarity within the OIC is neither principled nor indeed ideological, but utilitarian and strategic. The notional religio-cultural homogeneity of the OIC notwithstanding, no clear statement on common policy or collective security has been in view. Even in terms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution amongst its own members, the OIC has won few prizes. Leaving aside the ever-thorny question of Kurdistan, a cultural entity which the OIC does not recognize, the Organization has in most inter-Islamic conflicts (Iran–Iraq, Libya–Chad, Iraq–Kuwait, Afghanistan–Afghanistan) mobilized little energy and achieved even less.

For all its worth, the OIC has attempted to provide for trans-Islamic foreign policy alignment in three modes: By seeking to bridge the gap between the foreign policies of member states, by formulating a trans-state Islamic perspective on international questions, and by seeking to emerge as a collective mouthpiece of contemporary pan-Islam, perhaps ultimately developing into a coalescent “rhetorical presidency” for matters pan-Islamic. The results, however, have been dismal.

Far from “civilizational,” the case of the OIC vividly illustrates that the dynamics of trans-national, or pan-national alignment, fall in a spectrum from utilitarianism to hedonism. Indeed, the OIC itself emerges as a marketplace where, on the principle of self-help, market-shares are sought, deals struck, and interests protected. Regardless of angle, therefore, Choudury’s (1998) intellectual peregrination seem to be inducing fata morgana when he sees in the OIC “an effective politico-economic superstructure for the resolution and collective determination of the very woes which disparage the Muslim World today.” From Algeria to Afghanistan, from Bosnia to Bangladesh, from Cyprus to Chechnya, from Kashmir to Kuwait, and from Palestine to the Philippines, the lack of both collectiveness and competence has been readily noticeable. Siddiqui’s (1997) perception of the OIC as an “Organization of Islamic Unity”
(rather than what it is, namely, a conference association) also
displays a marked penchant for nostalgia and fairytales, unable to
clarify and even recognize the conditions of inter-Islamic cold war.¹⁹
To be certain, the generic history of contemporary Islamic inter-
nationalism, whether between states or sub-state entities, has been
and will likely continue to be bound up with individual nationalisms,
however synthetic. Finally, another ipse dixit rests in another
Choudhury’s (1990) perception of the OIC as “the Islamic people’s
spokesman in world forums,” ensuring that “their points of view . . .
are authentically portrayed and effectively advocated.”²⁰ Character-
ized rather by fluidity and fragmentation, the OIC has been
incapable of defining collective state interests, just as non-state
actors in the Muslim world have been incapable of defining cohesive
civic interests.

Given, thus, the indeterminacy in procedural outcome, the low
convergence of expectations, and simultaneously the high formality
of the regime, the OIC would in reality qualify for the epithet “dead-
letter regime” to follow a taxonomy introduced by Levy et al. (1995).²¹
By still other criteria—its low adaptation propensity vis-à-vis
international crises; its lacking autonomy of organizational norms, as
separate from the constituent member states; and its lack of policy
coherence, indicating both wavering loyalty and operational inertia—
the OIC fails the reliability test. Nor does the OIC induce confidence
as an international actor when its homogenization capacity in pursuit
of joint policies is assessed, and conversely its bearing as a collective
spokesperson, able independently to formulate policy remains
unimposing.²²

Still, all this is true only in the single dimension of foreign-policy
alignment examined in the present study and does not, per se, imply a
dismissal of the locus standi of the OIC in international equations.
Like most international bodies, not excluding the United Nations
and its predecessor the League of Nations, the OIC is more resource-
ful when dealing with less-intensive, largely techno-economical,
questions of “low” politics. But, in either case, it may well amount to
an analytical category mistake to seek to assess the OIC through the
prism of its empirical (in)action within the international domain, for
the transcendental idiosyncrasy, which as a subtext underlies the very
foundational principles of the OIC, will almost certainly escape the
empirical reading. It is here that we can, and must, distinguish
between organizational output and regime value. In one sense, the
establishment of the OIC, as an “Islamization” of the political para-
digm, was an ontological achievement (i.e. principle-borne), rather
than a counter-hegemonic or contumacious strategic project (i.e. power-borne). With it, Islam augmented its secularization-resistant profile not only in civil society but also in international society.

By implication, it is the imposed genealogy of Islamic modernity (externalized in the state-building venture) that explains the political aesthetics of postmodern pan-Islamism. In essence, a reversion to the “iron law of geopolitics” is prevented by the synthetic nature of Islamic state-centrism, in turn legible only in terms of its genesis as a post-colonial pathology and, within Islamic political culture, the magnetism of the ummatic construct, however cosmetic. Thus whilst Islam remains an autarkic thought-complex (and a realm in civil society), it also develops proportions of a resource in interstate alignment and de-alignment. The transcendental intersubjectivity of umma consciousness, however, does not translate into a transcendental imperative that can overrule (or undermine) realworldly deliberations, advocated from Ibn Khaldun to Machiavelli and beyond.

This intervening variable between “geo-cultural” discourse and political action, i.e. the interpretative and reflective actor, was highlighted by the third part of this study. As “the relationship between ideology and actual policy is notoriously opaque,” a reconceptualization of the linkage between perception and process becomes imperative. In essence, the “civilizational” logic of a postmodern pan-Islamism with transient roles (and few transparent rules) shrinks from a “master variable” and a pre-theoretical constant to an indeterminate and contested (yet versatile) variable. Although the political paradigm of Islam is moralist (idea-governed) rather than consequentialist (utility-governed), the postmodern purchase is a potential manipulation into desired behavioural outcome by the political entrepreneur. To the extent that Islamic imagery is employed in foreign-policy discourses, it, in truth, deflects policy issues away from Islam; instead of the state serving the ultimate ideals of Islam, Islam comes to serve the immediate objectives of the state. The instrumental utility of that narrative, I have referred to as “rhetorical Islam,” lies mainly in its twin effect as legitimizer and, notably, reinforcer of realworldly political preference.

Still, this does not imply that the residual “default setting for foreign policy is realism” nor, indeed, that the default position for foreign-policy analysis must be realism. Surely, Islamicist fixation does vacate both explanatory register (for the analyst) and predictive matrix (for the policy maker). For the flock of the faithful, however, its prescriptive property remains unblemished. This is so because its
“essential contestedness,” and thus praxeological malleability, is balanced by its perpetual status as ultimate signifier or “final vocabulary.” The behavioural violation of norms, hence, does not invalidate the norms.

Recurrent references to the OIC in even nominally secular media in the Muslim world, amplified by its wilful promotion by Islamist parties with “progressive” leanings, ensure that this pan-Islamic institution, even if postmodern, remains a pivotal referent in the “psychological economy” of the community. Perhaps, its post-modern propensity is its exact force, for fuzzy contours match an increasingly contourless world. The emergence of a global system of communication, and with the internet its decentralization, has only reinforced the possibilities of global Islam. Of course, Islam was itself, as much religion and most empires, an early vehicle of globalization (not only social laws and associated moral codices but also language, gestures, and sense of aesthetics crossed borders, the latter witnessed most ingeniously in architectural energies). But cyberspace, as a metaphorical grand union, has permeated the boundaries, contracted distances, intensified the interaction, and strengthened an otherwise elusive togetherness. If the OIC functions as a venue of poised intergovernmental diplomacy, it has also provided, by default rather than design, a frame of reference for Islamic thinkers (and doers) concerned with the current world constellation. In Islamocratic circles, and those are often ground zero, the OIC signifies less the palatability (or culpability) of the current Muslim leadership than the potential of the umma to reconstruct itself. Islam, thus, is perpetuated as a symbolic order.

If this could lead to an intra-Islamic Kulturkampf, it is worth recalling that symbols are defined, inter alia, in language and disseminated by socialization through a structure of propagation (or propaganda). Rhetorical Islam—in subverting the distinction between rationale and rationalization—constructs communal identities and promotes or defends the aspirations of political élites without automatically engendering particular, much less particularly primordial, policies. In this sense, a discursive dogmatism is analytically unhelpful. True, in the beginning was the word, but before the word was the thought. And with the empathetic engagement in analysis arise, prior to matters of textuality (self-representation), questions of both subtextuality (intention) and contextuality (situation).

As such, the status of prima facie “final vocabulary” does by no means imply a motivational gravity as first or final consideration.
Indeed, final vocabulary implies only the shared vocabulary of a religio-political entity whose internal diversity is as compelling as it is compound. In effect, their protoplasmic empirical poverty together with their latent political potential, as classicized icons of authentication, allow invocations of Islamic incentives to trade (geo-cultural) discourse for (geopolitical) rationale. What remains is a new post-modern politics, resultant in a vegetarian version of pan-Islamism. But, as it has continuously happened in the post-colonial and now exceedingly neo-colonial periods, meatless (and boneless) political meals are authenticated in a luring “suitable for Muslims” wrapping. Come, join the feast.

Such political marketing, pirouetting around Islam as a protean category, provides the very raison d’être for cosmopolitan incarnations of Islamic utopia, including that of the OIC. And most certainly, this remains a skilful masquerade: Washington as the geopolitical Mecca, yet the recurrent echo of “next year in Jerusalem”; entrenched étatism, and yet unreserved endorsement of pan-Islam; the appropriation of religion by realpolitik, yet a celestial mandate to veil the vice. In the final calculation, it is this exact divide of discourse and rationale (or the declaratory and operational aspects of foreign policy) which illuminates why the OIC, as the global embodiment of political Islam, is to remain in the very heart of religious internationalism. In the new century, as in the previous fourteen, Islam may struggle with inadequate institutions but its infatuations are bound to withstand the ongoing political challenges of a secular world order.
## APPENDIX A

### MEMBER STATES OF THE OIC

#### TERRITORY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of accession</th>
<th>Territory (sq.km)</th>
<th>Population (mio./'01)</th>
<th>GDP/PPP ($bio./'00)</th>
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</table>
## APPENDIX A: MEMBER STATES OF THE OIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Year of accession</th>
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<th>Population (mio./'01)</th>
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**Notes:**

Observer-status has been granted to the following states, IGO, and INGOs:

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republic of
2. The Central African Republic
3. The Economic Cooperation Organization
4. The Gulf Cooperation Council
5. The League of Arab States
6. Moro National Liberation Front
7. The Non-Aligned Movement
8. Northern Cyprus, The Turkish Republic of
9. The Organization of African Unity
10. Thailand, The Kingdom of
11. Togo, Republic of
12. The United Nations
13. The Union of the Arab Magreb

* Bangladesh, as part of Pakistan, was among the founder members. After secession, however, it became an independent member.
** Needless to say that the PLO is neither a state nor a government. The combined data for the Westbank (excl. East Jerusalem) and Gaza, however, is as follows. Territory: 6,220 sq. km; population: 3.3 million; GDP (purchase power parity): $4.1 billion.
*** Syria was a founder member as part of the United Arab Republic and became full member post-dissolution.
† The Republic of Yemen emerged in 1991 with the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen, both of which were OIC members since 1969.
APPENDIX B

THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OIC

A COMPREHENSIVE LISTING

1. PRINCIPAL BODIES

(i) Islamic Conference of Kings and Heads of State (Islamic Summit)

This is the supreme body of the OIC, entrusted with defining strategies for OIC policies. It convenes every three years, most recently the Ninth Islamic Summit met in Doha, the capital of Qatar, in mid-November 2000. Prior to this, summits were summoned in Rabat (1969), Lahore (1974), Mecca (1981), Casablanca (1984), Kuwait (1987), Dakar (1991), Casablanca (1994), and Tehran (1997).

(ii) Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM)

The ICFM is the main organ in the deliberative and consultative process. Its regular sessions are held annually, in which it adopts and reviews resolutions. It is formally empowered to appoint the Secretary General (and four Assistants on the recommendation of the Secretary General) and approve the budget of the Secretariat. Constitutionally, a resolution requires two-third's majority, but the convention of unanimity results both in silencing discontent and in much horse-trading. Although the ICFM was originally designed to assist the Summit as a preparatory and follow-up organ, the ICFM had gradually evolved as the pacesetting decision-making body. The Summit routinely endorses decisions reached at ICFM sessions.

(iii) General Secretariat

This is the executive and administrative organ of the OIC, established by the First ICFM (February–March 1970). It is headed by a Secretary General, elected by the ICFM, for a renewable four-year term. The Secretariat is located in Jeddah – “pending the liberation of Jerusalem” (Charter of the Islamic Conference, Article VI-5). The Secretary General is aided by four “Assistant Secretaries General.” The OIC has had eight Secretaries General since its inception: 1970–3, Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia); 1974–5, Hasan Tuhami (Egypt); 1975–9, Amadou Karim Gaye (Senegal); 1979–84,
APPENDIX B: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE OIC

Habib Chatty (Tunisia); 1985–8, Sharifuddin Pirzada (Pakistan); 1989–96, Hamid Al-Gabid (Niger); 1997–2000, Azeddine Laraki (Morocco); and since 2001 Abdelouahed Belkeziz also from Morocco. Twelve Specialized Committees exist adjacent to the Secretariat in Jeddah, some headed by an Assistant Secretary General.

(iv) International Islamic Court of Justice

The decision to set up an Islamic Court of Justice to adjudicate intra-OIC disputes and, on the reference of the ICFM, to provide religious edicts (fatâwa) was taken at the Third Summit (Mecca, 1981). Yet the preliminary phases have run into difficulties, arguably because a legal dimension to the OIC implies a suprastate authority which can bypass domestic legislation (both by recourse to international law and shariatic law), and thus challenge the sovereign disposition of individual member states. As of February 2002, less than a dozen member states have ratified the Basic Statute of the Court.

2. SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES

(a) Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Committee
(b) Permanent Finance Committee
(c) Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural, and Social Affairs (ICECSA)
(d) Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Co-operation (COMCEC)
(e) Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMICA)
(f) Standing Committee for Scientific and Technological Co-operation (COMSTECH)
(g) Ad hoc Committee on Afghanistan
(h) Ad hoc Committee on Southern Africa and Namibia
(i) Committee of Islamic Solidarity with the Peoples of the Sahel
(j) Committee on the Situation of Muslims in the Philippines
(k) Six-member Committee on Palestine
(l) Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

3. SUBSIDIARY ORGANS

(a) Islamic Solidarity Fund – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
(b) Al-Quds Fund – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
(c) Research Centre for Islamic History, Art, and Culture (IRCICA) – Istanbul, Turkey.
(d) Islamic Centre for Vocational and Technical Training and Research (ICTVTR) – Dhaka, Bangladesh.
(f) World Centre for Islamic Education – Rabat, Morocco.
4. SPECIALIZED INSTITUTIONS

(a) Islamic Development Bank (IDB) – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
(b) International Islamic News Agency (IINA) – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
(c) Islamic States Broadcasting Organization (ISBO) – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
(d) Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) – Rabat, Morocco.

5. AFFILIATED INSTITUTIONS

(a) The Islamic Committee of the International Crescent (ICIC) – Benghazi, Libya.
(b) Organization of Islamic Capitals and Cities – Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
(c) Islamic Ship-Owners’ Association (ISA) – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
(d) Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) – Karachi, Pakistan.
(e) Islamic Cement Association – Ankara, Turkey.
(f) Sports Federation of Islamic Solidarity Games – Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
(g) International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB) – Cairo, Egypt.
## APPENDIX C

### TRIANGLE OF NEUTRALIZATION

A SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW

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<th>Islamic Republic of Pakistan</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>foundation</strong></td>
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<td>1979: Islamic revolution</td>
<td>1947: Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Populace (2001)</strong></td>
<td>22.8 million</td>
<td>66.1 million</td>
<td>144.6 million</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (2000)</strong></td>
<td>$232.0 billion</td>
<td>$413.0 billion</td>
<td>$282.0 billion</td>
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<td>Shi‘i (Twelver)</td>
<td>Sunni (Maturidi)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ummatic normativity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International methodology</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 (RE-)INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1 In this text I shall use the capitalized form “International Relations” to refer to the academic discipline as distinguished from “international relations,” here understood as the realm of activity between different players in world politics.


5 The quoted construction belongs to Michael Howard, who is worth reproducing in full: “The United States indeed, virtually alone among nations, founds and to some extent still finds its identity not so much in ethnic community or shared historical experience as in the dedication to a value-system; and the reiteration of these values, the repeated proclamation of and dedication to the liberal creed, has always been a fundamental element in the cohesion of American society. In this respect the United States has always resembled rather a secular church, or perhaps a gigantic sect, than it has the nations-states of the Old World.” See M. Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience: The George Macaulay Lectures in the University of Cambridge, 1977* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 116.


10 The construction “anti-Muslimism,” a purported parallel to anti-Semitism, belongs to Fred Halliday. See Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), chapter 3. Although Islamophobia is often seen as an extension of, or compensation for, Europe’s erstwhile anti-Semitic tendencies, the parallel is probably deficient on at least one count: Where Jewry was seen as the enemy within, as a potential ideological and racial fifth column, Muslims, however indigenous, are viewed as external foes. The medieval spectre of Islam entering Europe by force, from the Balkans in the East or from Andalusia in the West, coupled with successive waves of immigration in the modern West has maintained a picture of Islam as an alien body.


12 This ideational take on a political project is not unique to the West’s relationship to Islam. In the Americas, too, the natives were viewed as aliens, for the soil (per Lockean liberalism) belonged to those who could, physically and culturally, cultivate it. See G. Mackenthun, Metaphors of Dispossession: American Beginnings and the Translation of Empire, 1492–1637 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997). Anti-Japanese Nihonjiron literature too falls in this category, see R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (New York: Penguin, 1974) for an example and R. Befu and J. Kreiner (eds), Othernesses of Japan: Historical and Cultural Influences on Japanese Studies in Ten Countries (München: Iudicium, 1992) for an analysis. Johan Galtung explains the self-referential cosmos of Western political scripts thus: “The Western assumption is that the world can be divided into three parts: a center which is the West; a periphery waiting to receive whatever comes from the West; and a recalcitrant evil refusing to receive the word, and the goods and services that follow, and to be incorporated as second-class West.” See Galtung, Human Rights in Another Key (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 12.


21 I.H. Malik, *Islam, Nationalism, and the West: Issues of Identity in Pakistan* (London: Macmillan in association with St Anthony's College, 1999), pp. xvii–1. Islamism asserts not only the revival (tajdid) or, if required, reform (islah) of religious belief, but asserts the imperative bearing of religious belief on political praxis. In this sense, the term “fundamentalist” is entirely misapplied, for the Islamists are concerned not with the religious fundamentals (like, doctrinal orthodoxy) but with the auxiliary (furu'), although their mission is marketed by promoting certain auxiliary branches, e.g. chiefly but selectively Islamic governance (al-siyasa al-shar'iyya), to foundational principle (usul) and thus mandatory practice. Islamists, thus, can be considered peripheralists as opposed to fundamentalists.

22 Consider this telling prefix of the editor Walter McDougall as he, having recounted the various virtuous, Christian, contributions of religion in defeating Communism in Eastern Europe (forgetting the decisive impact of the Afghan resistance) and safeguarding Russia’s conversion to democracy, sets the tone for a preview of Islam’s role thus: “On the unhappy side of the ledger, Islamic fundamentalists played the decisive role in the installation of an anti-American theocratic republic in Iran and continue to stoke the terrorism that frustrates the Arab-Israeli peace process.” His very introduction, thus, becomes an unforgiving indictment. See W.A. McDougall, “Introduction,” *Orbis*, vol. 42, no. 2 (1998), p. 159, emphasis added.


International regimes, in our context, is a synonym, although an analytical distinction can be drawn between international organizations as interstate and suprastate institutions and international regimes as the processes and procedural outcomes of international organizations. Stephen Krasner has defined international regimes as “acts of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” See S.D. Krasner, “Introduction,” in Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.

38 Please refer to Appendix A (p. 142) for details on the membership of the OIC.
veiled opportunism is the sole guiding principle of Turkish manoeuvres within the OIC.

2 PAN-ISLAMIC PARADIGMS

1. The Qur’an (3:103), based on Muhammad Asad’s translation, The Message of the Qur’an (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), p. 82.


5. A.S. Moussalli, “Islamism: Modernisation of Islam or Islamisation of Knowledge,” in R. Meijer (ed.), Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999), p. 98. The conceptual genealogy here is ostensibly Orientalist; cf. Bernard Lewis’ submission that, “Between the Muslim and the rest of the world there was . . . a religiously and legally obligatory state of war, which could only end with the conversion or subjugation of all mankind. A treaty of peace between a Muslim state and a non-Muslim state was juridically [sic] impossible.” See Lewis, “Politics and War,” in J. Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (eds), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 175.

6. T. Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1999), pp. 125–6. Tariq Ramadan’s much-acclaimed work is original, but clearly less innovative than it proposes to be: The spatial locus of Islamic political discourse is redefined but never relinquished, as if the discourse is possible only in territorial, rather than, say, transcendent or civic, terms.


8. Likewise, domestic Islamism is inspired by the ideal-type of early Islam, for “recourse to political Islam in most countries is not merely a ploy to wrest political power, it is an undefined and painful effort to rectify [social] stratification and [economic] underdevelopment by espousing the pristine successes of early times as an attainable alternative.” See Malik, Islam, Nationalism, and the West, p. 1. But even if not programmatic, the political theory of Islam would sustain the Medinite state as the realized ideal type in order to allow for the descent of divine reign in history. This philosophical commitment is clear even in the great proponents of falsafīṣa (a neo-Platonic intellectual tradition in medieval Islam), especially Abu Nasr al-Farabi’s work Al-madīnā al-faḍīlā (d. 950). See R. Walzer (trans.), Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abu Nasr al-Farabi’s Mabādīʿ ‘ara ahl al-madīnā al-fadīlā: A Revised Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
NOTES AND REFERENCES

9 I am grateful to H.E. Prof. M. Tahir ul Qadri, Chancellor of Minhaj ul Quran Islamic University (Lahore) for this valuable point. Incidentally, of course, the Arabic root-meanings of *dawla* literally denote an item that “routinely changes hands” or something ephemeral, thus hardly a valuable entity according to Islam’s political norms.


16 What exactly is meant by “faith and all its corollaries” is, of course, contingent on thinker. It would, however, be erroneous to assume a reductionist approach on the part of the classical jurists, who were sometimes surprisingly elaborate in their various enumerations of the objectives (*maqāṣid*) of law and governance. Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388), for instance, inferred three negative (constraining) and three positive (facilitating) objectives from the *shari’a*, all of which he referred to in terms of rights (*hūquq*). In the first rubric he listed the safeguard of individual life, social life, including offspring, and property (calling them respectively *ḥaq al-ḥayāt*, *ḥaq al-nasl*, *ḥaq al-māl*). In the second rubric, he listed the safeguard of freedom, dignity, and knowledge (*ḥaq al-ḥurriya*, *ḥaq al-karāma*, *ḥaq al-ʿilm*). For a discussion of Imam al-Shatibi, although not in these exact terms, see M.A. Choudhury, *The Unicity Precept and the Socio-Scientific Order* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993); and M.K. Masud, *Shatibi’s Philosophy of Islamic Law* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamic Research Institute, 1995).

20 For a well-circulated, but controversial, treatise, see T. An-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1996). The concept of “pious polity” is my attempt to propose an equivalent to the Arabic dār al-taqwa.
22 I owe this insight to T.J. Winter (Sheikh Zayed Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge).
29 See e.g. The Qur‘ān (12:40), (18:26), and (43:85).
31 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Political Thoughts (London: Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 6. See also supra note 20 in this chapter.
32 See S. Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Quest for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996) for a critical analysis of an-Nabhani’s thought. Another celebrated writer, whose fame again exceeds the soundness of his scholarship, is the South Asian Mawlana Abu’l Ala Mawdudi. He, too, is explicit about the resemblance of his Islamist theory of statecraft with Western totalitarianism. The Islamic state, he writes, “is a totalitarian state encompassing the whole [of] human life and painting every aspect of human life with its moral color and particular moralist programs. So nobody has the right to stand up against the state and exempt himself from the liability by saying this
is a personal matter, so that the state does not intrude.” Mawdudi then retreating slightly as he states in contradiction, “But despite this totality of the Islamic state, it is free from the color that dominates the totalitarian and authoritarian states of our age. Thus the Islamic state does not curtail the individual freedom nor has it much room for dictatorship and absolute authority.” See L.M. Safi, “Islam and the Secular State,” in Proceedings from CSID’s Second Annual Conference (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, 2001), p. 61.

33 Lewis, Multiple Identities, p. 26.
34 Lewis, “Politics and War,” p. 96.
40 Jansen, Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 27.
41 See e.g. E. Tauber, “Pan-Arab Subversion on an Islamic Basis: The Case of Rashid Rida,” in B. Abrahamov (ed.), Studies in Arabic and Islamic Culture I (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, 2001).
47 The term “state-nation” is owed to Bassam Tibi’s creative inversion which signified national identity when constructed around the non-nation state subsequent to the establishment of the state, not as a precursor to it. See B. Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accomodation of Social Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).
48 Lewis, Multiple Identities, p. 28.
49 Abul-Fadl, “Islam and the Middle East,” p. 29.
50 Sardar, Future of Muslim Civilization, p. 280.
53 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 255.

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60 F. Ajami, “The End of Pan-Arabism,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 58, no. 1 (1979), pp. 355–72. Of course, one little-examined cause for the crushing defeat of the Arab, in particular Egyptian, forces in the Six-Day War was the effective Saudi assistance to Israel’s blitzkrieg, in that its support to the royalist counter-revolution against the republicans in the North-Yemeni civil war tied up perhaps 100,000 Egyptian troops some 1,000 miles from Jerusalem. They never made it back in time.

61 Whilst the Israeli authorities pledged innocent by reference to the arson as the act of a crazed Christian fundamentalist from Australia, Denis Michael Rohan, inflamed Muslim world-opinion held that responsibility, by design or default, rested with the occupying authorities who had probably conspired and colluded with evangelical-messianic groups. See e.g. *Al-Ehram*, 29 August 1969.

62 Aykan, *Turkey’s Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference*, p. 35.


74 See Charter of the Islamic Conference, “Principles: Article II (B-2/B-3),” in *Guide*, p. 8. The salient provisions of the Objective declaration include the following aspirations:
“1. To promote Islamic solidarity among member states; 2. To consolidate cooperation among member states in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and other fields of activities. . . . 5. To coordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support the struggle of the people of Palestine. . . . 6. To strengthen the struggle of all Muslim peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence, and national rights.”


83 Please refer to Appendix B (p. 145) for details on the institutional structure of the OIC.


### 3 A GEOPOLITICAL GENEALOGY OF THE OIC


2 Salafism is a form of neo-fundamentalist Islam (here, I believe, the term fundamentalism is applicable, but do note its specific usage). The Salaficist self-identification is that of carrying, exclusively, the heritage of the primordial Islamic community (the “salaf”). Decrying theological innovation and heresy, they seek to return to a *de novo* scripturalism which refuses the mediation of the jurisprudential schools (*madhabs/madhāhib*) in deriving Shari‘ite law by way of precedent and dismisses the very legitimacy of the Sufic traditions (*tasawwuf*, the practice of which is sometimes referred to as *sulūk*). Although ideationally and genealogically close to Wahhabism (discussed later), which in many ways was its chief patron, Salafism is not tied to the
House of Saud. As it does not (necessarily) draw material resources from the Kingdom, it does not give allegiance to it. One trend of traditionalist Šalafism entirely eschews political participation and is concerned with reformulating the theological and jurisprudential sources of Islamic disciplines. Two other currents, which could be referred to as respectively reformist and activist, are committed to socio-political engagement although the emphases (respectively ījīhād vs. jihaḍ) provide for very different manifestations. For details, although with a varying taxonomy, see e.g. T. Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1999), pp. 240–3.

3 It must be recalled that ‘ulamā (sing., ‘alim) are religious functionaries charged with tending mosques and organizing rites. Yielding no theological authority, whether as God-man intermediaries or vehicles for redemption, they bear no similitude to clergy in e.g. the Catholic or Buddhist traditions. In the present text the English noun “clerics” will be used only insofar as the ‘ulamā are party to a structural order sustained by the state.

4 The theological divergence between Wahhabiyya (also known as the Muwahhidīyya) and the broad, “catholic,” church of Sunnism, despite its negligence in Western scholarship, is no less than the Shi‘īte-Sunni discord. See e.g. M.H. Kabbani, *Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine* (Mountainview, CA: As-Sunnah Foundation, 1998) and N.S. Sheikh, *A Charitable Challenge to the Cynics*, 2nd edn (Lahore: Minhaj Publications, 1997).


7 Aburish, *Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall*, p. 10

8 Ibid., p. 24.

9 F.A. Sankari, “Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia,” in A.E.H. Dessouki, *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 179–80. The first major assault of the Wahhabi movement was directed against Imam Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi-Talib’s mausoleum in Karbala (1801), which instantly antagonized the Shi‘ī branch of Islam and set the tone for future relations between the two sects. Later, Wahhabism was not adverse to the forceful conversion of Shi‘a communities, especially among the heterodox Ismailis in the southwestern region of Asir.

10 F. Al-Farsy, *Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation* (London: Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 13. Al-Farsy’s is, in the dual sense of the word, an incredible attempt of an official Saudi historiography, peppered with fanciful justifications and, failing that, disingenuous narratives. That the author has had a rocketing career in the Saudi bureaucratic establishment is hardly surprising, considering the following over-the-top dedication to King Fahd whom he, quite seriously, describes as “powerful statesman; skilful, talented, and experienced politician; leader of his country’s march to development; a powerful voice for
Arab and Islamic solidarity; and a moderate international politician who works tirelessly to achieve peace.” It follows therefore: “Any attempt to comprehend the scope and scale of the achievements of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz can be only partially successful, for his unique personality and outstanding abilities are not limited to the material benefits he has brought to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but extend to issues of morality and humanity in world at large. . . . This book is dedicated with the deepest respect, appreciation and gratitude to the Custodian of the two Holy Mosques. . . . His acceptance of this dedication will do me the greatest honor, for this modest book is but one of the fruits of his flourishing reign,” etc.


12 Aburish, *Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall*, p. 152


14 Aburish, *Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall*, p. 18.

15 Although, the Ikhwan (lit. “Brothers”) were handpicked primarily from remote tribes by the Saudi monarch and resettled primarily as farmers (rather than bedouins), to be used as a personal protection guard and, if needed, a fierce fighting force, their uncompromising vehemence and the moral certainty of their theology made them turn against him. They became “a dangerous and sour body of men who, as they grew in numbers, became as much of a challenge as a comfort to their ruler.” See D. Holden and R. Johns, *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), p. 70.

16 Al-Farsy, *Modernity and Tradition*, p. 285. Note also in the entire chapter dedicated to Saudi Arabia’s foreign relations, Al-Farsy describes no Islamic partner, while elaborating on the close relationships to the United States, to Europe, and to the (erstwhile) Communist bloc.


23 See note 42 for details on the Gulf Cooperation Council.


Incidentally, it was under Clinton that official US policy changed from supporting UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 194 (1948), which had affirmed the Palestinian rights to return, to restitution and/or to compensation. The United States thereby joined Israel in opposing this long-established resolution as a framework for the pursuit of a Middle East settlement. The sea-change came at the December 1993 session of the UNGA, ironically enough only subsequent to the Oslo Accords, but the resolution was nonetheless reaffirmed with a 127–2 vote. See N. Chomsky, “The Umbrella of U.S. Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of U.S. policy,” Open Media Pamphlet Series, no. 9 (1999), p. 17.

The suggested (but for obvious reasons never cartographically illustrated) future state of Palestine was to be, according to Edward Said, “a phony state that couldn’t fool even as ardent a claimant for the illusion as Arafat.” See Said, “Double Standards,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online (October 2000).


For an analysis of the Arab Summit, October 2000, see Roger Hardy’s perceptive commentary: “Analysis: Arab Summit Promises Words not Action,” BBC News, 20 October 2000. For an Islamist reaction to the Doha proceedings, see Press release from Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Open letter from Hizb ut-Tahrir to the Islamic Conference held in Duha [sic],” 11 November 2000, which states: “[Y]ou watch as if Palestine and its people have nothing to do with you, as if they are from another planet! Then know beforehand that the Ummah will not forgive you for the crimes you committed by abandoning them on their own [sic], as an easy prey for enemies and keeping your armies resting in their barracks to protect you authority and preventing them from intervening to deter the kaafir [infidel] aggressor.”


Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 October, 2000, quoted by N. Chomsky, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” internet version: <www.znetmag.org>. However, at least one concerned observer in the U.S. State Department had already voiced concern about whether Israel was in breach of a stipulation in the Arms Export Control Act, according to which US weapons can be used for “legitimate self-defence” only. See e.g. P. McGeough, “Israeli Weapons Bear an Embarrassing Label: Made in USA,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2002.


For an official presentation of OIC’s responsibilities, see <www.oic-un.org/about/over.htm>.


38 OIC Press Communiqué, “OIC Receives New Headquarters from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (4 December 2001).

39 Daniel Pipes approvingly quotes Khalid Duren’s reflection on the innovations entailed in the new tactics when “for the first time in history the imam of the Ka’ba has been sent on tour to foreign countries as if he were an Apostolic nuncio.” Pipes, “The Western Mind of Radical Islam,” *First Things*, no. 58 (1995), p. 20.


42 J.D. Anthony, “The U.S.–GCC Relationship: A Glass Half-empty or Half-full?,” *Middle East Policy*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1997), pp. 22–41. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an association of Arab monarchies and principalities, consisting of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. Although not overtly concerned with international security, geopolitical considerations (and in particular a desire not to be sucked into existing rivalries) provided impetus for the establishment of the GCC in 1981. On the one hand, the Iran-Iraq confrontation led to fears about whether the preponderant party (be it Baghdad or Tehran) would seek to exercise regional hegemony once the war was over. On the other hand, the Gulf sheikhdoms saw themselves encircled in the global standoff of the bipolar Cold War and feared that they might be sandwiched in a future Washington–Moscow confrontation. See H. Abe, “Regional Integration in the Gulf: The Background to the Formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” *IMES–I.U.J. Working Paper Series*, no. 9 (1987).


46 See e.g. A. Jerichow, *Saudi Arabia: Outside Global Law and Order* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997).


48 The members of the religious police, “Muṭawwa,wa,” (variously known as *muṭawwi‘īn* or *muṭawwa‘īn*) make up the Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice and are government employees. In fact, the president of the Mutawwa holds the rank of cabinet minister. As a manifestation of the domestic grip of Wahhabi ʿulamā, the propagation of Muslim
teachings not in conformity with the officially accepted interpretation of Islam is prohibited. Writers and other individuals who publicly criticize this interpretation, including both those who advocate a stricter interpretation and those who favour a more moderate interpretation, have reportedly been imprisoned and faced other reprisals. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Shi‘i citizens suspected of subversion have periodically been subjected to surveillance and limitations on travel abroad. Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of the US military installation at Al-Khobar authorities have detained, interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of eastern-province Shi‘a. In November 1998, several members of the Mutawwaa attacked and killed an elderly Shi‘a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a traditional Shi‘i practice) but failed in covering up the killing. See e.g. US Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Saudi Arabia, or Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Saudi Arabia, available on the internet respectively as <www.hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html> and <www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_saudiara99.html>.

49 Halliday, Nation and Religion, p. 170.
50 Aburish, Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall, pp. 184–91. According to The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Saudi Arabia’s annual defence budget amounts to nearly eleven times the budget of Pakistan, which in turn sustains an army that is seven times larger (550,000 vs. 75,000) and an air force more than twice as big (45,000 vs. 20,000). See e.g. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001–2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2001), pp. 145–6, 167–8.

52 US–Saudi ties are probably more multifaceted than most observers realize. Not only is the dependency of the greatest oil consumer on the greatest oil producer an all-important tie (which, incidentally, ensures continued US military presence in the Gulf), but both economic and military linkages exist in more covert ways. A most telling study is that of David Spiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), which shows how the United States, under different administrations, undermined the international market and thwarted international institutions in order to take advantage of the rise in oil prices after 1973. In the process, the United States used Saudi funds to sustain a debt-based US economy, bolster the dollar to artificially high rates in international currency markets, and relocate wealth in an inverse globalization (i.e. a centralization) of assets. Also as a strategic supplier of military merchandise, the United States is an expert player. According to Noam Chomsky, the US support to Israel amounts to an “export promotion” of military armament in that military grants to Israel help stimulate countervailing arms sales to the Arab states, again recycling petrodollars to American industry. For further discussion on this thought, see Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 206.

53 Curtis, Great Deception, pp. 155–6.
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55 This caveat is, of course, one that the Shi’a tradition would not recognize as integral. For an alternatively sympathetic treatment of the issue of political legitimacy in Shi’ism, see A.A. Sachedina, *The Just Ruler* (al-sultân al-‘âdîl) in *Shi’ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).


58 Ibid., p. 13.


63 Halliday, *Nation and Religion*, p. 49.

64 According to a public presentation by the Swiss journalist, Ahmed Huber, London, August 1998. Hassan al-Turabi too has cited similar statements.

65 Chubin and Tripp, “Iran–Saudi Arabia relations,” p. 48. The notion of Westoxication (*gharb-zâdegi*) was first proposed by Jalal-i Ahmad in a 1962 publication by that name, but appropriated and popularized by the religious establishment, whose analysis of the Muslim political degeneration revealed a contamination of indigenous values by a neo-imperialist penetration of Western culture.

66 Lewis, *Multiple Identities*, p. 30; see also D. Pipes, “The Western Mind of Radical Islam,” *First Things*, no. 58. (1995), pp. 20–22. The papal parallel derives from the practice of issuing authoritative, and sometimes absolutist, fatâwa/fatwas, universal obedience to which is deemed compulsory. Traditionally, compliance with a particular jurist’s *fatwa* had not been mandatory for, given the contingent nature of the *shari’a*, one *fatwa* cannot invalidate or supersede another (with the single, entirely legitimate, exception that both are authored by the one and same jurist, who has in the course of his research changed opinion).


68 See e.g. OIC Final Communiqué of the Twelfth ICFM (Baghdad, June 1981): “Iraq is relieved of any moral or legal responsibility for the continuation of the conflict: the responsibility lies squarely on the officials of Iran, for they have not so far exerted any serious or sincere efforts to halt the conflict and reach a peaceful, just, and honourable settlement in this dispute” (Annex V). Not surprisingly, these words were drafted by the Iraqi delegation and read out by the Iraqi President.

69 Regardless of the distressing experiences in Egypt and Libya, this seemed to indicate that to both Saudi Arabia, Israel and, notably, the United States, a military regime in Iran was preferable to a popular-religious one. See e.g. the much-acclaimed work by Avi Shlaim,

70 Resolution 8/10–(P)/1979 (CFM) had considered the Camp David Accords “null and void and not binding to [sic] Arabs and Muslims.” See Declarations and Resolutions: Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1975–1979 (Jeddah: OIC General Secretariat, n.d.), p. 31. Of course the logic of this statements remains somewhat opaque, given that the Camp David Accords were purely bilateral between Egypt and Israel; it did not directly affect the locus standi of “Arabs and Muslims.”

71 Resolution 9/4–(P)(IS) 1984 in Declarations and Resolutions: Fourth Islamic Summit Conference (Jeddah: OIC General Secretariat, n.d.), pp. 72–5. This action repeated the partisan slant of the ICFM three years earlier, see supra note 68.


73 Quoted in Baba, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, p. 171.

74 Mehdi, Organization of the Islamic Conference, pp. 64–76.

75 Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/0110, 26 March 1988.


81 See e.g. K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 7th edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 111. Indeed Art. 10 of the Principles in the Constitution charges the government with the responsibility to pursue “the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world,” a bigger task than simply aiming at solidarity, which the OIC does.

82 Lewis, Multiple Identities, p. 115.
83 See the website of the Iranian Sunni League <www.isl.org.uk>, which argues that the Sunni minority is treated “like the untouchables in India.” For all its worth, such demagoguery may well be based on tangibles: As of 2001, Tehran’s one million Sunni residents have been denied a separate mosque to offer services per Sunni rituals, while Sunni mosques elsewhere have been demolished. Sunni groups are clearly underrepresented on all levels of government, are virtually non-existent in strategic positions in the armed forces, and are socio-economically marginalized. Annual reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, moreover, describe repeated assaults on Sunni ‘ulamā and prayer leaders.


86 Of course, the *shari‘a* is itself a hybrid jurisprudential assemblage, not, for the most part, instituted directly as codified law. This derives partly from the open textuality of the canonical texts (the *Qur‘ān* and authenticated *ḥadīths/ahadīth*). In addition, further contestability is added with the secondary sources such as personal deductive reasoning (*ijtiḥād*) performed by the able jurist. In the four surviving Sunni schools (*madhabs/madhāhib*) of jurisprudential method (*fiqh*), consensus (*ijma‘*), too, forms a subsidiary source of law, although traditional legal scholars differ on the extent of and parties to the required consensus.

87 High-ranking clerics, as the Iraqi ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoei and the Azeri–Irani Muhammad Kazim Sharriat-Madari, both senior to Khomeini in scholarship, opposed the concept of *velā yat-i faqīh* which they saw as an unwanted innovation in Islamic political theory. The latter, otherwise known to be an international fatherfigure in piety and scholarship, was summarily stripped of his religious rank (“defrocked”) by the Khomeini regime in 1982—a truly unprecedented step in Muslim ecclesial history which historically has had no machinery for this. He was further placed under house arrest on charges of conspiracy, thus exposing that political fealty rather than religious credentials were decisive in the new Iranian order. See e.g. S. Zubaida, “Is Iran an Islamic State?,” in J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds), *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 111.

88 See e.g. Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, p. 50.
93 For a transcript of his reputed “open-door” interview with CNN in January 1998, see <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/iran/>. One important analysis is Elaine Sciolino’s “Seeking to Open a Door to the
US,” *New York Times*, 8 January 1998. In *The Economist* (“Islam and the Ballot Box,” 31 May 1997), Khatami was quoted as saying: “I think the West has a superb civilization which has influenced all parts of the world . . . having a deep knowledge of the West has always been very important to me.” His opponent in the first election, the conservative Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri was naturally presented as less inclined to open a dialogue with the West, at least not on the same terms.

A transcript of President Khatami’s speech was kindly provided by the Iranian embassy in London. It can also be located electronically, however, on the website <www.undp.org/missions/iran/oic002.html>.

Khamenei also suggested that the OIC “should become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and be the sixth member with veto right,” see <www.undp.org/missions/iran/oic001.html>. Not surprisingly, the Iranian embassy conveniently forgot to supply me with a transcript of Ayatollah Khamenei’s confrontational address, which may have been for factional consumption only.


*Summary of World Broadcasts* ME/3294 MED/4, 1 August 1998 and ME/3302 MED/22, 11 August 1998.


See Final Communiqué of the 21st ICFM (Session of Islamic Unity and Cooperation for Peace, Justice, and Progress), point 39.


Unique about the Bosnian tragedy was its savagery, which forced observers, including in many cases outspoken Rabbis, who previously ascribed to the Hitlerite Holocaust a unique genocidal status in history, to concede that a Serb replication was taking place. One voice reasoned thus: “Almost as soon as the character of the war against the Bosnians was clear, comparisons to the war against the Jews were made. In anguish and in analysis, the Holocaust was remembered; and since genocide is not quantitatively measured, the remembrance was right. . . . We have been robbed, you might say, of our post-Holocaust innocence.” L. Wieseltier, “Afterword,” in N. Mousavizadeh (ed.), *The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 194–5. See also R. Gutman and D. Rieff (eds), *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp. 50–7.

B. Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Allan Lane, 2001) is one of the most revealing books on the Bosnian tragedy, although it amounts primarily to an indictment of British policy.


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107 Turkish-Cypriot academic S.R. Sonyel quoted by Chaudhry, “Response of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to Crisis,” p. 287.


110 See e.g. Secretary General’s communiqué 18 April 1999 (Jeddah). Five days earlier, the Commission of Human Rights resolution 1999/2, entitled “The Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo,” had confined itself to an appeal for the UNHCR to extend assistance to the displaced Kosovars.

111 Resolution 26/26–(P)/1999 (CFM), Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (July 1999).

112 Compare this to the Final Communiqué of the same session in which the “flagrant violation of human rights” of the Indian Kashmiris was condemned, together with an emphasis on “their inalienable right for self-determination.” See Final Communiqué of the 26th session of the ICFM (Session of Peace and Partnership for Development), points 44–8.


121 Although both initiatives referred, ostensibly, to Afghanistan, by sheer irony-cum-tragedy Iran has proportionately the largest number
of heroin addicts in the world and is, according to Western sources at least, involved in a fair bit of terror activities, too.

See “S. Arabia, Iran sign Accord on Security,” *Dawn*, 19 April 2001. The latter disclaimer amounted to an acknowledgment of UAE’s sensibilities about the three strategic islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, under dispute. In June 1999, the UAE had threatened to leave the GCC in case other Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Oman, did not take a tougher stance on this issue and, as a display of its resolve, it reopened its embassy in Baghdad in April 2000, just as the Irano–Saudi rapprochement was reaching new heights with a visit of a senior military delegation from Iran to Saudi Arabia. See “UAE slams Iran over ‘Gulf Tension,'” *BBC News*, 11 September 1999; and “Iran Pledges Gulf Co-Operation,” *BBC News*, 25 April 2000.


Denis Halliday, former UN Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq to *The Independent*, 15 October 1998. In early 2000, Hans von Sponeck, his successor as a Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, and Jutta Burghart, head of UN World Food Program in Baghdad, also resigned in protest against the sanctions.


See e.g. Final Communiqué of 26th session of ICFM, July 1999, point 57.

See e.g. Resolution 19/9–(P) (IS) and Final Communiqué of the Ninth Summit (Doha, 2000); and “OIC Allows Members to Ignore Iraq Air Embargo,” *Dawn*, 15 November 2000.


This terminology belongs to Hooshang Amirahmadi, who has scattered a number of articles in cyberspace. For a book-length study, however, see, Amirahmadi and M. Parvin, *Post-Revolutionary Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).

J.J. Pal, *Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Sidhuram, 1983), p. 5; see also A.S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity* ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 76, where Jinnah is quoted to the following effect: “The Hindus and the Muslims are different in everything. We differ in our religion, our civilization and culture. Our language, our architecture, music, jurisprudence and law, our food, society, dress, in every way we are different.”
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142 Ibid., p. 61.
144 See e.g. S.S. Pirzada, “Pakistan and the OIC,” *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 40, no. 2 (1987), pp. 30–2; and the web-site of Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <www.forisb.org/oic.html>.
149 For a thorough investigation of the history of (spontaneous) “riots” and (state-induced) “pogroms” in India, see the recent volume by A. Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
150 See e.g. resolutions from the Sixteenth Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers (Fez, January 1986) and OIC’s endorsement of the Pakistani draft on establishing a nuclear-free zone in South Asia during the Twentieth ICFM (Istanbul, August 1991) and Twenty-first ICFM (Karachi, April 1993). The most recent Summit resolutions are 22/8–(P) (IS)/1997 and 8/8–(P) (IS)/1997 (Tehran, 1997).
153 Wedged between northwestern India, southeastern China, and northeastern Pakistan (while also touching a northeastern flank of Afghanistan), Kashmir encompasses several sets of disputed borders. “Greater Kashmir,” as it were, can be subdivided into five regions: The Northern Areas and Azad (“Free”) Kashmir under Pakistani
control (the former is annexed, while the latter is nominally autonomous); the Kashmir Vale, Jammu, and Ladakh under India control, and Aksai Chin (together with a small strip of land north of the Northern Areas wilfully ceded by Pakistan in 1963) under Chinese control. The Kashmir dispute, in its bilateral India–Pakistan guise, dates back to 1947 and the partition of the Indian Subcontinent. Maharaja Hari Singh, a British-backed hereditary Hindu ruler in a predominantly Muslim principality, remained for a number of months irresolute about which future federation to accede to, hoping perhaps for independent statehood. According to Indian sources, he finally agreed to join the Indian dominion on 27 October 1947, in return for military assistance against a Muslim revolt supported by tribesmen from across the border with Pakistan. Yet Pakistan, and independent historians, have challenged the Instrument of Accession as either fictive or legally invalid. The cease-fire line in the first Indo–Pak War of 1947, in which India captured two-thirds of Kashmir, came to separate Pakistan-held Kashmir from India-held Kashmir ever since. As a principle enshrined in several UN resolutions pertaining to the dispute, a plebiscite was supposed to follow, allowing the Kashmiris to exercise their right of self-determination. To date, however, there has been no plebiscite, due to Indian obstructionism and Pakistan resisting military withdrawal. Pakistan’s policy, nonetheless, has been a consistent call for a plebiscite in Kashmir, including the Kashmir Vale, where Indian security forces have increasingly engaged in human and civil rights violations in response to, or simply adjacent to, militant resistance. Yet Pakistan has held no plebiscite in the territories under its own administration, nor has official Pakistan favoured the third option of independence in addition to the two options of accession (to Pakistan or India). India’s position has either been that Pakistan was illegitimately occupying parts of its territory and sponsoring “cross-border terror” to take more (the hawkish approach) or, as seemed to be the tacit resolution at the 1971 Simla Accords, to graduate the Line of Control into international border (the dovish line). To both nations, Kashmir is, in addition to being part of a geopolitical calculus, a matter of national identity: Can a secular, but Hindu-majority, India reconcile itself with its only Muslim-majority state? Can Pakistan’s very raison d’être as a homeland for Muslims of South Asia remain unchallenged if it allows a Muslim Kashmir to remain with India? All literature on the intricate Kashmir dispute is contested, but see e.g. Alastair Lamb’s important trilogy, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991); Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994); and Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947–48 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1997). For a review of later developments, see R.G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

See Resolution 21/19–(P) (CFM)/1990.


As reported in “Chief Executive seeks Arab support on Kashmir issue,” Dawn, 17 February 2000.
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160 Burke, Mainsprings, p. 204.
161 Baba, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, p. 34.
166 Ibid., pp. 60–8.
171 The Monroe Doctrine was enunciated by President James Monroe on 2 December 1823. According to it the United States would bar European powers from establishing or re-establishing colonies and even exerting controlling influence in the Western Hemisphere, which was to remain a US sphere of influence. The doctrine has remained a firm pillar of US foreign policy ever since and was famously reiterated by Presidents Polk and T. Roosevelt, the latter of whom added the corollary that the US could intervene in Latin America to protect its interests (a corollary that could, and did, lead to preventive or rectificatory invasions). See e.g. D.W. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to US Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999).
Perspectives (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1996).
176 Resolution 24/26–(P)/1999 (CFM), entitled “The establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia” (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, July 1999).
181 Ibid., pp. 74–6.
185 One commentator, otherwise hardly sympathetic to militocracies, is thus forced to concede, “When it comes to government-sponsored human rights abuse, even Musharraf’s authoritarian regime has been a good deal less dictatorial than several of the civilian governments that preceded it.” See A. Lieven, “The Pressures on Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 1 (2002), p. 110.
187 In the immediate aftermath of its nuclear blast, Pakistan approached the Islamic Development Bank to compensate, generously, the loss of foreign aid. For details see the Pakistani Daily Dawn, 7 August 1998, or the Indian Daily The Hindu, 29 October 1998.
189 This wording is from resolution 17/11–(P)/1980 (CFM). See also resolutions 1/EOS/1980 (CFM), 2/EOS/1980 (CFM) and the Final Declaration (CFM), Islamabad, January 1980.
190 The fifteenth ICFM (Sana’a, December 1984) initiated this trend, in particular in the context of the Arab–Israeli feud. At the same time, OIC resolutions began questioning the efficacy of UN resolutions 242 and 338 as the guiding principles of an Arab–Israeli settlement—a disbelief, which has since been reversed.
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193 Intra-ummatic integration implies an intensification of economic and political interaction among Islamic states. In the fiscal year of 1994 the poor state of the former was expressed by inter-OIC export amounting to 7.8 per cent of all export by OIC countries, whilst inter-OIC import figured 10.8 per cent. Of this, three-quarters are composed of primary products, especially hydrocarbons. See M.A. Choudury, Reforming the Muslim World (London: Kegan Paul, 1998), p. 217.

4 SELF-IDENTITY IN FOREIGN POLICY


20 Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 258.
21 In this I differ somewhat from Hammond, “Culture versus Civilization,” pp. 127–33. Hammond, however, has the disadvantage of relying exclusively on Huntington’s parsimonious articles of 1993, not his later and more elaborate treatise, which forms the basis of my argument.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

2002), which, on the backdrop of the terror attacks of September 2001, could complain about the loss of the American creed due to internal non-socialization and immigration-without-assimilation.

26 See the important volume, E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

27 See e.g. D.A. Theophylactou, Security, Identity, and Nation Building (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), for excessive determinism. Needless to say that Huntington, too, lacks this “intervening variable.”

28 Mazarui, Cultural Forces, p. 8.


35 D. George, “Pax Islamica: An Alternative New World Order?,” in Sidahmed and Ehteshami (eds), Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 75. David George is somewhat imprecise in his terminology, leading him to state, it appears, the opposite of what he means.


See A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) for an original contribution to this aspect of International Relations.


The conceptual differentiation between “rationalist” and “reflectivist” theory derives from Robert Keohane; see e.g. his chapter “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), pp. 158–79.


Interestingly, Noam Chomsky’s name and fame arose when he, from the viewpoint of a secular linguist, discovered the universal generative grammar that is inert in all human beings as a basic template for language. Although Chomsky would resist such interpretation, the generic universalism of language structures could vindicate a creationist viewpoint. See e.g. N. Chomsky, *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory* (New York: Plenum Press, 1978). For a less-than-esoteric discussion, see D. Cogswell, *Chomsky for Beginners* (New York: Writers and Readers, 1996).


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56 The seasoned, and largely sympathetic, observer of Islam, Graham Fuller, has in a recent essay described this phenomenon in the following words: “When Westerners talk about political ideals, they naturally hark back to the Magna Carta, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution. Muslims [instead] go back to the Koran and the Hadith to derive general principles of good governance (including the ruler’s obligation to consult the people) and concepts of social and economic justice.” Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 2 (2002), p. 50.


61 Albeit not explicit, Albert Hourani seems to be indicating this in his “Conclusion”; see J.P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), pp. 228–9.


63 The grandson of the Prophet, Imam Hussein ibn Ali’s martyrdom with seventy-two members of the *ahlul-bayt* (the Prophet’s household) in 680 CE provides the paradigmatic event in Shi’i historiography and the matrix for later Shi’i discourses on persecution, perseverance, sacrifice and, ultimately, martyrdom. As a symbol of the simplistic–dualistic battle
between good and evil, righteousness and wickedness, the oppressor and the disinherited, the stories of Shi'i heroes have provided the ideological resources for much political and military mobilization, especially so in the 8-year war against Iraq.

64 Halliday, *Nation and Religion*, p. 38.
67 This social science concept was introduced by W.B. Gallie, see e.g. W.B. Gallie, *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964).
73 R.D. Crane, “New Directions for American Foreign Policy: Some Thoughts for Macromodeling,” *Orbis*, vol. 13, no. 2 (1969), pp. 464–7. Robert Crane was then the Director of Third World Studies at the Hudson Institute; he later became foreign policy advisor to President Nixon and was appointed US Ambassador to the UAE by President Reagan in 1981. He now heads the Center for Policy Research and is the Chairman of the Center for Understanding Islam.
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84 Juergensmeyer, *New Cold War*, p. 117.


89 Ibid., p. 84.

90 See e.g. Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States*.


97 Ibid., p. 13.


100 Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 397.
103 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 366.

5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

3 Resolution 21/26(P)/1999 (CFM), Section on “The Development Taking Place in the World, Especially in Eastern and Central Europe and their Impact on the Islamic World” (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, July 1999).
10 Hence the true motive of the Conference may well have been the following declaration: “The Conference calls on all the Palestinian people to rally around its National Authority under the leadership of President Yasser Arafat” (see Final Communiqué, Tenth Extraordinary ICFM, Doha, 10 December 2001).


13 Of course, this liturgy never amounted to an official doctrine. It was in use in the immediate aftermath of the serial nuclear blasts in South Asia, subsequent to which the United States penalized the two proliferants with comprehensive sanctions. A few months later, when US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, the US President put aside his dictum and decided to use nearly eighty Tomahawk cruise missiles from vessels in the Arabian and Red Seas to meter out a pounding to a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant, Al-Shifa, wrongfully as it turned out, suspected of producing the nerve agent VX for use in chemical weapons. Deprived of the biggest pharmaceutical factory in the African state, mortality (especially child mortality) soared, with ten thousands of deaths caused by malaria, tuberculosis, and other treatable diseases. No official apology from the United States, however, was forthcoming, much less medical and humanitarian aid. See e.g. D. Hirst, “The ‘Secret’ Factory that No One Tried to Hide,” *Guardian*, 23 August 1998 (online); V. Loeb, “Ex-CIA Analyst: Al Shifa not What US Claimed,” *Washington Post*, 30 March 1999, A15; and J. Risen and D. Johnston, “Experts Find no Arms at Bombed Sudan Plant,” *New York Times*, 9 February 1999, A1.


18 Choudury, *Reforming the Muslim World*, p. 217.


23 Such lingo occurs in A. Ehteshami, “Islamic Governance in Post-Khomeini Iran,” in Sidahmed and Ehteshami (eds), *Islamic Fundamentalism* and re-occurs in Ehteshami’s *Emirates Occasional Paper*. Needless to say, that such phraseology is largely meaningless as it is employed only in order to explain its own activation and thus entirely tautological as an explanatory category.


26 Ibid., p. 78.

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